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Synopsis
This thesis investigates the reasons for the idiosyncratic politicization of 
religion and the Church in Greece and Cyprus, and seeks to account for the 
production, development and propagation of religious nationalism and the 
sacralisation of politics in these two countries. It is a study of the birth (1830- 
1864), development, and contemporary mutation (1974-2000) of the 'Helleno- 
Christian' nationalist discourse, which reached its zenith, not in Greece, 
where it was born, but in Cyprus, immediately before and after independence 
(1950- 1974). The aim of the project is to explain the political processes 
whereby this ideology (Helleno-Christianism) attained a hegemonic status in 
the Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures, and to account for the present 
eminence of this prominent type of Greek nationalism.
Hopefully, this thesis fulfils a threefold purpose: firstly, it covers 
important gaps in the relevant historiography on Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
nationalisms. This 'historical' task is carried out through the analysis of the 
important role of the Orthodox Church in the consolidation of Greek and 
Greek-Cypriot national identities. Secondly, this case study is used as a test 
ground for an alternative theoretical framework in the study of nationalism 
which may offer solutions to the practical and theoretical problems of the 
dominant modernist paradigm. Thirdly, a comparative approach to the study 
of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in Cyprus is adopted- to my 
knowledge, for the first time- in the following pages.
There are two main research questions to be answered by this project: 
Why and how religion in Greece and Cyprus has been politicized in such 
manner so that Orthodoxy and nationalism became so closely associated? 
And, what are the results of this politicization in terms of contemporary 
Church policy, and national identity awareness in contemporary Greece and 
Cyprus? In other words, the logic that will be underlying my argument is that 
in order to understand contemporary Greek nationalism, one has to look back 
at its formative period.
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Acronyms:
AKEL [A.K.E.A]: Communist Party of Cyprus 
EOKA [E.O.K.A]: National Union of Cypriot Fighters 
KEK [K.E.K.]: Free Citizens Rally (Greek centrist party)
KKE [K.K.E]: Communist Party of Greece
LAOS [AA.O.Z]: People's Orthodox Rally (Greek far right party)
ND [N.A]: New Democracy (Greek centre-right party)
PASOK [IIA.ZO.K]: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Greek centre left 
party)
SYRIZA [ZY.PIZ.A]: Coalition of the Radical Left (Greek leftist party)
Notes:
* The names of Greek and Greek-Cypriot authors are transliterated
* Greek titles are translated by the author. Original titles in Greek are cited in 
parentheses
* Quotes from Greek are translated by the author, unless stated otherwise. 
The original Greek texts are cited in footnotes, whenever there is a possibility 
of ambiguity in the translation.
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Chapter I: Introduction
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LI Prologue
The first article of the first constitutional text of m odern Greece, the 
"Epidaurus Constitution" of 1821, classifies as Greeks "all natives 
[autochthonous] who believe in Christ".1 The phraseology of this sentence is 
indicative of the views of the first revolutionaries regarding the components 
of Neo-Hellenic identity. The newborn Greek nation was defined by a certain 
territory (hence the use of the word 'natives'); a certain language (the text was 
written in an artificially archaic Greek dialect, which came to be called 
katharevousa); and a particular religion (Orthodox Christianity). Scholars of 
nationalism would not find it difficult to explain the implicit reference to 
language and geography. Claims to a geographical 'fatherland' are shared by 
all nationalist movements. Similarly, allusions to a 'glorious past' are far from 
uncommon in most nationalist declarations. But why Orthodoxy? If 
nationalism is a social by-product of modernity, as most scholars in the field 
have been arguing, then a centralized state, a common vernacular, a common 
citizenship, and a common economy would be enough for the consolidation 
of a Greek identity. Nonetheless, in the aforementioned arch-definition of the 
Greek nation, the emphasis is placed on the Orthodox identity of the referent 
population. In the first three Greek revolutionary constitutions (1822-1827), 
there is not even clear distinction between the notions of 'Greek citizen' and
1 C i t e d  i n  V a s i l i s  R a f a i l id i s ,  1 9 9 3 . Icnopia (KajiiKOTpayiKri) to d  NeoeXkrjviKOD K p d ioD g, 1 8 3 0 -1 9 7 4  
[A  H is to r y  o f  th e  M o d e m  G reek  S ta te ] ,  ( A th e n s :  E iK o o ro u n p c b x o n ) ,  p .4 4 5  ( O r i g i n a l  t e x t  i n  G r e e k :
O o o i  crDTOxSovE^ KOTOiKoi x i]5 e m K p a r E ia s  E X A dS o^, niC TT E douaiv E15 X p ia x o v ,  ’E A A ijves 
E ia iv . . . ) .  S e e  a l s o  a p p e n d i x .
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'Greek Orthodox Christian'.2 One can observe in these constitutions two 
noteworthy parameters regarding Greek identity. First, the fact that it was not 
self-evident who was 'Greek', and therefore had to be somehow defined w ith 
reference to specific criteria, and, second, the crucial role of Orthodoxy in 
identifying 'Greekness' in a rather exclusionary manner.
Even if, for some reason, Orthodoxy was necessary back in the 
formative period of Greek nationalism, w hat is more peculiar for the 
contemporary observer is that Orthodoxy and Greekness are still inseparably 
linked in our epoch. Even today, the Greek constitution uses a sanctified 
language, which denotes the close links between Hellenism and Orthodoxy, 
while Orthodoxy is the established religion in Greece (article 3 of the 1974 
constitution, even after the 1986 and 2001 revisions).3 Since the declaration of 
independence, the close ties between the 'Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church 
of Greece' and the Greek nation have been reinforced and re-affirmed. In the 
words of the former Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis, in a speech he 
gave in 1981, while in office:
The nation and Orthodoxy...have become in the Greek 
conscience virtually synonymous concepts, which together 
constitute our Helleno-Christian civilization.4 
The equivalence between Orthodoxy and national identity is equally 
solid in Cyprus. When the first constitution for an independent Cyprus was
2 A. Paparizos, 2000. "Aiacpcoxiojio  ^ ©prjaKria Kai napaSooij an] ZuyXpovT] EAArjvLKr) 
Koivoovia" [Enlightenment, Religion and Tradition in Modem Greek Society]', in Nicos Demertzis 
(ed.), H EXkr\WKi] IIohTiK r} KooXrovpa Zrjyepa [Greek Political Culture Today], (Athens: 
OSoaoEa^, 3rd ed.), p. 89
3 See appendix
4 Cited in Kallistos Ware, 1983. "The Church: A Time for Transition," in Richard Clogg, (ed.), 
Greece in the 1980s (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1983), p.208
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drafted in the late 1950s (towards the end of the British rule in the island), the 
British Empire -and everyone else involved, including the local population, 
Greece, and Turkey- considered it natural to delineate membership in one of 
the two main ethnicities of the island according to religious criteria: that is, 
whoever was Orthodox was Greek and whoever was Muslim was Turk.5 
Ethnicity, nationhood, citizenship, and religion were thus conflated, with 
profound consequences for the island. Later, the archbishop of the Church of 
Cyprus became president of the Cypriot Republic, and he was referred to as 
the Ethnarch (i.e. the father of the nation).
This dissertation problematizes the relationship between Orthodoxy 
and Greekness. Why is being Orthodox considered an almost necessary pre­
requisite for being Greek? Why was Orthodoxy instrumental for the 
consolidation of the Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot national identity? 
W hat are the reasons of the heavy politicization of the Church and of the 
Orthodox tradition in Greece and Cyprus? If the Orthodox Churches in 
Greece and Cyprus are politicized, what kind of political discourse do they 
produce? And finally, what are the results of the nationalization of religion in 
these two countries?
I.IL Orthodoxy and Greek Public Culture
Anywhere you look in Greece, the presence of Orthodoxy is 
remarkable. For instance, in Serifos, a small tourist destination island in the 
Cyclades complex, which has a population of about 1,000 habitants,
5 See appendix
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according to the 2001 census, there are 117 churches, that is to say more than 
one church for every ten locals. During religious celebrations on nearby 
islands, army units are deployed to honour holy icons. Each evening, soldiers 
in most Greek army camps pray to God "to keep the Greek nation and its 
army safe, and to send His Angels to protect them".6 Holy icons decorate the 
walls of public and government offices. The Greek Constitution derives its 
legitimacy from the "Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity".7 The 
president of the Greek Republic and the country's parliamentarians are 
inaugurated w ith a religious oath in the presence of Athens's archbishop, 
who is also an honorary guest in all official government ceremonies. A 
relatively recent dispute between the Church of Greece and the ecumenical 
patriarchate over the ecclesiastical regime in parts of northern Greece became 
a major political issue, in which Greek political parties struggled to keep their 
neutrality.
The last census on the religious attachments of Greeks was conducted 
in 1951. According to it, 96.7 percent of Greeks considered themselves 
members of the Greek Orthodox Church.8 In 1991, a Eurobarometer survey 
showed that 98.2 percent of Greeks are Orthodox Christians.9 The 2008 CIA
6 Official evening prayer of the Greek A r m y  (original text in Greek: A e o n o x a  n a v r o K p d r o o p ,  o  
K a r a ^ id b o a s  i p id $  6 i e \ 0 e iv  t o  |if|K O $ xi]$ i p i e p a s  x a n x q ^ ,  n p o o S e ^ a i  x a $  e o n e p i v a ^  q p c b v  
6 e f |o e u ; K a i  K a r d n e p i p o v  t o  n \ r | 0 o ^  t o o  eX eo o s Z o o  e n i  n a v r a ^  r | | i d s  x o o $  S e o p e v o o ^  Zoo. 
T o ix io o v  rjpa< ; t o i $  A y io i$  A y y ^ o i s  Zoo, n e p ix a p d K c o o o o v  r ) |id $  t i \ a \ r ] 0 E ia  Zoo, t p p o d p r jo o v  
r |p d $  t i ]  6 o v a p e i  Zoo, cpvXa^ov vied vt\v m cem jv Zoo tov Zipaiov m i cutav to EXhjviKov 'Edvog, 
n a p a a x o o  6 e  i p i i v  K a i  t i \v  a iE p x o p e v q v  v o K x a  £ ip r]v iK f|v  K a i  a v a p a p r q T O V ,  K a i  n a o a < ;  x a $  
U p e p a ^  xr]9 £cof)<; rjp co v . n p e o p e i a i ^  xi]$ Y n E p a y ia ^  ip icb v  0 e o t 6 k o o ,  K a i  n d v x o a v  xcov A y ic o v , 
A p f jv ) .
7 See preamble of Greek Constitutions (appendix)
8 Kallistos Ware, Op. Cit.
9 Yannis Stavrakakis, 2002 "Religion and Populism: Reflections on the 'Politicised7 Discourse 
of the Greek Orthodox Church," Hellenic Observatory, Discussion Paper No. 7, European 
Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 5
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World Factbook places this figure at 98 percent. This trend does not appear to 
vary significantly when it comes to the younger generation, since a 2002 
Eurobarometer survey showed that Greek youths (ages 15-24) are the most 
religious in Europe after the Irish.10 A recent European Social Survey shows 
that church attendance levels in Greece are on the rise and among the highest 
in Europe.11 Moreover, the level of those who do not attend church services at 
all has dropped over the past few years. The attitude of Greeks towards 
Orthodoxy is exemplified in the words of a Greek dentist, as it is narrated by 
the author Kallistos Ware: "Personally I am an atheist; but because I am 
Greek, I am of course a member of the Orthodox Church".12
But what is the response of the Church to the strong feelings of 
affiliation of the Greek people? What is certain is that the Orthodox Churches 
in both Greece and Cyprus have always been operating as political 
institutions. But this fact in itself is not anything new. Unless one accepts that 
Churches are divine organizations or messengers of the will of God, the 
political nature of these institutions is indisputable. Like all other religious 
institutions, Christian Churches have had to defend their place within the 
public sphere of a particular social milieu (in this case, the nation-state). 
Consequently, their politicization was inevitable. Indeed, it is doubtful if a 
depoliticized religion ever existed.
10 The survey was conducted throughout the 15 pre-enlargement EU countries; see 
umnv.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archive/flash_arch.htm
11 The results can be found online at umnv.ekke.gr/ess and unmv.europeansocialsuroey.org. For 
relevant articles, see EXevdepomma [Eleftherotypia] and Kadrjjiepivr] [Kathimerini] (both 
November 6,2003).
12Kallistos Ware, Op. Cit., p. 205
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Therefore, the questions that we will be asking in this dissertation will 
be focused on the nature of the politicization of the Orthodox Churches in 
Greece and Cyprus, rather than with the question of whether they are 
politicized or not. More specifically, the focus will be on the relationship 
between these Churches and nationalist ideologies. The existence of this link 
is well-known to all those who have an interest in Modern Greek studies, but 
under-investigated in the relevant literature. The Economist 'Intelligence Unit' 
summarized the nationalization of religion in Greece as follows:
The Orthodox Church regards itself as the repository of 
Hellenism during the 400 years of Ottoman rule and the first 
150 years of the struggle to establish the Modern Greek state.
The church argues that over the past 20 years the Socialists have 
adopted an increasingly secular stance in order to achieve 
European and international acceptance. This, according to 
Archbishop Christodoulos, has underm ined the unique Greek 
cultural heritage of which the church considers itself the 
guardian (The identification of the church with a Hellenistic 
state was best embodied in Cyprus, where the first head of state 
at independence was Archbishop Makarios, who was also 
known to the Greek Cypriots as the Ethnarch, essentially the 
embodiment of the state in the person of the cleric). Archbishop 
Christodoulos has repeatedly spoken out in public against what 
he considers the corrosive influence of the EU on the spiritual 
and nationalist character of Hellenism. He has likened the EU to
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a grinder making mincemeat of the national identities of 
member states and refers disparagingly to the "Euro-craving" of 
Greek politicians.13
As the Economist columnist rightly points out, the identification of Greekness 
with Orthodoxy has been even more evident in the case of the Greek-Cypriot 
community. The paradox here is that Christianity (unlike Judaism for 
example) is an ecumenical religion, and not an ethnically-specific one.
Nonetheless, the Church responded to the strong feelings of affiliation 
of the Greek public by acting as a political agent whose basic aim is to counter 
the effects of the 'westernization' of Greece by articulating a nationalist 
discourse, while at the same time protecting and prom oting its political 
privileges. It appears to regard itself as the guardian of the 'Greek identity' 
and continuously interferes in Greek political affairs. This Church policy 
came into direct antithesis with the spirit of secularization of the Socialists 
(PASOK), one of the two major parties in the Greek political landscape. At the 
same time, it has often brought the current centre-right government into a 
difficult position. Several bishops have repeatedly intervened in the media of 
the country, demanding that the Greek governments should adopt a more 
aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM). Moreover, the case of an exchange of public lands 
with a lake which "belonged" to a monastery in northern Greece proved to be 
a scandal that has turned the tide in Greek politics.
13 See the Economist, 7/6/2000
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The liberal view with regard to the societal role of the Church is quite 
clear, and suggests that the practice of religion should be confined to the 
private sphere. This tension between the traditionalist discourse of the 
Church and the reluctant, yet westernization-oriented, public policies of the 
Greek governments is becoming increasingly important for Greek politics, 
since it creates cultural and political tensions in the Greek society. For 
example, as it will become obvious in the following chapters, the influence of 
the church in Greek society has obliged the governments to avoid 
compromises in a series of foreign policy disputes with its neighbours.
In Cyprus, on the other hand, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that 
the Church's involvement in nationalist politics has altered the history of the 
island. Not only has the Church been involved in the anti-imperialist struggle 
against the British, but it also actively participated in the government of the 
island until 1977, since its archbishop, Makarios, stayed in office as a 
president for 17 years. More recently, the Church's fierce opposition to the 
reunification plan put forward by the United Nations demonstrated its 
continuing commitment to Helleno-Christian nationalism.
This thesis will study the development of the aforementioned religious 
nationalist political discourse in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. It 
seeks to investigate the reasons for the politicization of religion and the 
Church, to account for the production, development and propagation of 
religious nationalism and sacralisation of politics, and to explain the 
paradoxical way in which the Orthodox Church has acted as a nationalist
political and cultural institution, while its canonical tradition, the Gospel, and
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its Byzantine past were inherently ecumenical in character. It is a study of the 
birth (1833-1871), development, and contemporary mutation (1998-2006) of 
the "Helleno-Christian" nationalist discourse. The aim of the project is to 
explain the political processes whereby this ideology attained a hegemonic 
status in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures, and to account for the 
present eminence of this prominent type of Greek nationalism.
I.III. Greece, Cyprus and the Wider Picture
Our line of argument is that the study of the link between religion and 
nationalism in Greece and Cyprus is an important enterprise for historical, 
theoretical, and political reasons. The study of the conflation between religion 
and nationalism in Greece and Cyprus is important in itself as an effort to 
understand the political culture of these two countries. As it was mentioned 
before, the tension between the traditionalist discourse of the Church, the 
New-Orthodox theories of a significant number of acclaimed intellectuals and 
the westernization-oriented policies of the Greek governments creates 
cultural and political tensions in the Greek society. Outcomes of the present 
'identity7 conflict (which one may argue is an everlasting feature of Greek 
politics since independence) will almost certainly affect the future of this 
country. In Cyprus, whose entrance into the European Union has revived 
international interest for reunification, the stance of the Church towards 
peace efforts is of seminal importance for their chances of success.
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Secondly, the type of nationalism described above is, according to the 
view of many commentators, a worrying social phenomenon. As Greece 
becomes an increasingly multicultural society, the identification of Greekness 
with Orthodoxy lays the basis for social conflict and unrest. Over the last 
decade, more than one million immigrants have settled in Greece, and, 
naturally, not all of them embrace the Orthodox religion. Moreover, Greece 
has a sizeable Muslim minority in Western Thrace, a small Slav-speaking 
population in the province of Macedonia, a Roma minority dispersed around 
the country, as well as some increasingly populous communities of Roman 
Catholics, Protestants, Evangelists, Jewish and Jehovah's Witnesses. All these 
religious and ethnic minorities find it difficult to effectively integrate in a 
'Greece of Greek Orthodox Christians'.14
In Cyprus on the other hand, the side-effects of Helleno-Christianism 
are, more or less, well known. The failure to construct a Cypriot national 
identity which would replace existing 'ethno-religious identities' played a 
crucial role in the outbreak of civil unrest, ethnic fragmentation, and the 
subsequent dichotomisation of the country. Ethnic identities have and will 
continue to play an important role in influencing the political situation of the 
island. In light of an attempt to reunite the two communities on the basis of a 
federate or confederate model, the importance of Orthodoxy in drawing 
frontiers between the communities needs to be investigated.
Part of the present work is focused on an im portant period of Balkan
history: the era of the birth of Balkan nations in the 19th century. It has been
14 Nicos Demertzis, 1997 "Greece", in Eatwell, R., (ed.), European Political Cultures: Conflict or 
Convergence?, (London: Routledge) p. 113
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argued that some of the other Balkan nationalisms (e.g. Bulgarian 
nationalism) were formed as a reaction to the successes of Greek nationalism 
and irredentism.15 They were, in a sense, counter-nationalisms. Similarly, 
Turkish Cypriot ethno-nationalism was definitely influenced and augmented 
by the explosion of Greek-Cypriot 'irredentist ethno-nationalism' during the 
late 1940's. The success of Greek nationalism has had a profound effect on the 
eventual resolution of the 'Eastern Question', and the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire. Despite the fact that the investigation of these issues is not the main 
focus of the present enquiry, the historical account offered here may shed 
some light at least to a historical epoch which has become obscure due to the 
effects of nationalist historiography.
Additionally, the present research work addresses questions of 
citizenship and identity, as it enquires into the role of religion in influencing 
the content of concepts such as citizenship, otherness, exclusion, and national 
identity in non-secularized, yet liberal, systems of government. Undoubtedly, 
issues of identity are becoming increasingly pertinent in the globalized world 
of late modernity. However, in the field of nationalism studies, the treatment 
of the concept of identity has been, to say the least, trivial. There are two main 
reasons for that: firstly, political analysis is being increasingly dominated by a 
natural sciences type research model. Comparative institutional studies, and 
rational choice approaches to societal phenomena and hum an behaviour, 
have jettisoned alternative paradigms to the periphery of the discipline. The
15 Roudometof, Victor, 2000. 'The Social Origins of Balkan Politics: Nationalism, 
Underdevelopment, and the Nation-State in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880-1920', in 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 144-163.
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second reason for the underdevelopment of the 'identity issue' in the study of 
nationalism is the hegemonic position of the modernist paradigm in the 
relevant literature. This paradigm usually tends to place its emphasis on the 
economic and political dimensions of nation-building, thus overlooking the 
importance of cultural aspects. "The result of this state of affairs is that 
identity is becoming fashionable as a word without, however, its meaning as 
a theoretical category and a tool for analysis becoming more clear in the 
process. Such problems in conceptual clarity and theoretical rigour have 
serious analytical repercussions".16 Not only are questions left unanswered 
with regard to the emergence and persistence of national identities, but such 
questions are not even being asked by many modernist scholars of 
nationalism.
The issue of the relations between church and state is closely 
associated with the wider topic of the relations between state and civil 
society,17 and the results from this study of religious nationalism may be used 
in order to provide further insight into topics such as public discourse, identity- 
construction, populism, or the return of God to politics. Especially this last issue 
has lately draw n considerable attention in social sciences, and not w ithout a 
reason.
In his book Dieu est-il fanatique ?,18 Jean Daniel argues that Europe is re­
enchanted, meaning that religion has regained its significant position in
16 Yannis Stavrakakis, 2005. "Passions of Identification: Discourse, Enjoyment, and European 
Identity", in David Howarth, & Jacob Torfing (eds.) Discourse Theory and European Politics, 
(London: Palgrave)
17 Evangelos Venizelos, 2000. Ot Zjeaezg Mera§v Kpazovc, m i ExKlrjoiag [The Relationship between 
State and Church], (Thessalonica, napcrn]pi]Tf|$), p. 28
18 Jean Daniel, Dieu, Est-Il Fanatique?, (Paris, Alr£a: 1996)
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European politics. The phenomena, which mainly manifest the 'return of 
God' to politics are, the rise of political Islam, the spread of various religious 
groups and sects in Europe, the resurgence of Christian Churches in Eastern 
Europe after the end of the Cold War, the growing influence of Buddhism, 
the renaissance of Jewish Orthodoxy, and the growing influence of religion in 
contemporary ethical philosophy (e.g. Alasdair Macintyre, Emanuel Levinas) 
and politics.19 At the same time, religious right is revived throughout the 
Western world and the ex-president of a secular superpower was a self- 
declared 'reborn Christian'. The aforementioned phenomena discredit these 
historical and philosophical views, which perceive modernity as a linear 
process towards rationalization and secularization of society.20 The revived 
religious discourses in Europe usually are, according to some commentators 
in the field, "religions without God, and should be better understood as 
sources of personal, ethnic, and cultural identification, rather than as 
confessions of faith" 21 The return of religion to politics illustrates that the 
processes of Western European integration and globalization do not 
automatically dilute the forces of communal fragmentation and nationalism 
in Europe.
However, one may argue that any conclusions draw n from the present 
project regarding the general issues discussed above may be valid only if they 
are subject to comparative analysis and verification/falsification within a 
different social context beyond the Greek and Greek-Cypriot case. Despite the
19 Stavros Zoumboulakis, 2002. O 0eog aujv TloXt] [God in the City] (Athens: Ecrcia), p. 18
20Yannis Stavrakakis., "Religion and Populism...", p.13
21 Stavros Zoumboulakis Op. Cit. p. 52
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fact that comparative testing is definitely invaluable as a method of social 
research, this is not undermining the importance of 'case-study' as a central 
feature to social enquiry in itself. Especially the case-study of Greek 
nationalism becomes particularly interesting due to a specific distinctiveness 
that characterizes it: Greek nationalism is, so to speak, 'geographically 
dispersed'. It has been developed in mainland Greece, in Cyprus, and in large 
Diaspora communities around the world. To my knowledge, a 
comprehensive comparative study of the varied facets of Greek nationalism 
in mainland Greece and in Cyprus has not yet been undertaken. Due to 
academic and methodological limitations, the inclusion of the nationalism of 
Greek Diasporas was not possible in this essay. Despite that, the parallels 
draw n between Greece and Cyprus in this case-study signify a step towards a 
comparative approach to Greek nationalism.
Additionally, the present thesis will allow for the testing of a series of 
hypotheses with regard to the study of nationalism. More specifically, the 
arguments here pose a challenge to the heuristic value of modernism and 
modernization theory in the field of nationalism studies. Instead, an 
alternative theoretical framework is adopted, one which, hopefully, can offer 
a more convincing analysis of the emergence and longevity of nationalist 
ideologies. The extent to which this theoretical framework can correspond to 
empirical observations in the cases of Greece and Cyprus will generate useful 
conclusions with regard to its validity. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
general conclusions about national identity formation can be draw n from this
study will be judged by the reader. Before moving on to the discussion of the
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theoretical outlook which will be used in the following chapters, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the basic research questions and 
hypotheses of this thesis.
I.jy. Research Questions and Hypotheses
The thesis will attempt to challenge existing theorizations of the 
development of Greek nationalism, by focusing on two moments in Greek 
history: i) The period of national identity(-ies) formation in Greece between 
1830-1871, and ii) The post-dictatorial period (metapolitefsi), especially in the 
years between 1998 and 2004, when there is for the first time a serious 
disruption in the harmonious relations between Church and State in Greece, 
while at the same time a secular 'Cypriotist' nationalism is being developed 
in Cyprus. Developments in national identity consolidation in Greece will be 
contrasted w ith parallel developments in Cyprus.
There are two main research questions to be answered by this research 
project: First of all, how and why religion in Greece and Cyprus has been 
politicized in such a manner that Orthodoxy and nationalism became so 
closely associated? And secondly, what are the results of this politicization in 
terms of contemporary Church policy, and national identity awareness in 
contemporary Greece and Cyprus? In other words, the logic that will be 
underlying my argum ent is that in order to understand contemporary Greek 
and Greek-Cypriot nationalism, one has to look back at its formative period, 
when the equivalence between national and religious identities was 
established.
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Hypotheses:
1) In the course of modern history, both in Greece and Cyprus, where it 
has held an active and critical political function, in the formation and 
reshaping of the idea of the nation, the Church assumed the role of a 
political institution and ideological mechanism, which has been 
disseminating to the values of Greek nationalism and functioned as a 
national religion. However, it has been increasingly difficult for the 
Church to compromise with lesser political power and influence, as 
both its agents and institutions have held relatively stable identities.
2) Efforts made by the state and some intellectuals to articulate and 
promote a secular political mechanism in Greece and Cyprus were 
unfruitful due to the prevailing of the 'Helleno-Christian' thesis for 
three reasons (independent variables) : i) As it was based on folklore 
traditions, symbols, myths and recollections linked to the past of the 
majority of the population, it was compatible with a number of 
identities (familial, communal, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and citizen 
identities) assumed during the periods under research and thus held a 
great degree of familiarity, connecting Greek people to pre-modern 
and pre-national existing collective ties. What we now call Helleno- 
Christianity became a particular system of meaning, encompassing a 
number of practices, for example churchgoing, expressing animosity 
towards the Turks or using archaic Greek, and was thus experienced 
by individuals as the "Greek way of life". Consequently, by replacing
a previous symbolic order with recognizable symbols under a new
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nationalist ideological structure, these contingent and otherwise 
isolated practices acquired meaning within this new symbolic order, ii) 
The birth and supremacy of Helleno-Christianism was further assisted 
by the legal and political position of the Churches of Greece and 
Cyprus. In order to reinforce and spread its distinctive cultural 
nationalism, the Church employed the mechanisms supplied by its 
legal position, which also enabled it to retain a certain degree of 
cultural autonomy (education, charity, Sunday masses, etc.). 
Consequently, although it was politically subjected to the secular 
authority of the state, it succeeded in preserving an extensive degree of 
sovereignty, iii) From an ideological viewpoint, 'Helleno-Christian' 
nationalism erected unyielding boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders, Greeks and non-Greeks, granting the infant nation a 
concrete collective identity. In the words of Freud: "it is always 
possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, as 
long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of 
their aggressiveness".22 By placing emphasis on the Hellenic aspect of 
the Greek identity, the Helleno-Christian discourse offered adequate 
grounding for a solid distinction between Greeks and the other 
Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire, an element that other 
forms of nationalism that were emphasizing the religious character of 
Greek identity were unable to provide. However, since the masses that 
formed the Greek nation were separated in different and fragmented
“ S. Freud, (1982:44), as cited by Yannis Stavrakakis, "Passions of Identification..."
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groups in terms of ethnicity, language and culture, an Hellenized
notion of the Greek nation was alien to the Greek people as only few 
could understand the 'language of Plato', despite the fact that they 
were mostly using Hellenic dialects.
3) The m odernization/ secularization process in Greece has been further 
complicated and obstructed by a number of hindrances created by pre­
existing cultural material and symbolic resources. The interaction of 
official westem-style institutions formed in Greece in the early period 
of independence with the local Orthodox tradition altered their
character to such an extent that it replaced a Western polity with
Eastern political culture qualities with an Eastern political culture in a 
westem-style institution context (at least during the period until 1974). 
Therefore, the functioning of western-type institutions in Greece has 
not always been harmonious, instead often quite problematic.23 
Consequently, the Church as an institution has consistently been the 
sole point of identification for Greek people, as it maintained a long 
and stable presence in Greek and Cypriot social life in the problematic 
and inharmonious context of ineffective bureaucratic politics and 
dysfunctional western-type institutions, especially in Cyprus where 
these were formed and shaped by colonization. Therefore, it is evident 
from the Greek case that pre-modern institutional structures and
23 See also Nicos Mouzelis, 1979. Modem Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London: Holmes 
& Meier), and Nicos Mouzelis, 1986. Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and 
Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (Basingstoke: Palgrave)
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political culture can obstruct the process of rationalization and 
secularization of society, thus impeding the linear process of 
modernity.
I.V. Organization of the Chapters
The main task of this chapter was to introduce the research problem of 
the dissertation at hand, make some preliminary historical remarks which 
have hopefully introduced the reader to the context of the case studies under 
investigation, problematize the current state of affairs with regard to Greek 
and Cypriot religious nationalism, and pose the research questions to be 
answered. Subsequently, the research questions were placed within a wider 
political and theoretical framework in order to demonstrate their significance 
and relevance. In short, the introduction's aim was to delineate 'w hat will be 
done in the thesis', 'w hy will it be done', and 'how it will be done' in the 
following chapters. The next chapter will be mainly concerned with the 
theoretical outlook of the thesis. After presenting a short literature review 
which, as we shall see, will reveal the gaps and inadequacies in the existing 
literature, the underlying logics of the thesis and its theoretical framework 
will be presented. Before finishing this introduction it would be useful to 
provide the reader with a short description of the main chapters of the thesis:
Chapter 3: The period of National Identities Formation- 1830-1864: The focus of 
this chapter is historical, providing an account for the emergence of different 
nationalisms, and of how these confronted each other during the period of
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nation building in Greece. The role of the Orthodox Church in the debate 
regarding the content and meaning of Greek identity will be analyzed in 
detail.
A number of different and often contrasting paradigms define this 
particular period. Articulated by a plethora of agents in different ends of the 
spectrum, we come across cases that vary from extreme republican 
nationalism to an extremely theocratic conception of the nation, and in 
between less radical but equally nationalist views. This comes in direct 
opposition with popular views of the existence of only two opposing blocs, 
the traditionalists and the modernizers and is further supported by the 
presence of other nationalist groups which cannot easily fit to a "religious/ 
non-religious" ideological spectrum.
W hat is significant here is that in this newly founded Greek state there 
was no major cosmopolitan, non-expansionist, and forward thinking political 
movement of modernizers, as it was unthinkable by the vast majority of the 
Greek people, let alone legitimate or broadly accepted. The only sign of 
progressive thinking, by today's standards, was the view that supported the 
separation of the Greek Church from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Constantinople. In today's public discourse, progress is synonymous to those 
who opposed the 'populist Archbishop Christodoulos' in support of the 
Patriarch's views against him. This irony demonstrates the relativity of 
categories such as 'progress' and 'reaction'.
Moreover, there was not a unified Church policy, or a single source of 
an 'underdog' Eastern oriented culture. Concepts, such as 'the East', 
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'Orthodoxy', 'the West', 'Byzantium', 'nation', etc. acquired different 
meanings and place within different discourses. The most peculiar example 
of such discursive ambiguities can be found in the word 'genos', which came 
to denote, under different discourses, anything from 'race', to the 'Hellenic 
Volk', and from Greek speaking populations, to the Orthodox Christians of 
the Ottoman Empire. Within this context of political, social and discursive 
struggles, a particular national imaginary attained a hegemonic position in 
Greek society. This hegemonic form of nationalist discourse was structured 
around a series of nodal propositions: i) there is a unified history of one Greek 
nation starting from the pre-Homeric era, through to Classical Greece, the 
Hellenistic epoch, the Byzantium, and continuing in m odem  Greece, ii) The 
nation is bound together by geography, history, language, and religion, iii) 
Being Orthodox Christian is an almost necessary pre-condition for being 
Greek, iv) The Greek nation is superior to almost any other nation in the 
world since Greeks are the heirs of almost all the great civilizations of the 
West (Ancient Greek, Hellenistic/Macedonian, Eastern Roman/Byzantine).
Ethno-symbolism and its emphasis on pre-national ethnic affiliations 
can explain why this particular 'Helleno-Christian' nationalism prevailed. 
Moreover, the role of legal and political arrangements that took place during 
that period should not be underestimated. The techniques of discourse 
analysis will be used in the study of this 'formative period' of Greek 
nationalism in order to illustrate how words and concepts acquired different 
meanings within the context of the ideological processes of modernity.
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Chapter 4: Aspects of the Helleno-Christian thesis in Cyprus 1950-1974: The 
paradox with Cyprus is that, until 1974, it failed to develop a Cypriot national 
identity. Greek-Cypriot nationalism was in essence a Greek ethno- 
nationalism and Greek Cypriots understood themselves first and foremost as 
Greeks and perhaps secondarily as Cypriots. The ethnic, linguistic and 
religious similarities between Greek-speaking Orthodox Cypriots and Greeks 
are not enough to explain this phenomenon. While being largely Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants, for instance, Americans gradually developed a distinct identity, 
which, of course, overrode their 'English' national identity. Similarly, 
Walloon Belgians are a national community clearly distinct from the French. 
Yet again, the role of the Orthodox Church was decisive in fostering Greek 
ethno-nationalism in Cyprus.
In this chapter, it shall be investigated how the aforementioned 
understanding of reality, society, and self-identity (Helleno-Christianism) 
was transmitted and developed to Cyprus and affected key moments in 
Greek-Cypriot history. The aim here is not to present a 'short history of 
m odern Cyprus', but to illustrate how a system of meaning mobilized 
subjects, institutions, and government decisions in critical historical junctures. 
The emphasis will be on the role of the Church of Cyprus in the development 
of ethno-nationalism in Cyprus from 1950 to 1974 (i.e. the short period 
starting with the struggle for independence and ending Turkish invasion). 
The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the Church has acted in the 
same way in Cyprus as it has in Greece, though even more actively. However, 
in the case of Cyprus, the presence of a large ethnic minority and severed 
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other small ethnic minorities triggered the production of a counter-ethno- 
nationalism on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot community.
The Church played a significant role both in disseminating religious 
ethno-nationalism, and in dividing the ethnic communities of the island. The 
constitution of Cyprus divided the two main ethnic groups of the island on 
the basis of religious criteria. This fact also illustrates the importance of 
Orthodoxy in defining ethnic identity and preventing the establishment of a 
non-ethnic Cypriot national identity. As in Greece, Helleno-Christian 
nationalism in Cyprus managed to transcend party and class differences, to 
legitimize government policies, to constitute political orthodoxy and to define 
publicly accepted social behaviours.
The analysis of Greek-Cypriot ethno-nationalist ideology will be 
conducted through the use of the techniques of discourse theory, while 
emphasis will also be placed on the importance of ethnic-symbols and myths, 
as well as on the relationship between the development of Helleno- 
Christianism in Greece and in Cyprus.
Chapter 5: The Post-Dictatorial Period 1974-2001: Since the restoration of 
democracy in Greece, the state has attempted to change the legal status of the 
Church and the ideological position of Orthodoxy in Greek society. The 
stance of the Church during the "colonels' dictatorship" may have 
contributed to boosted attempts for secularization in post-authoritarian 
Greece. On the other hand, a non-ethnic 'Cypriotist' nationalism developed in 
Cyprus, as a response to the tragic events of 1974. As we m ay note, historical 
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 32
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
contingencies can be used in this case as independent variables which may 
explain the sudden dislocation of the Church-state-nation equivalence in both 
countries (dependent variable).
In this chapter we will be critically studying the production of 
nationalism on the part of the Church and its affiliated intelligentsia in the 
post-authoritarian period, with particular emphasis in the period starting 
from the enthronement of the radical archbishop Christodoulos Paraskevaidis 
in 1998 until his sudden illness in 2006 that dispensed most politicized 
activities. More specifically, the construction of the national imaginary in the 
political discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church shall be described, and 
explain why the Church remains a nationalist institution in our era. The 
Greek Church seeks to protect the role which has been assigned to it during 
the nation building period. Such is also the case in Cyprus, where the Church 
tries to protect its 'ethnarchic' role. Moreover, the present political discourse 
of the Greek Church signifies a structural change in Greek politics, whereby 
the Church emancipates from the political influence of the state, and assumes 
the role of an autonomous political agent. Within this climate of antagonism 
between the Church and the state, a new series of competing nationalist 
doctrines has developed, which have indeed provoked a debate over the 
Renegotiation' of Greek national identity. However, religious nationalism 
remains the hegemonic form of nationalist ideology in Greek and Greek- 
Cypriot political cultures and public discourse, and this can be explained on 
the basis of the tradition that the 1830-1865 and 1950-1974 historical 
developments produced, respectively for each country. Instead of a 
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weakening of religious nationalism in Greece, we may empirically observe a 
revival of 'Helleno-Christian' ideas (among political parties, intellectual elites, 
and the Church) in the face of liberal globalisation, while in Cyprus, after an 
initial decline between 1974 and 1985, Greek ethno-nationalism started to 
gain ground again, reaching its peak during the negotiation of the U.N. peace 
and reunification plan.
One of the aims of this chapter will be to expose the problematic, 
racist, and exclusionary arguments of religious nationalism in Greece and 
Cyprus. In short, this chapter will be an account of the current state of Greek 
and Greek-Cypriot political cultures with reference to the role of religion in 
shaping nationalism and national identity in Greece and Cyprus, while it is 
also a study of social antagonisms and ideological dislocations in post-1974 
Greek and Greek-Cypriot politics.
Chapter 6: Conclusion: In the conclusion, we will attem pt to summarize the 
empirical observations with regard to the emergence and persistence of 
religious nationalism in Greece and Cyprus and draw  theoretical inferences 
from the present empirical study. In particular, we will assess the significance 
of discourse analysis as a heuristic tool for studying nationalism and the 
possibilities of using its techniques to advance the ethno-symbolist 
paradigm 's analytical validity. Moreover, we will consider the extent to 
which other concepts from classic theories of nationalism and ideology can 
supplement the methodological/technical approach of discourse analysis, 
and therefore enhance our understanding of the nationalist phenomenon. 
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Additionally, possibilities for future developments in Greek and Greek- 
Cypriot political cultures based on the 'historical lessons' draw n from this 
study will be assessed.
Finally, the chapter outlines trajectories for future research in the field 
of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. More specifically, there are three 
areas in which further research is required: i) the nationalism of the Greek 
diasporas and its relation to Orthodoxy and mainland Greek nationalism, ii) 
comparative analysis of the role of the Church in producing nationalism, 
between Greece and other Orthodox countries, and iii) comparative analysis 
between Greek nationalism and other nationalisms of the Balkan and 
Southern-Eastern European region where cultural attitudes towards the West 
are also ambivalent.
Before examining the formative period of Greek nationalism, it is 
necessary to provide a brief account of the existing literature and its 
limitations since, it is the existence of these limitations which justifies both the 
empirical and the theoretical parts of this dissertation. Moreover, the 
theoretical outlook of the thesis will be described in detail.
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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework and 
Methodology
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 36
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
Perhaps the most significant claim of this research project is that it suggests a 
novel theoretical approach, which will contribute to a most comprehensive 
understanding of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. This claim is partly 
based on the assessment of the theoretical perspectives adopted in the 
existing literature, which is indeed limited in scope and unable to explain the 
multiple facets of Helleno-Christianity, and account for its force and salience.
ILL Existing Literature and its Limitations
Nations are the primary loci of individual and collective identification 
within the milieu of modernity, and nationalism has been the most 
comprehensive, persistent, and widespread ideology of the m odem  epoch. It 
spread across continents, societies, social classes and genders. Nationalism 
divides the world into clearly defined nations- each with its own particular 
'national character'- which exist almost since time immemorial. Freedom, for 
nationalists, is inseparably linked with national-self-determination, in the 
form of political sovereignty.
Until the early 1960s very few social scientists disputed the 
aforementioned nationalist myth. However, the emergence of a new 
discipline- what is generally known as nationalism studies- has contributed to 
the gradual but steady deconstruction of the nationalist narrative.
We may now claim with confidence that nations are relatively recent 
ideological and political constructions which emerged at the dawn of the 
m odem  era, as a result of the serious crisis of legitimacy which characterized 
late traditional societies in Europe and the Americas. This crisis of legitimacy
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arose when the increasingly powerful middle class disputed traditional 
political structures in which sovereignty lied with the 'divinely appointed' 
king or the feudal class. Eventually, this new class struggled and achieved to 
shift political sovereignty towards the people, or -what came to be called- 'the 
nation'. Moreover, the proclaimed 'death of God' has stripped religious 
leaders, kings, and aristocracy from their exclusive claim to power. But how 
did the bourgeois class managed to win peoples' 'hearts and minds' and 
convince them to adopt the new ideology of nationalism? How did 
nationalism spread from the limited circles of urban intellectuals, merchants 
and entrepreneurs, to the countryside, to become later on an official state 
ideology?
In order to answer these questions, several theoretical approaches to 
nationalism have been developed, including primordialism, modernism, 
perennialism, and ethno-symbolism. Of course, this is an ideal-types 
categorization and downplays to a certain extent the importance of 
substantive differences among individual authors and schools of thought. 
However, such classification is useful for analytical purposes as it brings to 
light the central ideas behind each of the existing approaches to nationalism.
Primordialist perspectives on nations and nationalism emphasize the 
significance of individual emotional ties to the nation, as well as of 
'prim ordial' traits that demonstrate the uniqueness of each nationality. These 
qualities and kinship ties which unite the nation may be the result of biology, 
belief in biological decent, or of cultural environment. In the words of Pierre
Van Den Berghe, "both ethnicity and race (in the social sense) are in fact
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extensions of the idiom of kinship, and that, therefore, ethnic and race 
sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin 
selection".24 Such implicitly racial views on Greek identity have been 
articulated by New-Orthodox and Neo-Romantic Greek thinkers, who 
idealise the communal nature of Greek Orthodox culture,25 or argue for the 
superiority and uniqueness of the inherent traits of 'Greekness'. Their 
advocates come both from the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. 
For example, in 2003, Mikis Theodorakis, a music composer, intellectual, and 
icon of the Greek left commented the following: "Greeks, like Jews, are 
unique people. But Greeks are not inherently fanatic and self righteous like 
the Jews. They [the Jews] are the root of most evil, and not a force for good 
[like the Greeks]. This is because their weapons are shadows -  for example 
Abraham and Jacob, while we had the almighty Pericles. That is why our 
nature is not aggressive, like the Jewish one".26
Nations, for most primordialist authors, exist since time immemorial, 
and nationalism is essentially an extension of kinship bonds characterizing 
pre-modern ethnic communities, which arise from natural 'givens' of hum an 
history (race, language, environment, etc.).27 This perspective, in all its 
variants, is rejected in this thesis, mainly due to the lack of any substantive
24 Pierre Van Den Berghe, 1994 [1978], "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective", in 
Anthony Smith & John Hutchinson (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford : Oxford University Press)
25 See for example, Christos Yanaras, 2000. To AJupafhjmpi t o o  NeoeWrjva [Modem Greeks], 
(Athens: narcncq^)
26 See EXevdepowma daily [Eleftherotypia], November 13, 2003. Also cited in Akis Gavriilidis, 
2006. H AQepcutemr] Nexpocpiha t o o  PiCpmacrnxoh TlaTpiancrpov [The Unbearable Necrophilia of 
Radical Patriotism], (Athens: Futura), p. 9
27 For an excellent account of the primordialist perspective on nations, see Anthony D. Smith, 
1998. Nationalism and Modernism, (London: Routledge), pp. 145-151, and Anthony D. Smith 
Nationalism, 2001. (Oxford: Polity) pp. 51-56
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 39
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
evidence that there are inherent environmental characteristics or biological 
phenotypes, which justify particular certain social behaviours, such as the 
deep psychological attachment to a conceptual entity called the 'Greek 
nation'. Besides, the reduction of social phenomena to biological or 
'metaphysical' determining factors has met little approval in social sciences in 
general, since such simplification lacks any solid theoretical or scientific 
substantiation.
Perennialist thinkers also hold that nations (or at least some nations) 
existed before the emergence of nationalism. However, unlike primordialists, 
perennialist authors hold a historicist, instead of an organic view of the 
nation.28 Through exhaustive historical research, these 'historians of nations', 
are at pains to demonstrate the existence of ethnic an d /o r national affiliations 
well before the m odern era. For example, Greek historian Nicos Svoronos 
summarizes his book titled Review of Modem Greek History [EmoKOTrrjarj rrjg 
NeoeXkrjviKfjs Ioropiac;] as a "story of the sustained efforts of an ancient people 
to transform itself into a modern nation, to realize its character, and to secure 
its place as a distinct entity into our world" 29 Although one cannot dispute 
the prevalence of a common religion and the existence of a dominant 
language ( albeit in several local variations), in the Greek peninsula and the 
island of Cyprus well before the Greek War of Independence, there is not any
28 See for example the work of Adrian Hastings, 1997. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity 
Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), and John Armstrong, 
1982. Nations Before Nationalism (Chapell Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina Press)
29 Nicos Svoronos, 2007. EmoTcdjrrjari rrj$ NeoeAXtjvucris Iaropiag [Review of Modern Greek History], 
(Athens: ©qi£\io), p. 155. Even if Svoronos is considered a "modernist" scholar by many 
commentators of his work, there are numerous perennialist arguments in his books. See Akis 
Gavriilidis, 2006. H Adepcuiemr] NeicpocpDaa t o o  PiCpmaomKov n a r p iG m a j iO D  [The Unbearable 
Necrophilia of Radical Patriotism], (Athens: Futura)
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evidence, again, that these elements were perceived by people as constituent 
characteristics of the Greek nation. Moreover, there are not any scientific or 
historical indications that people living in these regions believed that they 
belonged to any nation or even understood the concept of the nation. Hence, 
one may wonder if all this discussion about nations before nationalism is 
anything more than an anachronism.
Modernist conceptions of the nation constitute indisputably the 
orthodoxy in the field, while the majority of the analyses of Greek 
nationalism are influenced by modernist paradigms. Most well known 
scholars of nationalism subscribe to the modernist paradigm  (Kedourie, 
Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Anderson). Although important differentiations do 
exist between the various modernist approaches to nationalism, essentially 
the basic assertion of modernism remains unaltered: "Nationalism...is a 
product of modernity, nothing less...But it is not only nationalism that is 
modern. So are nations, national states, national identities, and the whole 
'inter-national' community".30
For Ellie Kedourie31 nationalism is a m odem  religion, an essentially 
millenarianist movement, which arose as a result of the radical changes in 
societal values that modernity produced. Ernest Gellner32 on the other hand, 
articulated a more structuralist approach to nationalism. He argued that 
nationalism has been the product of the modern capitalist state, which used 
its "educational machine" in order to produce a class of literate clerks who
30 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, pp. 46-47
31 Elie Kedourie, 1993. Nationalism, (New York: Blackwell, 4th Edition)
32 Ernest Gellner, 1983. Nations and Nationalism, (New York: Cornell University Press)
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could meet the administrative needs of modern bureaucratic politics. 
Nationalism has spread throughout the world due to the effects of combined 
and uneven development and revolution. Though Gellnerian approaches to 
Greek nationalism are not dominant in the literature, we may still find some 
examples of them. Anna Koumandaraki for instance, emphasizes the role of 
the Greek state in fostering Greek nationalism and national homogeneity, and 
downplays the importance of the Greek Church in the production of national 
identity.33
The aforementioned theoretical approaches to nationalism have 
undoubtedly shed light to the importance of the objective conditions of 
modernity in the rise of nations. Nonetheless, the claim that nationalism is an 
ideology which arose under the specific historical conditions of the capitalist 
industrial epoch, has very little to contribute to our understanding of the 
idiosyncratic nature of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms and the role of 
the Church in their legitimization.
Finally, Benedict Anderson views nationalism as an 'imagined 
community'. "Rather than thinking of it as fabricated, one should understand 
national distinctiveness in terms of its style of imagination and the 
institutions that make that possible" (e.g. print-capitalism).34 Anderson's 
concept of 'imagined communities' is well-received in analyses of Greek and 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and has been the basis for one of the most 
authoritative conceptualizations of the place of Orthodoxy in nation-building
33 Anna Koumandaraki, 2002. "The Evolution of Greek National Identity", in Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 2:2, pp. 39-51
34 John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (eds.), 1994. Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), p.48
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by Paschalis Kitromilides.35 Kitromilides argues that the 'Orthodox 
commonwealth' was one of the most powerful imagined communities in the 
Balkan region during the Byzantine and Ottoman eras. Orthodoxy had been 
outspokenly hostile to the nationalist ideals of the Enlightenment due to the 
ecumenicity of the Orthodox dogma, as well as because of the institutional 
interests of the Constantinople Patriarchate. The nationalization of the 
Orthodox Churches throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe replaced the 
Orthodox imagined community by national imagined communities.
Kitromilides does not -  nevertheless - fully substantiate the claim that 
cultural, economic and political mechanisms led to the Church's ideological 
"conversion" to nationalism. He also fails to take into account the possibility 
of an inverted causal relationship between nationalism and Orthodoxy, that is 
to say the seminal role of the Church in the production of nationalism. This 
shortfall is rooted in Kitromilides' insistence on implicitly comparing "true" 
Orthodoxy, with Orthodoxy as a vehicle of nationalism. Hence, the paradox 
he traces is based on an essentialist approach to religion. One could argue, for 
example, that the stance of the Greek Church towards Turkey, or Israel, does 
not conform to the "ecumenicity" of Orthodoxy. However, even if such 
ethical and religious "pureness" ever existed in the Orthodox Church, it 
would still not be a reliable criterion for the interpretation of its political 
behaviour, under varying - and constantly changing - social and political 
circumstances. Therefore, nationalism and even anti-Semitism have
35 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1989. "Imagined Communities And the Origins of the National 
Question in the Balkans", in European History Quarterly, Vol. 19, pp. 149-194
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characterized Church rhetoric, in line with a particular reading of the Gospels, 
and not against a supposed true meaning of the Gospels.
Apart from Kitromilides, other authors have also noted the antithesis 
between Orthodoxy and nationalism. Gregory Jusdanis, in his Necessary 
Nation, argued that there is a fundamental antinomy between the 
ecclesiastical conceptions of knowledge, time and progress and the nationalist 
ones in Greece.36 Even if this conception of 'ecclesiastical wisdom' is accurate, 
it appears that there is a sharp difference between abstract Orthodox 
philosophy and concrete Church practice.
Indeed, there is recurrent pattern in the work of several critics of the 
Orthodox Church in both Greece and Cyprus. They have been repeatedly 
argued that nationalism is an un-Orthodox doctrine.37 This line of approach 
to the issue at hand is fundamentally flawed, as it contrasts a political 
ideology with the teachings of a metaphysical dogma. An authoritative 
interpretation of the fathers of the Church is beyond the analytical scope of a 
social scientist. Moreover, religious institutions do not generally adhere to a 
transcendental reading of "sacred" hooks, like the Bible, or the Koran. On the 
contrary, such texts are constantly revisited and reinterpreted in light of the 
changing historical conditions. This is not true just for Orthodoxy, but for every 
other religion. Besides, let us not forget that religious institutions are, after all, 
social institutions, and not metaphysical ones.
To return to our exposition of theories of nationalism, a large number 
of modernist scholars of nationalism adopt an instrumentalist view of
36 Gregory Jusdanis, 2001. The Necessary Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 109
37 See also Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004. "Unorthodox Politics", in http://www.greekworks.com
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nationality. This is particularly the case w ith Marxist and Neo-Marxist 
thinkers (e.g. Eric Hobsbawm), and rational choice theorists. For Hobsbawm, 
nations are 'invented traditions', used by elites to legitimize their authority. 
These traditions are invented, or constructed, through national education, 
national symbols, national monuments, and national ceremonies. In general, 
contemporary Marxist thinkers have been exceptionally hostile to 
nationalism.38
Perhaps the most typical Marxist analysis of the relation between 
religion and nationalism in Greece has been carried out by Apostolis 
Harisis.39 Harisis argues that the conflation between religion and nationalism 
in Greek political culture is the result of particular dynamics and 
configurations of power in Greek capitalism, and arises as a result of the 
manipulation of farmers, petty-bourgeois and 'luben' classes by capitalist 
elites. Structural-Marxist theories of Greek nationalism, though useful in 
identifying structural features of Greek political culture tend to reduce 
nationalism to a feature of the capitalist dynamics at a particular historical 
juncture, thus ignoring other facets of nationalism apart from the economic 
ones. Moreover, the reduction of nationalism to a conspiracy of some 'dark 
elites', which plot behind closed doors in order to manipulate the mindless 
masses, underestimates both the complexity of society and history, as well as
^Especially classical Marxist thinkers like Rosa Luxemburg. However, even among classical 
Marxism, there were voices that saw nationalism as essentially an anti-imperialist (and thus 
progressive) force. See M.R. Ishay, (ed.) 1997. The Human Rights Reader, (London: Routledge). 
Moreover, the Communist Party of Greece has been supportive, or at least in line with 
several Church arguments, especially in the field of foreign policy, as we shall see in the 
following chapters.
39 Apostolis Harisis, 2002. ©prjcnceia m i UohTmj orrjv EXXA6a [Religion and Politics in Greece], 
(Athens: Euyxpovr] Enoxn)
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the dialectic between production and popular understanding of ideologies. 
Above and beyond that, we should add that important figures in Marxist 
currents of thought (e.g. Lenin, Otto Bauer) hailed nationalist liberation 
movements, and considered them as progressive reactions to colonialism.
Finally, ethno-symbolic approaches to nationalism (Anthony Smith, 
John Hutchinson) accentuate the significance of pre-m odem  ethnic symbols 
and cultural resources for the construction of national identity. Elites may 
have been able to produce nationalism, but their efforts were constrained by 
the cultural environment in which they operated and lived, since both them 
and the people were already bound together by cultural and ethnic 
mechanisms of social cohesion, including religions, customs, and traditions. 
Ethno-symbolism shifts the focus of the analysis of nationalism from 
economic, political, or socio-biological factors, to the importance of ideas, 
myths, memories, symbols, and traditions.40 Ethno-symbolism has not been 
yet implemented in any comparative study of the role of the Church in 
producing Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. In spite of this, as we will 
be arguing in the following sections, ethno-symbolism is probably the 
paradigm which provides us with the most fruitful conceptual resources for 
studying the complex dynamics of Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalism. 
This is mainly because ethno-symbolism may offer theoretical solutions to the 
major flaws of the modernist paradigm on nationalism and offer answers to 
questions yet unresolved.
40 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism, p.59
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These flaws can be summarized with reference to two points: first of 
all, modernist theories of nationalism fail to account for the immense role of 
the pre-modern past for the popular legitimization of nationalist movements, 
and the subsequent amalgamation of tradition and modernity in nationalist 
ideologies. This failure is basically the result of the overemphasis of many 
modernist scholars on forces of production (e.g. print capitalism- Anderson) 
and relations of production (e.g. unequal development- Gellner), which 
downplay the importance of the realm of ideas. Secondly, modernist theories 
of nationalism tend to exaggerate the role of the elites in manipulating the 
masses into nationalism, and thus contain 'conspiracy theory' undertones 
(e.g. Hobsbawm) which are unable to account for the durable effects of 
nationalist feelings in the hum an psyche. In other words, modernism fails to 
explain how ideology communicates with the 'masses' and affects individual 
identifications.
The above portrayal of some of the main theoretical arguments 
regarding nationalism was not by any means an exhaustive review of the 
bourgeoning literature around the subject. Besides, the study of theories of 
nationalism at an abstract level is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
The purpose of exposing the reader to some of the major theories of 
nationalism was to place this work within the wider context of academic 
debates regarding nationalism and national identity and to give a picture of 
the views on Greek nationalism which have already been conveyed.
This thesis will seek to challenge the aforementioned theorizations of 
Greek and Cypriot nationalism by putting forward an alternative angle of 
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analysis. It will also aim to question the dominant theoretical scheme of 
Greek political culture, which has been articulated by Nikiforos 
Diamandouros. Diamandouros perceives Greek society as an arena where 
two political cultures are at conflict w ith each other: the first one, "the 
underdog culture", is anti-western, parochial, clientist, and statist in outlook 
(religious nationalism has sprang from this culture), and the other one is the 
culture of the "modernizers", inspired by the Enlightenment and its liberal 
ideals.41 Diamandouros believes that the latter political culture will 
eventually prevail within the milieu of the European Union. However, this is 
a reductionist and oversimplified approach to political culture, which maybe 
reflects the differences among Greek academics, but definitely underestimates 
the complexity of the Greek society.
First of all, the ideological horizon of Greek politics has been a great 
deal more fragmented than Diamandouros suggests, and the intellectual and 
social struggles during the first years after independence cannot fit into a one­
dimensional spectrum which would divide the political map of Greece 
between two opposing camps. Even if there is an antagonistic struggle 
between two ideological formations in Greece, we should be aware that social 
antagonisms are a constitutive feature of every society and they are unlikely 
to be resolved with a complete prevalence of a particular political discourse.
41Nikiforos Diamandouros, 1993. "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An 
Interpretation", in Richard Clogg, (edj, Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan), pp. 3-5. See also Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2000. noXmopiKog Aoiopoc, m i nohnKrj 
AXXayij orrjv EXXaSa rrjc, MeTajtoMjevcrrjc, [Cultural Dualism and Political Change in post- 
Authoritarian Greece], edited and translated by Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, (Athens: 
AAe§dv8p£ia), pp. 41-50. Other Greek authors also share similar views. Generally speaking, 
Diamandouros7 theory is the dominant interpretation of Greek political culture today.
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Antagonisms are the outcome of the essential contingency of subjective 
identities and the consequent impossibility for total closure in the horizon of 
social meanings. In contrast w ith Enlightenment, naturalist, or theological 
conceptions of identity which assume the existence of an autonomous and 
unified individual, the theoretical perspective adopted here emphasizes the 
social construction of identities and their inherent contingency. Identities are 
never permanently fixed, but always subject to change and reconstruction.
Furthermore, unlike w hat Diamandouros believes, the boundaries 
between discourses are not always clear, resulting to what some authors have 
described as 'the perpetual crisis of the 'Neohellenic identity'. For example, 
on the one hand, many Greeks were enthusiastic supporters of the late anti- 
European Archbishop of Athens, Christodoulos, and, in opinion polls, 
Christodoulos consistently ranked among the three most popular public 
figures. On the other hand, 68% of the Greeks are supportive of the country's 
E.U. membership (E.U. average 54%).42 In addition to that, even though the 
Church is a fierce critic of the.E .U ., it is a beneficiary of its budget. 
Consequently, when we make the distinction between 'modernizers' and 
'traditionalists', we should bear in m ind that individual's identities are not 
completely coherent. Individuals hold multiple and often self-contradictory 
views and self-images, which cannot always fit in a concrete theorization 
between two opposing ideologies. Subjects occupy numerous subject 
positions within a social structure. These subject positions constitute, in a 
sense, 'm ini' fragmentary identities. A subject may therefore occupy a 'pro-
42 Standard Eurobarometer, vol. 56, p.20
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European', a 'Christian', a 'nationalist', a 'right wing7 and a 'worker' subject 
positions at the same time. The different subject positions of individual agents 
may at times conflict with each other in certain respects (e.g. someone may be 
a 'right-w ing worker' or a 'pro-European nationalist'). In this case, different 
subject positions prevail under different circumstances.43
A final point that demonstrates that the boundaries between the two 
opposing discourses of 'tradition' and 'modernisation' are blurred is that 
modernisation cannot exist outside a tradition. Modernisation presupposes a 
tradition,44 and this is most evident in nationalist movements in which the 
past is 'recruited' in order to legitimize the present and the future. The whole 
meaning of concepts such as modernization, or secularization is defined in 
relation to what we usually call 'tradition'. In any case, Greek nationalism is 
far from a parochial traditionalist remnant, since, as m odem  social theory has 
repeatedly emphasized, nationalism in general is both modern and vibrant.
Despite the existence of the abovementioned theories of Greek 
nationalism, we should note that most of the literature of the 'academic left' 
on Greek political culture disregards questions about the emergence of 
religious nationalism and the reasons for its persistence. It just assumes that 
the Church is and has always been nationalist, and develops polemical 
arguments against this nationalism. Although this study will expose racist 
and nationalist elements in the political discourse of the Greek Orthodox 
Church, the aim is to proceed further than that. On the other hand, New-
43 Obviously, there is a hierarchy between different subject positions. However, this does not 
change the fact that an individual may hold several contradictory self-images and positions. 
^Nikos Demertzis., 1997. "Greece", in R. Eatwell, (ed.), European Political Cultures: Conflict or 
Convergence?, (London: Routledge), p. 118
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Orthodox academics view through rose-tinted glasses the role of the Church 
in Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. Sofia Mappa evaluates the 
current state of affairs in Greek social science work related to Orthodoxy, as 
follows:
With very few exceptions, Orthodoxy today constitutes the 
object of praise of the 'faithful' and the new-Orthodox...and the 
object of rejection... of those who are supposed to be pro­
western and 'm odernizers'...both the former and the latter 
spend most of their time reaffirming themselves and fighting 
each other, rather than reflecting or deliberating.45 
The majority of studies, which have addressed the issue of the political 
function of the Church of Greece, have been mainly concerned with the legal 
aspects of the problem.46 Especially the works of Alivizatos and 
Dimitropoulos have been very helpful in delineating the constitutional 
aspects of the complex relationship between the state and the Church. 
However, constitutional legal research is inept to account for the dynamics of 
an issue, which is so closely related to political culture.
Moreover, the vast majority of legal works (in particular the works of 
Venizelos) reduce the complexity of the subject matter to an issue of 
constitutional arrangements. A plethora of examples from around the world 
points out that constitutional separation between the Church and the state
45 Sofia Mappa, 1997. Op9o5o§ia m i E§ovoia orrjv EXXrjvncrj Koivcovia [Orthodoxy and Power in 
Greek Society], (Athens: E^avrag), p. 20
46 See Nicos Alivizatos, 2001. O A(3e^aiog EKOvyxpovicrjidg [The Uncertain Modernization] 
(Athens: IloXig), Evangelos Venizelos, Op. Cit., Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, 2001. Kpaiog m i 
EKxXtjaia: Mia AvcncoXt] Iyicnr\ [State and Church: A Difficult Relationship], (Athens, KpixiKrj), 
Antonis Manitakis, 2000. Oi Zjeueig i7/g ExicXrjcnac, j i e  t o  Kparog- Edvog [The Relationship between 
Church and Nation-State], (Athens, NecpeXi])
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does not necessarily confine religion to the private sphere nor it does produce 
a 'secular ethos'. This is particularly the case in the U.S.A. and Turkey for 
instance, where there are no established religions, but Christianity and Islam, 
respectively, have a considerable effect on the public life of these two 
countries. The Prime Minister of Turkey and the former President of the 
United States, for example, are not only 'm en of faith', but, in addition to that, 
their religious convictions seem to have influenced their political agenda and 
caused controversy both in the interior and the international politics of these 
two countries.
Beyond the realm of practical politics, the effectiveness of the liberal 
doctrine of secularization has also been theoretically challenged. William 
Connolly, in his Why I Am Not a Secularist, contended that "secular models of 
thinking, discourse and ethics are too constipated to sustain the diversity that 
they seek to admire",47 in the sense that they seek to hegemonize the public 
space w ith a singular view of public reason (like the one presented by 
Rawls48), which excludes alternative pictures. However, a careful reading of 
Connolly leaves the reader with the impression that he has not yet managed 
to produce a concrete alternative to secularization, and that his "ethos of 
engagement and pluralisation" is a vague scheme. Moreover, the principle of 
secularization has managed to gain the acceptance of both the neo-liberal right
47 William Connolly, 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press), p. 6
48What Rawls's liberal political project proposes is that people should use their public reason, 
independently of religious doctrinal adherences, and conform with the basic principles of 
justice as they are laid out in democratic constitutions. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
(i.e. systems of belief that define what is of value in human life), whether ethical, 
philosophical or religious, should not challenge the basic institutions of a democratic society, 
or else social cohesion is threatened. See John Rawls, 1993. Political Liberalism, (New York: 
Columbia University Press), especially pp. 35, and 58-59
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as well as that of the democratic and radical left and there is not a concrete 
alternative legal framework, which will ensure the equal treatment of 
religions in a democratic society. The contribution of Connolly to the recent 
discussions about disestablishment is to be found in the fact he drew our 
attention to the reality that secularization and disestablishment may be 
essential for the protection of the rights of minorities in a multicultural 
society, but they are not a panacea. Moreover, Connolly is among those 
thinkers who have pointed out that legislative and constitutional 
secularization does not necessarily lead to societal secularization.
Besides, Durkheim maintained that there is no such thing as a 
'nonreligious' society, since there can be no society without symbols, rituals, 
and beliefs that bind it together, or without some form of distinction between 
the sacred and the profane.49 For Durkheim, religion performs similar 
functions as nationalism performs for Anthony Smith. Even sociologists who 
predicted the eventual withering away of religion, like Marx or Weber, 
accepted that at least up until the m odem  era, religion has been a primary 
source of social meaning.50
These functions of religion remain relatively unexamined in Greek 
historiography of the Orthodox Church, which has yet to present a coherent 
social and political history of the Greek Church since independence.51
49L. F. Edles, 2002. Cultural Sociology in Practice, (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 32. For a detailed 
account of the 'functions7 of religion, see Emile Durkheim, 1915. The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, translated by J. Swain (London: Allen &. Unwin)
50Marx believed that religiosity will disappear with the eventual win of proletariat over 
capitalism. Weber thought that bureaucratic legitimization will replace divine legitimization 
of societal arrangements. See L. F. Edles, Op. Cit., pp. 23-55
51 A notable effort to present a comprehensive summary of church-state relations in Greece is 
the one of Georgios Karayannis, 1997. EKKXrjoia m i Kparoc, 1883-1997 [Church and State 1833 -
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Historical accounts of Orthodoxy are usually nationalist, like the 'official' 
Greek history of Paparrigopoulos,52 which exemplifies the primordialist 
perspective on nations, or they are written by theologians and support the 
historical narratives articulated by the Greek Church.53 An exception to this 
rule may be the work of Paraskevas Matalas,54 and some historical chapters in 
sociological or legal works which, however, are not detailed enough to grasp 
the complexity of the issue.
However, the most serious gap in the literature regarding Greek 
nationalism is the absence of a comparative study between metropolitan 
Greek nationalism and peripheral Greek nationalisms (Cyprus, Diasporas). 
This thesis is a case-study of Greek nationalism, but within a geographically 
comparative perspective. The comparison between Greece and Cyprus will 
not be balanced in its details, since the main focus will be on Greece. The aim 
of the comparison will be the extraction of theoretical conclusions regarding 
the relation between Orthodoxy and nationalism in Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
political culture. Therefore, the focus of the comparison is very specific and
1897], (Athens: To novxiKi). However, as the author admits in the preface of this work, his 
outlook is clearly journalistic and aims to present the course of events without any theoretical 
inferences.
52 Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, 1886. Ioropia t o v  EJOtrjvncov Edvovg [History of the Greek 
Nation], (2nd ed., Athens: Av£orr|<; KoovaravriviSijs)
53 See Leon Brag, 1997. To M iAAov t o v  EXXtjinayov o t o v  ISeoXoyiKb Kbapo t o v  A j t o o t o X o v  MaKpaKt} 
[The Future of Hellenism in the Ideological World of Apostolos Makrakis], (Athens, App6$), 
and Ch. Maczewski, 2002. H Kivtjarj wjg Zcorjg orrjv EXXd8a {The Zoi Movement in Greece], 
(Athens, Appo$). Despite their pro-Church bias, these two works have some insights to offer 
to Greek ecclesiastical history. For a detailed, but somehow outdated review of the state of 
Greek historiography, see, Alexander Kitroeff, 1990. pp. 143-172, in M. Blinkhom & Th. 
Veremis (eds.), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, (Athens: ELIAMEP)
54 Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Edvog m i Opdo8o§ia, oi IlepmiTeieg yiag Zxicrrjg [Nation and 
Orthodoxy: the Adventures of their Relationship], (Heracleon, University of Crete Press). This is 
an extended M.A. dissertation written at the University of Crete and examines the Bulgarian 
and the Greek schism from the Constantinople Patriarchate. Another work of impressive 
quality is Paraskevas Konortas' 1998, Odapavncig ©eoprjaeig yia t o  OiKovpevmo IlaTpiapxdo 
[Ottoman Perspectives on the Ecumenical Patriarchate], (Athens: AAe^dvSpeia). However, this 
work only examines the Ottoman perspective on the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
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limited to a particular social, cultural and historical context. However, the 
comparative aspect is necessary since, until now, a contrast between the 
dynamics of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece and in another country 
has not been attempted, despite the fact that it is widely accepted that 
nationalist movements develop differently within different social and 
historical contexts.
Cypriot economic, social and political development has been 
undoubtedly dissimilar to that of Greece, and this is not only due to the 
colonial past of the former. Greece and Cyprus have led different histories 
since the 11th century when the latter ceased to be a province of the 
Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, Cypriot society is far less ethnically 
homogeneous than the Greek one. The comparative outlook of this study will 
hopefully provide some insights into the role of Orthodoxy in fostering 
nationalism under different social contexts.
On the whole, there are only a handful of noteworthy studies 
regarding Greek-Cypriot political culture. Possibly, the most notable of those 
is the work of Caesar Mavratsas.55 Despite the theoretical depth of this 
analysis, Mavratsas only dedicates five pages to the role of the Church in the 
production of nationalism, only to repeat the antithesis between the 
ecumenicity of Orthodoxy and nationalism, which has already been noted by 
Kitromilides. Kitromilides56 has also written on the effects of Greek 
irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus, along the same line of reasoning.
55 Caesar Mavratsas, 1998. Oipag t o v  E X K tjv ik o v  Edvncurjiov orrjv Kvutpo [Facets of Greek 
Nationalism in Cyprus], (Athens: Karapxi)
56 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1990. "Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus", in Middle 
Eastern Studies, vol. 26:1, pp. 3-15
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Moreover, we should note the work of Niyazi Kizilyiirek57 who blames the 
present discontents of Cyprus to the existence of ethno-nationalisms in both 
sides, but again does not give a detailed account of the role of Orthodoxy in 
cultivating ethno-nationalism.
Finally, the Cyprus problem has drawn considerable attention from 
anthropologists, who seek to explain the different understandings of history 
and identity among the two ethno-religious communities. Influenced by the 
work of the prominent Cypriot anthropologist, Peter Loizos, Rebecca Bryant's 
recent study, titled Imagining the Modem, argues that "two conflicting styles of 
nationalist imagination led to the violent rendering of Cyprus in 1974 and 
sustained this division over the decades". According to Bryant, these 
"conflicting styles" turned Muslims in Cyprus into Turks, and Christians into 
Greeks.58 Nonetheless, the author allocates very few pages to the institution 
of the Orthodox Church, and its role in the aforementioned procedure of the 
nationalization of religious identities.
Expectantly, this review revealed that there are indeed gaps and 
inadequacies in the literature regarding the production of nationalism by the 
Greek and Greek-Cypriot Churches, which necessitate the conduct of further 
research. Nonetheless, the aim of this project is not simply to cover gaps in 
the literature, but also to develop a new perspective on Greek nationalism by 
using a theoretical framework which has not yet been applied in the Greek
57 Niyazi Kizilyiirek, 1999. Kwrpog: To A5ii§o6o rav EdviKicrjiav [Cyprus: the Dead end of 
Nationalisms], (Athens: Mauprj Aicrra)
58 Rebecca Bryant, 2004. Imagining the Modem -  the Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus, (London: 
Tauris). On the Greek case, see as well Umut Ozkirimli & Spyros A. Sofos, 2008. Tormented by 
History -  Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (London: Hurst)
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case, and thus analyze historical and political phenomena that do not fit to 
existing theorizations. This framework is based on the fundamental 
assumptions of the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism. These 
assumptions are justified and reinforced through the use of the major 
methodological tools of discourse theory. The specific concepts which are 
relevant to the Greek case will be explored in subsequent chapters.
II.II. Theoretical Framework and Methodology
An immediate question which may occur to the reader is why we 
should attem pt this juxtaposition of two different theoretical frameworks. The 
answer to this question may be extracted from the previous section. Given 
that the logic of this dissertation is question-driven, the reason for choosing to 
bring together these two theoretical frameworks is that they can provide us 
with sufficient answers to the questions left unanswered, or unconsidered, by 
other methodologies. To put it simply, ethno-symbolism is used to explain 
how Orthodoxy served as a pre-modern cultural resource as well as a stable 
institution in order to consolidate Greek and Greek-Cypriot identities. 
Discourse theory is used to explain how Helleno-Christian nationalism has 
been socially and linguistically constructed and sustained over the past two 
centuries. The two theoretical traditions act as complementary to each other 
in this dissertation, and may therefore explain both the pre-m odem  cultural 
roots of Greek nationalism as well as its longevity.
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Il.II.i. Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism
The era of the emergence of modernity was a time of crisis in Europe. 
This crisis was a derivative of new developments in the economic base of 
society (industrialization, vernacular print capitalism, etc.), the political 
system (consolidation of liberal systems of government in bureaucratic states 
with clearly demarcated borders), and the cultural superstructure ('death of 
God'). Existing political cosmologies were unable to explain and 
accommodate the aforementioned radical break with the pre-m odem  world 
in their symbolic order. They were therefore dislocated and replaced by the 
new cosmology of nationalism. So, w hat was nationalism all about?
The political aims of the nationalist project are to some extent 
'universal', meaning that they do not significantly vary among different cases 
of nationalist movements. "These generic goals are three: national autonomy, 
national unity, and national identity, and, for nationalists, a nation cannot 
survive without a sufficient degree of all three".59 The core themes of 
nationalist ideology as they are presented by Anthony Smith are the 
following:
Table 1: The Core Themes of Nationalist Ideology60
1. Humanity is naturally divided into nations.
2. Each nation has its peculiar character.
3. The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity.
59 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism., p. 9
60 Source: Anthony D. Smith, (1983: 21), as cited by F. Halliday, 1997. "Nationalism", in J. 
Baylis & S. Smith, (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
p. 362
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4. For freedom and self-realization, men must identify w ith a nation.
5. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states
6. Loyalty to the nations overrides all other loyalties
7. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the 
strengthening of the nation-state.
These 'core themes of nationalist ideology' are widely accepted as the 
founding rules of legitimacy of the m odem  interstate system. They are 
reflected in the basic texts of contemporary inter national law,61 inter national 
politics,62 and inter national political theory.63 When, and if, a specific 
community achieves a 'sufficient degree' of its abovementioned 'generic 
goals', it follows that a nation has been constructed and a significant part of 
what is perceived by nationalists to be the national population has 
internalized a national identity.
As we can conclude from the table above, the emergence of 
nationalism is inseparably linked with the 'objective' conditions of modernity. 
Nationalist ideology required the establishment of some notion of citizenship, 
since, for nationalists, sovereignty lies w ith the people (and not with the
61 See for example Article 1, §2 of the U.N. Charter, which states that among the basic 
purposes of the U.N. is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...". This principle of national self- 
determination was later promoted' to a human right in international law. See for example 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), The Helsinki Agreement (1975), the Vienna 
Declaration (1993), etc.
62 Especially among the dominant realist school of international relations (e.g., K. Waltz). 
However, even liberal-institutionalism nowadays accepts these principles, while Neo-Marxist 
schools of autonomous development (e.g. I. Wallerstein) contain nationalist overtones.
63 Even liberal political theorists, who are supposed to have cosmopolitan principles, accept 
the basic themes of nationalist ideology. For example, in 1861, John Stuart Mill wrote: "Where 
the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the 
members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves 
apart". John Stuart Mill, in M. R. Ishay (ed.), The Human Rights Reader, p. 282
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king).64 It also requires, or aims at, the founding of a centralized state, 
something which only became technologically, economically and politically 
feasible at the dawn of the m odem  era. Furthermore, the presence of a 
vernacular language which would ensure undisrupted communication 
between the members of a nation greatly facilitated the nationalist cause. In 
this sense, the emergence of nationalism is unthinkable in pre-modem 
contexts. Thus, in his Ethnic Origins of Nations, Anthony Smith points out that 
modernists, meaning those who share "a belief in the contingency of 
nationalism and the modernity of the nation," must be right.65 By 
acknowledging this fact, ethno-symbolism distinguishes itself from perennial 
and primordial approaches to nationalism. In short, nationalism could 
adequately accommodate the novel conditions of modernity into its 
ideological symbols, and therefore managed to make the new social reality 
intelligible to subjects.
The obvious question which now emerges is why nationalism in 
specific, and not some other ideological discourse? Modernism, with its 
exclusive emphasis on the conditions of modernity, fails to explain the 
specificity of the nationalist system of beliefs, as well how nations came to 
acquire a positive ontological status in the eyes of the 'people' in Europe and 
elsewhere. The answer of ethno-symbolism is that we should search at the 
'ethnic origins of nations'. Identities do not emerge ex nihilo. The starting
641 use the term citizenship with caution here. Rather than referring to the formalistic sense of
the term (universal suffrage and voting rights), citizenship here implies a form of political 
self-awareness of the sovereign nature of the referent population, as well as a degree of 
political participation. Political participation may take various forms other than voting (e.g. 
commitment to a revolutionary cause, wide participation in social upheavals, etc)
65 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 11
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point of a new identity is a previous one. What we mean by this is that new 
symbolic orders do not only emerge through the creation of new symbols, but 
also through the re-arrangement of existing symbols in a new order. This is 
necessary for a smooth passing from one hegemonic political discourse to 
another since individuals are more easily 'converted' if the new ideology uses 
some familiar symbols, rituals, and practices. The conclusion draw n from this 
line of thought is that pre-modern ethnic, religious, and cultural material not 
only shaped the character of individual nations but it was also a necessary 
condition for their emergence. It was probably as equally necessary as the 
objective conditions of modernity were.
This conclusion differentiates ethno-symbolism from classic modernist 
accounts of nationalism. It explains the specific nature of nationalism by 
referring to pre-existing ethnic ties. Thus, ethno-symbolists are not 
"constructivists" ex nihilo. To put it in Smith's words, "the rise of nations and 
nationalism is placed within a framework of earlier collective cultural 
identities, and especially of ethnic communities, or ethnies".66 The category of 
ethnie accounts for the longevity of nationalism, by emphasizing the 
importance of strong pre-modern cultural bonds. It also explains why 
nationalism was so successful in communicating with the people, since it 
emphasizes the role of the politicization of cultural norms as the basic method 
of legitimization of nationalist claims. It gives answers to the question of why 
nationalism has been a 'universal' social phenomenon which has arisen 
during several historical phases of modernity, and in all the continents of the
66 Anthony D. Smith, 2001. Nationalism (Oxford: Polity), p. 58
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globe, and tended to hypostasize in different forms under different social 
contexts. This is obviously because culturally and historically specific 
communities existed everywhere, well before nationalism emerged. Finally, it 
explicates why there is no single canonical text of nationalism, like it is the 
case w ith other political discourses, since the political ideas of each nationalist 
movement differed in each case, and were dependent on the different 
historical and social environments. In short, ethno-symbolism deals w ith the 
questions left unanswered by the modernist paradigm: "By relating national 
identities to prior ethnic ties, and showing the influence of subjective 
dimensions of shared symbols, myths and memories, ethno-symbolism 
throws light on the continuing hold exercised by nations over so many people 
today".67
After making these important preliminary observations, we may now 
proceed to a working definition of the nation for the purposes of this 
dissertation: Nation is a m odem  mode of conceiving the political identity of a 
population, based on the politicization and re-interpretation of pre-existing 
cultural material and symbolic resources in this referent population by 
nationalists. In other words, it is the ideology of nationalism that defines 
what is the nation, and not some 'objective' criteria. A subjective definition of 
the nation has been chosen over an 'objective' one, since the use of 'objective' 
elements (geography, history, religion, 'race', ethnicity, citizenship, etc.), and 
their articulation within a particular system of meaning which describes 
'w hat is the nation' differs from case to case and ultimately depends on the
67 Anthony D. Smith, Op. Cit. p. 59
Keligion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 62
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
handling of symbolic resources by nationalists. Thus, nationalism is an 
ideology which constructs the "nation-as-this and the people-as-one."68 
Moreover, this definition places emphasis on the existence of pre-modem 
communal affiliations and allegiances ('pre-existing cultural material7) in the 
nationhood-construction process. Hence, it attempts to explain the 
intertwining between tradition and modernity within nations, while it 
hopefully avoids the essentialism of 'objective' definitions. Finally, this 
definition pre-supposes that an image of the nation may exist in the minds of 
nationalists well before the people who are supposed to constitute the nation 
have internalised a national identity. This definition merges discourse theory 
with ethno-symbolism. But how can this 'blending' be usefully translated into 
the Greek case?
II.II.ii. Discourse Theory and Nationalism
Like every fashionable word in the world of social sciences, the 
concept of 'discourse' has been widely used and abused in a variety of 
different contexts. 'Discourse analysis' has been used to describe a plethora of 
different methodologies, from the extreme positivist/behaviouralist end of 
content analysis, to structural linguistic analysis and post-structuralist 
(Derridean, Lacanian, etc.) analysis of 'texts'. I use the term  'discourse' here as 
almost synonymous to the one of 'ideology'. The reason for choosing to refer 
to 'discourse' instead of the more familiar concept of 'ideology' is that 
particular emphasis is placed on the linguistic and semiotic elements that did
68 Jacob Torfing, Op. Cit., p. 193
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 63
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
hold Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalist doctrines together. This paper 
rejects the idea that discourse (or ideology, for that matter) is a form of 'false 
consciousness':
Discourse analysis refers to the process of analysing signifying 
practices as discursive forms, This means that discourse analysts 
treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic material -  speeches 
reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even 
organizations and institutions -  as 'texts' or 'writings' that enable 
subjects to experience the world of objects, words, and practices.69
The linguistic connotations of the term  'discourse', as opposed to the 
one of 'ideology', are important for the purposes of this thesis. In 
contemporary linguistics words, or 'signifiers', do not contain a fundamental 
meaning in themselves, other than the one that is assigned to them in relation 
and in opposition to other signifiers. This relational aspect is crucial in 
understanding concepts such as 'nation', 'Hellenism', and 'Orthodoxy', as 
these were shaped and evolved within various systems of meaning 
(discourses).
Conversely, discourses are particular ways of perceiving social reality. 
The exterior world is not sensed by the individual as a series of random and 
unconnected events. On the contrary, social reality is meaningful in the sense 
that language mediates between the 'real' and our discursive perceptions of the 'real' 
(what we may call 'reality') and therefore ascribes 'meaning' to the world. 
Discourses are schematic and historically specific systems of meaning which
69 David Howarth, 2000. Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press)
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determine the individual's sense of reality and place its practices within the 
context of a particular symbolic order. Consequently discourse is not a form 
of 'false consciousness'; it is the only possible form of consciousness.
Unlike other 'post-modern' social theories, discourse analysis is neither 
idealistic nor it reduces the social world into language. The perspective on 
discourse analysis adopted here does not deny the existence of a world 
exterior to hum an thought or language; that would constitute a form of 
arbitrary idealism. It just states that the social world acquires meaning only 
through language. W ords like nation, people, democracy, republic, acquire 
different, and often contrasting meanings in different political discourses. 
Hence, each 'signifier' is not objectively connected with a particular 
'signified'. The signifier nation does not 'naturally' signify anything specific, 
unless it is placed w ithin the context of a political discourse. This basic 
principle is widely accepted in m odern linguistics.
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse 
has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to 
thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An 
earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly 
exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently 
of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed 
in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the w rath of 
God' depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is 
denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but 
the rather different assertion that they could constitute 
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themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of 
emergence.70
Discourse theory is therefore the study of emergence, logic, hegemony, 
and eventual dislocation of discourses. Discourses are never completely 
stable systems of meaning. Since they are only representations of the world, 
and not the world itself, they are unable to explain every possible 
contingency, historical situation, or social change. Political ideologies are 
themselves 'languages' through which the world becomes intelligible. Thus, 
they are always vulnerable to criticism and change, by disillusioned 
individuals or groups.
In this sense, discourse analysis avoids possible charges of 'hyper- 
structuralism', since it leaves sufficient space for agency, relative autonomy, 
and self-institution. Discourse analysis is a 'creative catachresis' of the 
concept of 'discourse' which is now used in a much wider than its original 
linguistic sense. It is a technique for studying any meaningful social practice, 
and thus any hum an practice, since, for discourse theorists, any hum an 
practice is meaningful. Discourses are therefore systems of meaning that are 
bound together be particular signifiers (e.g. 'the nation') and make the social 
world intelligible to subjects. These systems of meaning are contingent 
ideological structures which are subject to change, since a discourse can 
neither close the horizon of social meanings nor represent the 'real'.
Another nodal point in the logic of discourse analysis is 'antagonism'. 
Despite the fact that one may acknowledge that there are some positive
70 Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (London: Verso), p. 
108
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aspects in group or individual identities, the fundamental logic of identity 
construction is basically negative and oppositional. The hegemony of a 
certain discourse always suppresses, or at least ignores, other possibilities. 
Similarly, individual political subjectivities are constructed on the basis of a 
series of oppositions ( I am a father means I am not a mother, I am a worker 
means I am not a bourgeois, I am Greek means I am not Turkish, Western 
European, or Slav). In David Campbell's words, "the constitution of identity 
is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an 
'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 
'foreign'."71 Identities are never fully positive. This is especially the case when 
it comes to nationalism. Nationalism illustrates the importance of drawing 
political, social, and cultural frontiers between 'us ' and 'them ', in constituting 
individual and collective identities.
Therefore, a discourse analysis perspective on nationalism would 
skeptic towards other 'post-modern' theories of nationalism which talk about 
the 'twilight of nations', 'post-national identities', 'deterritorialization', etc, 
for two main reasons: first of all, because of the remarkable ability of 
nationalism in drawing frontiers, and thus fostering stable identities, and 
secondly, because identities are not easy to get rid of. Even if one 
acknowledges her nationalist identity, or the nationalist character of her 
actions, this does not mean that it would be easy for her to assume a different 
identity. "Perhaps the post-modern consumer can purchase a bewildering
71 David Campbell, 1998. National Deconstruction, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press), p. 9
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 67
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
range of identity-styles. Certainly, the commercial structures are in place for 
the economically comfortable to change styles in the Western world ... One 
can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after ... But being Chinese or 
Turkish are not commercially available options".72 Identities are not clothes 
that one can change at will. A different political identity (e.g. a European 
identity), can only replace existing ones, only if it manages to perform similar 
functions and deal with the "weak points' of previous identities. However, the 
presence of antagonisms in every society ensures that alternative 
subjectivities and discourses may always emerge.
...The social only exists as a partial effort for constructing 
society- that is, an objective and closed system of differences- 
antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility of final suture, is 
the 'experience' of the limit of the social.73 
Discourses are internalized by subjects either through the exercise of 
force by privileged actors of a social milieu (e.g. state), or through the 
ritualization of certain social practices associated with particular discourses.74 
These practices are experienced by individuals as parts of 'their way of life' 
and their identity. Even if individuals do not realize, their socialization into 
practices and symbols usually associated w ith 'banal nationalism' plays an 
extremely important role in their transformation into nationalist subjects. This 
emphasis on symbols and practices is one of the main meeting points
72 M. Billig, 1995. Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage) p.139
73 Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Op. Cit. p.125
74 For example, the ritualization of practices like the eating of the Paschal lamb, the Good 
Week fast, and the attendance of Sunday Masses, fosters the Eastern Orthodox Christian 
identity of Greeks.
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between discourse theory and ethno-symbolism. It explains the cross-class 
penetration of nationalism, since the roots of the phenomenon are to be found 
in the political and cultural superstructure rather than in the economic base. 
By arguing for this 'primacy of the political', discourse theory avoids the 
shortfalls of classic Marxist approaches on nationalism.
We hope that it is obvious by now that this thesis rejects any 
primordialist, essentialist (e.g. Marxist-determinist), and sociobiological 
perspectives on modern nations and nationalism. Instead, it is closer, at an 
ontological and epistemological level, with those approaches/theoretical 
traditions that view m odem  nations as discursive constructions of 
nationalism. Nationalism is viewed in this paper "as a way of imagining 
political community and communitarian fullness".75 The fact that nations and 
national or religious identities are discursively constructed does not make 
them any less 'real'. Conversely, discourses are materially effective in the 
sense that they determine political subjectivities and constitute subject 
positions within a society, and they are "materialized in specific types of 
institutions and organizations".76 This ontological stance also implies that the 
author is conscious of what Rawls calls 'the burdens of hum an judgement' 
and suspicious of any claims of 'scientific objectivity'. That said, we should 
note that a balanced and coherent approach to the subject of Greek national 
identity is possible, while the aim is to avoid the polemic and 
overwhelmingly biased (even hysteric) rhetoric of some previous analyses.
75 Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse, p. 193
76 David Howarth, 2000. Discourse, (Buckingham: Open University Press), p. 94
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The question which now emerges is where does ethno-symbolism fits 
in all this. Discourse theory alerts us to the dangers of reducing discursive 
formations, like nationalism, to a mere reflection of the economic conditions 
of modernity. Nationalism cannot be reduced to rational self-interested 
motivations, economic conditions, and institutional dynamics. As important 
as the aforementioned factors may be, the play of identifications should be at 
the heart of any effort to study group actions and hum an agency in 
nationalist movements. Our perspective may also explain how nationalist 
discourses were constructed on the basis of pre-existing symbols, practices 
and symbolic material. In this way, it enters the area of ethno-symbolism. 
Moreover, the valuable insight of ethno-symbolism "merely displaces the 
terms of our paradox. Surely ethnic and cultural elements are also the 
products of social, historical construction -  a construction that took place in 
earlier centuries and went through a successful process of sedimentation 
an d / or re-activation. In that sense, we seem to need something more to make 
sense of the attachment of people both to the nation and to its ethnic fabric".77 
The emphasis placed by discourse theory on the oppositional, exclusionary 
and salient nature of identities is of seminal importance in our effort to 
appreciate this attachment.
The theoretical framework adopted here has been summarized in an 
article co-authored by the writer of the thesis at hand and Yannis Stavrakakis. 
The article, titled, "(I Can Get No) Enjoyment: Lacanian Theory and the 
Analysis of Nationalism", was published in the peer-reviewed academic
77 Yannis Stavrakakis & Nikos Chiysoloras, 2006. "(I Can Get No) Enjoyment: Lacanian 
Theory and the Analysis of Nationalism", in Psychoanalysis Culture and Society, vol. 11, p. 147
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journal Psychoanalysis Culture and Society in 2006, and was well received 
among academics who study Greek nationalism. Although its outlook was 
theoretical and the article was not focused on the Greek or Cypriot cases, its 
main arguments were used in subsequent case-studies of facets of Greek 
nationalism.78 Moreover, an earlier articulation of some of the arguments of 
this thesis, regarding the emergence of Helleno-Christian nationalism, has 
been published in the journals Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism and Journal 
of the Hellenic Diaspora.79 The two articles have been cited by several authors.80
II.III. Applying Political Theory to the Study of Political Practices: The 
Greek and Greek-Cypriot Cases.
The foregoing analysis of the relevant theoretical frameworks 
hopefully provides clear indications about the way in which our perspective 
on the political theory of nationalism will be applied in the context of the 
Greek and Greek Cypriot cases: our initial engagement with the particular 
case-studies of the dissertation at hand, will start by examining the structural 
conditions that facilitated the birth of nationalism in the two countries that 
will be studied here. Here, Anthony Smith's emphasis on 'the crisis of
78 See the book of Akis Gavriilidis, 2007. Z to v  Kdajio t o v  A v B e v t ik o v  Eipaore 'OXoi Etvoi [In the 
World of Authentic, we are all Foreigners], (Athens: IlavoimKov), where the author applies the 
theoretical framework of Stavrakakis & Chiysoloras in his study of Greek nationalist 
intellectuals, particularly of the acclaimed Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis.
79 Nikos Chiysoloras, 2004a. "The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church", in the 
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 30.1.2004, pp. 97-119 and Nikos Chiysoloras, 2004b. 
"Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture", in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
vol.4.1.2004, pp. 40-61
80 See for example, Maria Koundoura, 2007. The Greek Idea: The Formation of National and 
Transnational Identities (London: Tauris), p. 189. Tomasz Kamusella, 2009. The Politics of 
Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (Basingstoke: MacMillan), p. 263. Yannis 
Stavrakakis, 2008. The Lacanian Left, (New York: SUNY Press), p. 208
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legitimation' in pre-modem societies and the existence of 'ethnic' cultured 
material in the referent populations which later formed nations is 
instrumental for understanding why Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms 
took their specific forms in these specific communities. Subsequently, 
discourse theory will be used to analyze and elucidate the semiotic/rhetorical 
structure of nationalist discourses and the practices that perpetuate them: 
"the multifarious practices and rituals, verbal and non-verbal, through which 
a certain sense of reality and understanding of society were constituted and 
maintained".81
Hence, the importance of cultural bonds and customs that provided 
populations in present day Greece and Cyprus with a sense of community 
cannot be underestimated. For a number of reasons, Orthodoxy was the most 
prominent of these bonds. This is not only because, like nationalism, religion 
is a comprehensive doctrine that ascribes meaning to most aspects of the 
society in which one lives in. Social hierarchy, good and evil, sacred and 
profane, ethics, relations with the other sex and the social Other, daily 
routines, etiology of natural phenomena, customs, even dietary habits, are just 
some of the aspects of hum an life that have been profoundly influenced by 
religion, especially in pre-modern times, when science had not yet put 
religious metaphysics into question.
Moreover, we could not fail to note the absence of any other significant 
social institution or cultural characteristic which could match the place of 
Orthodox Christianity in the lives of the people in Greece and Cyprus. This
81 Aletta Norval, 1996, p.2 as cited in David Howarth, Discourse
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becomes evident if we consider that the Orthodox Christian subjects of the 
Sultan could not unite around political parties, military leaders, armies, or 
any other political or cultural force, simply because this was strictly 
prohibited in the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say that identification with the 
Sultan himself, a distant ruler with a foreign language, religion and habits, 
was not any less improbable. On the other hand, Orthodoxy, beyond its 
prominent place in the system of beliefs of Christian subjects, enjoyed quite 
important political privileges and rights, which made its transformation into a 
vehicle of nationalist political claims, a likely outcome.
The details of the politicization of the Orthodox culture will be 
examined in the following chapters. For the moment, it is worth pointing out 
that nationalism not only shifted the meaning of concepts like 'Greece', 
'Cyprus', 'Christian', 'M uslim ', 'nation', and others; it also used these 
concepts in the construction of a new reality for the people of the region, in 
which both personal ('I') and collective identities ('we') are seen through the 
prism of the Helleno-Christian political discourse.
II.IV. Sources
I have reached to the abovementioned conclusions following the study 
of a wide range of primary and secondary sources, related to my research 
question. More specifically, my basic primary source for the formative period 
of Greek nationalism, which is examined in Chapter III of this thesis, were the 
Archives of the Greek National Awakening [Ta Apxeia rrjc, EXkr\viKr\(^  
naXiyyeveoiafl. This is a collection of the full body of available legal 
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documents, speeches, official statements, and laws, which were issued during 
and immediately after the Greek War of Independence. They were published 
in 2003 by the Parliament of Greece, both in electronic form and in 28 hard­
copy volumes. In this priceless source of historical information, the reader can 
observe and appreciate the fierce ideological and political struggles which 
marked the "birth" of m odem  Greece, as well the first signs of the 
consolidation of Helleno-Christian nationalism. Moreover, I consulted all of 
the constitutional texts of m odern Greece and Cyprus, in which a meticulous 
researcher can trace the institutional dimension of Helleno-Christian 
discourse. Finally, as I am going to argue in the following chapter, Helleno- 
Christian nationalism was crystallized in Constantinos Paparrigopoulos' 
monumental work, titled The History of the Greek Nation -  from the ancient years 
until the present day [Ioropia t o o  EXktjinxov Edvoog -  and t c d v  apxaiomTCDv xpovcov 
piXP1 TCDV veorspcDv], which was completed in 1876. Paparrigopoulos was the 
historian who shaped the narrative of the "uninterrupted history of the Greek 
nation", in which Orthodoxy is a primary factor of unity. Since the thesis at 
hand places this narrative under scrutiny, Paparrigopoulos' history was a 
basic point of reference. Needless to say, I conducted research on the work of 
other important 19th century Greek historians, intellectuals and decision 
makers (e.g. Adamantios Koraes, Theoclitos Pharmakidis, Constantine 
Oikonomos, Spyridon Zambelios, and others). However, their views do not 
feature extensively in the thesis, since, as I demonstrate in the relevant 
chapters, the formation of Helleno-Christian nationalism started to take shape
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in the legal documents of the W ar of Independence, and was completed by 
Paparrigopoulos.
Further primary sources of data were the official Church publications, 
statements, and leaflets (e.g. Apostle Vamavas [AjrdoroXog Bapvafiag] -  the 
periodical of the Church of Cyprus; Ethniki Epalksi [Edvucrj E7iaX§rj] - a 
periodical publication of the Church of Cyprus). Special emphasis was also 
placed on the views expressed by archbishop Makarios, of the Church of 
Cyprus, and archbishop Christodoulos, of the Church of Greece. As it will 
become obvious in the following chapters, these two personalities had a 
profound influence in the political discourse of the Church of Cyprus and 
Greece, respectively. During their archbishopric tenure, all dissenting voices 
within the Church were marginalized, while, for the vast majority of the 
population in Greece and Cyprus, Christodoulos and Makarios were 
considered the rightful "voices" of Orthodoxy, by virtue of their place as 
heads of the respective Holy Synods. Hence, the reader of the thesis will find 
several references to Sunday sermons, books, speeches, statements and 
political manoeuvres, by Christodoulos and Makarios.
As part of my research, I spent two years in Greece, six months in 
Cyprus, as well as three weeks in Istanbul. During this period, I had the 
chance to attend Sunday masses, listen to several sermons, follow closely the 
local press, study opinion polls and social surveys, discuss my research with 
academics, clergymen (including Patriarch Bartholomew) and intellectuals, 
visit Greek and Cypriot libraries, and even observe, as participant, numerous 
rituals related to the Helleno-Christian culture. References to this rich body of 
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ethnographic material are mostly found in the introduction and the fifth 
chapter of the thesis. Nonetheless, my central arguments are the product of 
the study and interpretation of legal documents, and archival and historical 
sources, and not of ethnographic research or participant observation. 
Although a discussion regarding the epistemological foundations of 
ethnography is well beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth pointing out 
that the reason for excluding some of the field research material is the fact that, 
due to my personal background, I often found it impossible to position myself 
"objectively" within the particular cultural context of my case studies.82 
Therefore, the study of discourses (texts, ideologies, institutions, laws) from a 
"safe distance" was seen as a much more reliable route to draw  sound 
conclusions. This is not to suggest that ethnography lacks heuristic value, but 
only a rem ark regarding its weight the specific research project.
The theoretical framework of the thesis was formed while I was 
studying for an M.A. in Political Theory at the University of Essex and, later, 
while attending the Doctoral Workshop in Ethnicity and Nationalism, at the 
London School of Economics. Although it is original, I draw  on a wide range 
of primary and secondary sources, both in the field of nationalism studies, 
and in political philosophy (see bibliography). Some of my initial findings 
were also presented and discussed in workshops and academic conferences,83
82 See: Edward Said, 1995. Orientalism (London: Penguin); James Clifford, 1988. The 
Predicament of Culture (Boston: Harvard University Press);
83 June 2004, ECPR Standing Group on European Studies Conference, John Hopkins 
University, Bologna Campus. Paper presented on "Orthodoxy, Greek national identity and 
the European Union; April 2004, ASEN Conference, LSE, London: "The Nationalism Debate". 
Paper presented on the relationship between religion and nationalism in Greece; February 
2004, 6th Annual Kokkalis Workshop, JFK School of Government, Harvard University: 
"Religion in South-Eastern Europe: Historical and Contemporary". Paper presented on the 
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and subsequently published in the form of three articles in peer reviewed 
academic journals.84 In short, the questions posed in this thesis have been 
tackled from almost every available angle.
"relevance of A.D. Smith's theoretical framework for the study of Greek nationalism"; June 
2003, 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Modem Greece: "Current Social Science Research on 
Greece". Paper presented on Religion and Nationalism in Greece
84 "I Can Get No Enjoyment: Lacanian Theory and the Analysis of Nationalism" (with Yannis 
Stavrakakis), in Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, vol. 11, 2006, pp. 144-163; "Why 
Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greece", in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol. 
4.1., July 2004, pp. 40-61; "The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church", in the 
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 30.1, June 2004, pp. 97-119
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Chapter III: The Period of National Identity 
Construction in Greece, 1830-1864
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III.I. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe, analyze and explain the emergence of 
nationalism in Greece. Initially, and in accordance w ith the modernist 
approach, we will be arguing that the emergence of the nationalist 
phenomenon in Greece is inseparably linked with the objective conditions of 
modernity. The emergence of an educated Greek-speaking middle class, the 
development of trade and industry, and the diffusion of the liberal, secular 
and scientific spirit of the Enlightenment in the Greek peninsula, were 
instrumental factors for the construction of the idea of the nation. In that 
sense, the Greek nation- like every nation- is an historical and social 
construction which emerges as a result of the fundamental split between the 
pre-m odern and the modern.
However, none of these two features (historicity and social 
construction) of Greek nationalism- or any nationalism for that matter- can 
explain the longevity, specificity, and power of nationalist identifications. If 
Greek national identity was constructed for specific socio-historical reasons, 
then why has it shown such a remarkable resistance to reconstruction or 
deconstruction over the past two centuries? If Greek national identity is a 
simple by-product of the adaptation process of a pre-modern society to a 
m odern bureaucratic state, then why is the Greek nation still the primary 
locus of individual and collective identification in late-modernity? If Greek 
nationalism has been 'produced' by modernized elites and intellectuals, then 
why was it 'consumed' by the people? If nationalism has been inspired by the
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ideals of Enlightenment, then why has Orthodoxy been the cornerstone of 
Greek national identity?
Modernist and constructionist approaches are unable to provide 
answers to those questions. The value of the theoretical framework which is 
proposed in this dissertation is to be found in its ability to deal w ith such 
questions which would otherwise remain unresolved by alternative 
approaches.
The main argument of this chapter is that in order for nationalist 
symbols (language, institutions, architecture, paintings, music, etc.) to gain 
public acceptance and popularity, they have to build on and integrate pre­
existing demotic cultural material, w ith which people are already 
familiarized and which they hold dear. The main source of cultural material 
in the Greek speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire was the Orthodox Church 
and its traditions. Therefore, Orthodoxy was instrumental for the 
consolidation of Modem Greek national identity, and an essential component 
of Greek Helleno-Christian nationalism. Let us start though by providing the 
reader with the historical background on the politicization of the Orthodox 
Church, which may explain both why the Orthodox tradition exercised such 
influence over Greek-speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire, and why 
its position in the Greek state which emerged after the War of Independence 
became an issue of heated political debate. Subsequently, we will move on to 
analyze the political and ideological struggles that took place during the first 
years after independence. During this period of nation building and identity 
formation, several competing nationalist imaginaries tried to win the 
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allegiance of the people and the state and define the content of 'Greekness'. 
O ut of these ideological struggles the hegemonic form of Greek nationalism, 
Helleno-Christianism, emerged which confirmed the position of Orthodoxy 
as an integral part of Greek national identity. Helleno-Christianism remains 
the dom inant way of imagining Greek national identity even in our epoch.
III.II. Orthodoxy before Independence
The roots of the politicization of the Greek Orthodox Church can be 
traced back to the times of the Byzantine Empire. Since its establishment as 
the official religion of the Eastern Roman Empire in the fourth century, the 
Church became a department of the Byzantine state and played an active 
political role in the development of Imperial policy. The ties between the 
Church and the state in Byzantium were legal, political, and most importantly 
'ideological' in nature. The emperor derived his power and legitimacy from 
God ( ' e t e a  O eov /focrzJteog), and the official Orthodox dogma was under the 
protection of the state that showed little, or no religious tolerance at all. It 
may well be argued that the Byzantine emperor was carrying out the role of 
the holy inquisition in Byzantium,85 and that the religious policy of the 
Byzantine Empire was based on the doctrine, 'one God, one empire, one 
religion'.86
This attitude of the Byzantine Empire was not an idiosyncratically 
Eastern or Orthodox phenomenon. Throughout the medieval Europe, 
religious homogenization was seen as a precondition for the consolidation of
85 V. Adrachtas, 2001. Op. Cit. p. 41
86 Ibid.
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 81
Nikos Chysoloras Department of Government, LSE
the sta te / empire.87 The particularity of Orthodoxy is to be found in the fact 
that it remained an imperial institution throughout the rule of the Byzantine 
and Ottoman Empires in the Balkans (altogether more than fifteen centuries), 
and therefore religion in the region did not follow the path of privatization 
which took place in the rest of Europe, where Enlightenment and nationalism 
displaced the protagonistic role of the Churches in public life.
The 'Great Schism' between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in 1054 
divided Christian Europe into two parts, the 'Byzantine East' and the 'Papal 
West', w ith profound political consequences for the historical and social 
development of the two parts of the Continent.88 If we add the regions that 
followed the Reformation to this map, we will see that the religious division 
of Europe remains unaltered until today, a fact that demonstrates the 
remarkable salience of religious identities even in the milieu of 'secular' 
modernity.
87J. R. Llobera, The God of Modernity, p. 134
88 Some commentators have even attributed the 2010 Greek financial crisis to the religious 
division between East and West. See for example Robert D. Kaplan, "For Greece's economy, 
Geography was Destiny", in the New York Times, April 25,2010
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Map 1: Religious Division of Medieval Europe. Source: Philip Ralph et al. 1997. World 
C ivilizations, (Kingston, MA: R.S. Means Company)
It is, of course, well-known that the reasons for the division of Europe 
between Orthodox East and Catholic West were not solely theological in 
nature. Suffice to say that the Orthodox defiance to negotiate a 
rapprochement with the Pope before the end of the Byzantine Empire 
resulted in a brief occupation of Constantinople by the Crusaders, and, later 
on, the denial of Western Christian kings to help their 'Eastern Christian 
brothers' in their fight against the Ottomans. The justification for this denial 
was the rejection of the prospect for reunification of the two divided 
Churches by the Byzantines. Indeed, the issue of reunification of Catholicism 
and Orthodoxy became quite pertinent in the Byzantine Empire in the years 
just before the fall of the city. After a long period of deliberations and 
discussion, the Orthodox Church eventually rejected the Catholic demands 
for union. In reality, it is doubtful if the fragmented and weak West would be 
in a position to help the Byzantine Empire anyhow, since the Ottoman army
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was at the zenith of its power during that period, and its forces even 
managed to reach the walls of Vienna later. The fall of Constantinople in May 
29,1453 marked the beginning of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans for the next 
four centuries.
The Byzantine legacy left its m ark in the later formation of Greek 
nationalism in two important ways. Firstly, it isolated the territories which 
were to be included in the Greek state after the 1821 War of Independence 
from the rest of Europe. Ottoman rule in the Balkans meant that the 
development of nationalism in the region took place in a social environment 
relatively secluded from the rest of Europe and in a manner distinctively 
'South-Eastern7, given the particularities of the Ottoman system of 
government. To name one of these, anti-Western sentiments, which initially 
sprang from the ecclesiastical Schism, were further inflated by the Crusaders7 
occupation of Istanbul and their denial of help to the Byzantines in the face of 
the Ottoman hazard. In the last days of the Byzantine Empire, a Byzantine 
high official said that he would rather see the turban of the Turk rule in 
Constantinople, than the Latin Mitre.89 This anti-Western attitude influenced 
Greek-speakers of the Byzantine Empire, who gradually started to perceive 
themselves as different and distinct from the rest of the European Christians, 
led them to appreciate their linguistic heritage, and encouraged the use of the 
word 'Hellene7 as a self description:
This development had been well prepared. In the eleventh century, 
the scholar-bishop, John Mauroporus wrote a poem asking Christ to
89 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, (New York: Variorum), 
p. 191
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save Plato and Plutarch. In the twelfth, the decoration of Digenis's 
Palace on the Euphrates...is described as showing Samson, David 
and Goliath; then Achilles, Agamemnon, Penelope, Odysseus, the 
Cyclops, and Bellerephon; then Alexander's victory over Darius, and 
his encounter with the Indian Brahmins; finally, Moses, the exodus, 
and Joshua...In the same century, a writer could describe his father 
as a pure Hellene and a bishop specifically contrasted Hellene with 
barbarian in promoting someone at court.90
This juxtaposition of Hellenism with Christianity was of course 
initially an elite movement, with no evidence suggesting a wider popular 
appeal. However, it did exist among intellectuals and seminal personalities of 
the Byzantine world, like "Georgios Gemistos Plython (c. 1370-1452), 
Cardinal Bessarion (c. 1403-1472) and Constantine XI Palaeologus (1403-1453), 
the last 'Basileus and Autokrator of the Romans' ".91 Anti-Western sentiments 
were further enhanced by the Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox Church, 
due to both religious and political differences.
The second important mark that Byzantium left in the nationalist 
development of the region was the influence of Orthodoxy in the political and 
social life of the Christian subjects, as we shall see in the following section.
III.II.i. Orthodoxy during the Rule of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans
90 Costa Carras, 2004. "Greek Identity: A Long View", in Maria Todorova (ed.), Balkan 
Identities -  Nation and Memory (London: C. Hurst & Co), p.p. 313-314
91 Stephen G. Xydis, 1968. "Mediaeval Origins of Modem Greek Nationalism", in Balkan 
Studies, vol. 9, No. 1, p. 6
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Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalist historiographies have created a number 
of myths with regard to the position of the Orthodox Church under the 
Ottoman rule. The most common of them suggests that the Church suffered 
greatly under the rule of a heterodox imperial ruler. Archbishop 
Christodoulos described the widely accepted view regarding the status of 
Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire as follows: "Frequent insults against the 
Church and its emissaries, m urders of patriarchs, archbishops and other 
priests, abusive characterizations of the Symbol of Faith, raids on holy 
temples and stealing of sacred valuables, turning of churches into mosques, 
and violent islamizations, are just some of the torments of medieval 
Hellenism".92
However, contrary to this common doxa, historical evidence suggests 
that the Church, far from being enslaved, actually operated as an institution 
of the Ottoman establishment: "The Patriarch and the high-ranking clerics 
had assumed responsibility for all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
conquerors. Their power, privileges, and influence were great, not only in 
comparison with the Orthodox people, but also in comparison w ith most 
poor Muslims. We could actually argue that the prestige of Orthodoxy had 
been augmented after 1453, following the decision of the Sultan to allow the
92 Christodoulos, "EiorjYnxiKri OpiXia cni xr\ Euxaipia Zupn\i]pd>0£G)<; 180 xpovov ano xqv 
E§o6o t o o  MEOoXXoyyiou" [Introductory Speech on the Occasion of the 180th Anniversary 
from the Messologi Exodus], April 10, 2006, cited in
http:/ /  www.ecclesia.gr/ greek/ archbishop/ default
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Patriarch to retain all of his Byzantine powers and to exclude the clergy from 
the requirement to pay annual taxes".93
In a highly decentralized system of government, in which local (often 
Greek-speaking) lords enjoyed great autonomy, the Church often found itself 
performing a number of administrative tasks, in addition to its typical 
religious and spiritual functions. These tasks included arbitration in local 
disputes, tax collection, and the supervision of the adherence of Christian 
subjects to traditional Orthodox family law. The words of the Sultan himself 
to the first appointed patriarch after the fall of Constantinople are clear: "Be 
Patriarch, preserve our friendship, and receive all the privileges that the 
Patriarchs, your predecessors, possessed".94 The reasons which led the 
Ottoman Empire to transform the Orthodox Church into a component of the 
state apparatus are beyond the scope of this essay. It suffices to say that they 
were related both to a set of established governance practices in the Empire, 
as well as to the constant pressures created by the influence of Russia to the 
Orthodox populations of the Balkans.95
In short, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, and the emergence of 
the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Orthodox Church found itself again in 
an advantageous political position. Isolated from the emerging religious 
scepticism in Europe, local populations continued to live in accordance and 
harmony with Orthodox traditions, rituals, myths, and symbols. Moreover,
93 Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978]. Oi Ajmpx&S t t/g ZvyKpdTijcrrjg Evyxpovoo Kpdrovg 
otijv EXXada, 1821-1828 [Political M odernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in 
the Formation o f  the M odem  Greek State, 1821-1828]. (Athens: MIET), p. 73
94 Cited in John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, 1969. Modem Greece, (New York: Frederick A. 
Paeger), p. 189
95 Stephanos Papageorgiou, 1988. To EXktjvtKO Kparog, 1821-1829 [The Greek State, 1821- 
1829], (Athens:nana£r]oi]), p. 31
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the religious division between the subjects of the Empire (what is known as 
the millet system) benefited the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople who 
became the spiritual leader of all the enslaved Balkan Christians, responsible 
for the collection of some of their taxes, and the representative of the people 
to the Sublime Porte. "Subaltern Metropolitans, in their turn, became civil 
governors responsible for civil jurisdiction, enjoined, in the words of 
Mahomet II, to 'watch day and night those entrusted with their guidance, to 
observe their conduct, and to discover and report their lawless action to my 
government'; and they looked upon, and addressed, the holder of the 
Ecumenical throne as 'their sovereign, their emperor, and their Patriarch'".96
Finally, since religion became the main -and perhaps only- dividing 
line between Muslims and enslaved subjects, Orthodoxy developed into the 
primary locus of cultural and political identification among Christians. This 
was especially true in times when linguistic and ethnic identities were quite 
fluid within the milieu of the multi-ethnic and multilingual Ottoman Empire. 
An idiosyncratic example of this flexibility of identities was the ethnic group 
of Karamanlis, the members of which were Christians, but spoke only Turkish 
which they wrote with Greek characters.97
The Christian subjects who formed the millet-i-Rum (literally, the 
nation of Romans) and fell under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
were not, of course, exclusively Greek speakers. The Orthodox millet 
"contained Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Orthodox Albanians, and
96 John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, 1969. Modem Greece, (New York: Frederick A. Paeger), 
p. 190
97 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy (New York: Variorum), 
p. 185
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Arabs".98 W hat is interesting for the Greek and Greek-Cypriot cases is the 
progressive Hellenization of Orthodoxy in the course of the years between 
the fall of Constantinople and the Greek War of Independence.99 The 
Ecumenical Patriarchs as well as the vast majority of the highest ranking 
clergy were Greek speakers. This trend was the result of both the 
linguistically Greek Byzantine tradition and Orthodox ritual, but it also 
reflected the social hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, in which the Greek 
element enjoyed a privileged status among the non-Muslim populations. 
One cannot fail to point out that this progressive conflation of the Greek 
language and culture with Orthodox Christianity served later as an important 
nation-building factor in the nationalist era.
However, during the period under investigation, the Hellenization of 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodoxy in general, did not lead the 
Church to an unreserved acceptance of Greek nationalist claims. On the 
contrary, its traditional anti-western sentiments, which dated back to the 
schism of 1054, meant that it considered Enlightenment as a Protestant and 
Catholic political project.100 Moreover, dialect variations between Greek 
speakers in the various parts of the Ottoman Empire impeded the 
communication of nationalist claims, while the same can be said about the 
conflicting interests and political aspirations of the different social classes of 
Greek speakers. Besides, we should not forget that nationalism had not yet
98 Paschalis Kitromilides. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy,, p. 185
99 Charles A. Frazee, 1969. The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 6
100 Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978], Oi Ajiapyic, irjg ZvyKpdTrjarjg Zvyypovov Kpdrovg orrjv 
EXM5a, 1821-1828 [Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation 
of the Modem Greek State, 1821-1828]. (Athens: MIET), p. 75
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been widespread in Europe, while the Orthodox Church functioned in a 
multi-ethnic Empire. For hundreds of years, Orthodoxy had been an imperial 
institution (Byzantine, and later Ottoman). Hence, its scepticism towards 
demands for the creation of national states was something to be expected, 
since it could potentially threaten the Church's political status.
In fact one of the main duties of the Orthodox Church was to ensure 
that the Christian subjects of the Empire would remain obedient to the 
Sublime Porte. Naturally, when the ideas of Western Enlightenment and 
nationalism reached the Balkans, the Church vehemently opposed them. Not 
only western conceptions of progress and science undermined the authority 
of the Orthodox Christian dogma, but they also threatened the ecumenicity of 
the Constantinople Patriarchate by encouraging local populations- mainly 
Slavic- to emancipate their Churches from the Greek-dominated 'Great 
Church' in Istanbul. Nonetheless, by the daw n of the 19th century, the spread 
of Greek nationalism among the Christian subjects of the Sultan was well 
under way. In the preface of an 1802 Greek-Rumanian-Albanian-Bulgarian 
lexicon, the author suggests the following course of action to the non-Greek 
speaking Christians:
Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarians, speakers of other tongues rejoice,
And prepare yourselves all to become Greeks,
Abandoning your barbaric language, speech and customs,
So that they may appear to your descendants as myths.
Do honour to your Nations, together w ith your motherlands,
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By making your Albanian and Bulgarian Motherlands Greek.101 
Nationalism and the consequent nationalizations of local churches 
were developments that the Church opposed for religious, cultural, and 
political reasons. Given the degree of control of the Church over the 
education of Christian pupils, it was unavoidable that the ideas of the West 
and the Enlightenment were filtered through the Orthodox prism before they 
reached the curricula of the various Church schools around the Balkans. 
Moreover, many of the Greek 'Enlighteners' were clerics themselves, and 
therefore, they either transmitted the teachings of Voltaire from their 
Orthodox point of view, or, when they did not, they were persecuted. The 
Patriarch himself published, in 1798, an anonymous pamphlet called T l a T p i K t j  
AiSacncaXia [Paternal Instruction], in which he claims that the rule of the Sultan 
over the Orthodox Christians is a will of God.102 Moreover, he suggested that 
Enlightenment "is a trick of the devil... while the so called political system of 
liberty may seem good at first glance, but it contains the spirit and the venom 
of Satan, which will lead peoples to loss and lawlessness".103
This state of affairs created a tension between, w hat we would call, 
'soft Orthodox enlighteners' who mainly lived in the territories of the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia, and their more radical Diaspora counterparts 
who lived in Western Europe. This tension would later be reflected in the 
political formations and ideological struggles which emerged during and
101 Cited in Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, p. 189
102 ibid.
103 Nikiforos Diamandouros, 2002 [1978]. Oi Artapyec, 17/g EvyKpoTtjcrtjg Evyypovov Kparovg orrjv 
EXXA8a, 1821-1828 [Political Modernization, Social Conflict, and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation 
of the Modem Greek State, 1821-1828\. (Athens: MIET), p. 77
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after the revolution. What is certain is that the Orthodox Church was an 
important part of the everyday life, customs, and political organization of 
Christian subjects in the times of the Ottoman Empire, and that, since it 
functioned in accordance with the Eastern Byzantine tradition and under the 
auspices of the Ottoman apparatus, it was reluctant to identify with western- 
bred nationalist movements.
III.JJ.fi. the Church during the 1821-1829 W ar o f  Independence  
Unlike what is still sometimes maintained in Greek political 
historiography,104 the Orthodox Church was very reluctant to support the 
nationalist War of Independence. As we explained above, there were serious 
political, cultural, and religious reasons for that. The Orthodox establishment 
knew that its spiritual and political authority was put into question by local 
warlords, politicians, and Western-bred nationalists. Indeed, Patriarch 
Gregory V condemned the uprising and excommunicated the 
revolutionaries,105 whiles the Paternal Instruction was published in 
Constantinople, a pamphlet which, as we have seen above, urged the 
Christians before the War of Independence to accept the authority of the 
Sultan, and denounced the ideas of liberty and civil disobedience as the 
works of devil and the atheist French Revolution. However, Gregory's 
conservatism did not save him from decapitation by the Ottoman mob when 
the news about the massacre of Turks in Tripolitsa reached in Istanbul. His
104 Christos Yannaras, 1992. Opdo5o§ia xai Avery anj NeoTeprj EAlada [Orthodoxy and the West in 
Modem Greece], (Athens: Aopo$]
105 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1994. Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, p. 193
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brutal killing turned him from a fierce critic of the revolution to one of its 
martyrs in the eyes of the Orthodox people, and, together w ith the support of 
low-ranking clerics, it served as a legitimizing factor for this very un­
orthodox war.
Besides, the revolutionaries could only legitimize their endeavour and 
thus mobilize the local population by presenting it as being in accordance 
with the will of God and the Orthodox dogma. This is clear in the sources of 
the time. For example, the revolution was often presented as the realization of 
a series of popular folklore myths which predicted the rebirth of the 
Byzantine Empire, the return of the 'Race of Princes' to the throne of 
Constantinople, and the resurrection of the last Emperor of the Byzantine 
Empire, Constantine Palaeologus, who had supposedly turned into stone 
after the fall of the 'City' in 1453. The most popular of these prophecies was 
one that claimed that a fair haired race will deliver the Christians from the 
evil of the Turkish yoke. OiXiktj Emipeia [Friendly Society], the freemason-like 
group which played a seminal role in the organization of the revolution, 
purposefully built on these myths and repeatedly implied that the fair haired 
race (i.e. the Russians), will back the War of Independence.106 Hence, the 
revolution was presented as a Christian struggle against a Muslim oppressor.
The popular painting shown below for example, called 'the Oath', 
shows a Greek revolutionary taking an oath of allegiance to the Friendly 
Society and the cause of Greek Independence in the presence of a priest. This
106 Ibid., pp. 263-275
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is an explicit symbolism which suggests that the revolution enjoyed the 
support of the Church.
An 1823 letter of the "minister of religion" of the second revolutionary 
government, to the bishops of the Cyclades islands is indicative of the effort 
to legitimize the War of Independence on Orthodox grounds:
The Greek race, having suffered from the tyrants for almost four 
centuries, having been deprived from its right to self-government, 
having been scorned and mocked because it observed its sacred 
rules, has started an armed struggle against the infidel oppressors, in 
order to achieve political sovereignty and honour its Orthodox 
faith... may our Lord and Saviour be with us, and guide our 
decisions.107
107 Hellenic Parliament, 2003. Ta Apyeia rrjg EALrjviKrjg nahyyeveoiag 1821- 1832 [The Archives of 
the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832], vol. 14., p. 265 (Original Text in Greek: To 
£ \\t |v ik 6 v  y£vo<5, ctuevov uno to v  xuppavixov ^uyov x£ooapa<; oxeSov aicbva$, Eorepripevov 
i5ia$ noAixuajc; vopoOeoia^ x a i Sioiktjoeco^, nEpioPpi^opsvov Kai n£puppovoD|i£vov 8i' qv  
£TT|p£i 0£iav x a i ekkAtj aiaoriKT) v vopo0£aiav, ExivrjoE xeAooikivxcdv xa onAa xaxa xcov d0£cov 
xupawcov iv a  x a i xqv noAixixrjv xou onap^iv ouoxr)or] x a i xa apcopfjxou x a i op0o8o§ou  
nioxEco^ £nioxr|pi§av 0 d a  x a i i£pa opia euxAeco  ^ xaxaAapnpuvr| x a i oAco$ euieiv £0vo$ 
ava6£ix0r), £§ apcpoxEpcov xouxgov xcov aooxaxxxcbv xou auyxpoxoupEvov. En£i8£v avco0£v o 
moDpavio^ paaiAED^ x a i npooxaxi}$ xou ycvou^, ano6£x0il xov ^rjAov xax£U0uv£ va  
Siaprjpaxa qpcbv....)
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In September 23, 1823, the head of the Greek revolutionary 
government, analyzed the role of religion in public life, in a formal letter he 
also sent to the prelates of the Cyclades islands:
The role of the ministers of our national church is to enlighten our 
people, to spread the word of the Gospel, to set an example of virtue, 
to teach Greeks respect towards our sacred traditions... and to 
contribute to the creation of citizens who will be praiseworthy 
successors of their ancestors and will perform their holy duties, 
assigned to them by heaven.108
The "holy duties assigned by heaven", in which the author of the 
aforementioned letter refers, is the obligation to serve in the cause of the War 
of Independence, which is supposedly the will of God.
But why was this justification of revolution on religious grounds 
necessary? The answer to this question partially lies to what has been argued 
in the previous section. Throughout the years of the Byzantine, Frankish, and 
Ottoman rule in the Balkans, the Church was the only institution that 
retained an extensive degree of civil and spiritual authority in the Balkan 
Peninsula. In the absence of a stable state and army, generation after 
generation of local peoples changed imperial rulers and local prelates, w ith 
the Church being the only stable point of reference as a source of authority 
and legitimacy. Moreover, since the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires isolated 
the local populations from the influence of historical, social, and intellectual 
developments which took place in Europe, Orthodoxy remained the only
108 Ibid., vol.10, p. 208
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locus of cultural identification, and united the Christian subjects of the 
Empire under a set of common rituals, practices, customs, and rights, which 
formed the core of their identity. It is worth that the revolutionary 
government often used a sanctified language to address the people, or even 
threatened those who were not obeying its will, with religious retaliations. 
For example, the minister of religion issued a command in 1822, according to 
which, those who helped the bandit revolutionary Odysseus Androutsos will 
be excommunicated. Among other religious curses, he mentions the 
following:
In the name of our Lord, all those who cooperate w ith this unholy 
monster, this lawless enemy of our religion and our nation, will be 
excommunicated, and cursed, they will not be buried, and will be left 
rotting when they die....They will meet the fate of Judas, and will 
wonder upon the earth like Cain.109
Further evidence of the Orthodox Christian solidarity during the 
initial stages of the struggle for independence can be found in the historical 
records of the time. Many of the protagonists of the revolution were not 
Greek speakers, while Rigas Feraios, its ideological father and a Hellenized 
Slav, argued for the formation of a multi-ethnic Christian Republic in which 
the Greek element will hold a seminal position. The political discourse of the
109 Ibid., vol. 14, p. 254 (Original text in Greek: Tov onoiov ev ovopcm Kupiou ZapacbG, pe 
o\ou$ exeivous oooi nox£ r|0eXav cpavf| poi]0oi ano xcbpa xai uaxepa £i$ xa empXapfj 
cppovf|paxa x o d  xaxonoiou xouxou, xou xaxacppovqxou x i j s  0pr)oxda^, xou napapdxou xcov 
vopcov, xou exGpoii) xi]<; naxpiSo*;, xouxou^ navxa? ilex' auxou exopev acpcopiapEvoui;, 
Kaxi]pa|i£vou$, aouyxci>pi]xous xai aXbxou  ^ pexa Gavaxov xai xupnaviaiou^. 
K\i]povo|ii]oeiav...xi]v ayx6vi]v xou npoSoxou Iou5a. Hxevovxe  ^eiqoav xai xpepovxe^ enixi]$ 
Ti]5 0)^  o Kaiv...)
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revolutionary governments often implied that the Greek nation owes its 
existence to Orthodoxy:
The character, the customs, the ethos, the elegant language, the 
ancestral glory, and the name of our nation derive from our holy 
religion. We owe our very political existence and independence to 
our religion, since the Great Lord of Christians, who defends his 
Church, fights on our side against tyranny and blasphemy.110
Moreover, it is often forgotten that the War of Independence broke out 
simultaneously in mainland Greece, and the Danubean principalities, where 
Romanian-speaking populations were in majority. However, the revolution 
only survived in the southern parts of Greece (Peloponnese, the Cyclades 
islands, and Roumelis).
Finally, there was a further-more practical- reason which necessitated 
the support of the Church for the War of Independence. In poverty ridden 
regions, the -often fortified for fear of bandits and pirates- monasteries were 
important sources of funding for the war, while Sunday masses gave the 
opportunity for revolutionary indoctrination to illiterate local peoples. 
Indeed, despite the excommunication of the revolutionaries by the 
Patriarchate, many bishops and clergy in Peloponnesus, the southern part of 
the Greek mainland, joined the struggle:
110 Ibid., vol. 10, p. 207 (Original Text in Greek: To eX X tjv ix o v  £0vo<; £15 xqv lepdv t o o  
0pi]OK£iav ocp£i\£i xov xopuKUlpa t o o ,  xa f|0r] t o o ,  xa £0ipa t o o ,  xrjv npoyovixfiv t o o  
e o x A e u iv  xai xo Xapnpov ovopa t o o .  Eh; xi]v i£pav t o o  OpijoxEiav ocpEiXEi xa oipi£piva$ 
apiox£ia<; t o o ,  xqv avE^apxqaiav xai xi]v noXxnxr|v t o o  bnap^iv, Sum Mfiyag o ©£05 x o v  
Xpicmavcbv, 00x15 unEpaani^Exai xa Sixain tc d v  xai xi]v ayiav t o o  ExxXrjoiav xai aopp&xexai 
pET7 aoxGbv xaxa xi]5 avopia^ xai xr|5 aoEpsia^)
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There, Bishop Germanos of Old Patra distinguished himself in the 
capture of his city from the Turks; other bishops were imprisoned 
and died while in captivity in Tripoli. Many village priests (there 
were 2,400 in the Peloponnesus in 1821), since they were natural 
leaders of their communities, enthusiastically joined the armies 
which sought the expulsion of the Turks.111
However, there were various problems regarding the support of the 
Church for the nationalist cause of the Greeks. First of all, this support could 
only be given at a local level, since, as we have already noted, it was not 
feasible for the 'Great Church of Constantinople', to officially support a 
nationalist and separatist struggle. Other autonomous Christian churches, 
like the church of Crete, tried to contain the spread of the War of 
Independence in their territories. The bishop of the province of Chania, in 
Crete, for instance, wrote the following letter to be read during the Sunday 
mass in every Church under his jurisdiction, in July 15,1822:
Our Great master, the Sultan, has ordered me to reassure you that 
you should not be afraid. If you lay down your arms and swords and 
demonstrate your allegiance to him, he will do you harm. Even if 
you have participated in the revolution, and have realized your 
mistake, he will forgive you like a good father.112
111 Charles Frazee, 1977. "Church and State in Greece", in John T. A. Koumoulides (ed.), 
Greece in Transition -1821-1974. (London: Zeno), p. 130
112 Hellenic Parliament, 2003. Op. Cit., vol. 15a, p. 116 (Original text in Greek: Aoraov i8oi!> k c i i  
xcbpa pe npooxayr|v xou uipqAoxaxou aoOevxo^ pa$, oa$ ypatp© naAi xai oa$ pepaubvoo 8ia  
axdpaxds xou 6xi noxi: x o v e v o v  <popov pr]v e x £ x e . Movov va £A0r|X£ xai va npooxuvqoEXE yia 
xo xaAo oa<;, va f|ax£ nciXi E19 xa onaOiav xai npaypaxa oa$ anEipaxxoi xai avEvoxAipoi. 
EnEiSrj xai e x e I v o u ^  onoo and x i jv  ayvoooiav xou$ xai p£ va xou$ yEAaoouv xaxoi avOpamoi 
EouxcDoav xa dppaxd xou<; xaxa xr|$ Toupxia^, oav yvajpioouv T°  ocpaXpa xou  ^ xai 
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In other words, many officials and bishops of the Orthodox Church 
found it difficult to endorse the revolution, even if they wanted to. In 
addition to that, it gradually became evident that the struggle of 
independence could only be fought and won in -mainly- Greek-speaking 
regions. This was due to both tactical-strategic and socio-economic reasons, 
which lie beyond the scope of this essay. It thus became more and more a 
nationalist, rather than a social or religious struggle.
Therefore, even the local clergy, which also enjoyed a number of 
privileges under the Ottoman regime, began to doubt the cause. On the other 
hand, those church officials and clerics who joined the w ar had to come into 
conflict with the Patriarchate which remained faithful to the Sultan. Christos 
Yannaras also emphasizes the canonical problems which were caused by the 
revolution: The Patriarchate was unable to exercise control over the liberated 
regions and thus elect new bishops, arbitrate ecclesiastical disputes, or send 
holy Myron (holy oil), which is necessary for the baptism of Orthodox 
children.113
The 3rd National Assembly, which was convened in 1827, addressed 
the issue and decided that the Greek Church should not become 
autocephalous, but temporarily autonomous. The bishops who participated 
in the Assembly argued the following:
Since all of us, and above all the holy clergy of the Eastern Church, 
know no other mother than the Great Church, and no other head,
ji£Tavof|oouv Kdi acpr|oouv xa appaxa, xou<; EoonXaxvi^ EXE, xou^ OD|ina0d Kai xou$ pdvEi 
naXi £15 xa§ ayxaXa^ tod, cooav ko\6<; Kupr)$ xa naiSid xou)
113 Christos Yannaras, 1992. Opdo5o§ia m i Avarj orrj Neorepr] EXXASa [Orthodoxy and the West in 
Modem Greece], (Athens: Armos), p. 262
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other than the Patriarch of Constantinople, and, since his Holiness, 
Patriarch Gregory was sacrificed a few years ago in defence of faith 
and country, it is impossible for us to break apart from this Church, 
and so the Bishops who currently preach in Greece will govern our 
churches, according to our strength, without causing any schism or 
division in our spiritual and ecclesiastical unity [with the Church of 
Constantinople] ,114 
Nonetheless, this anomalous situation in which the spiritual leader of 
the revolutionaries was politically opposed to their struggle and subject to an 
enemy of the newborn state would later create problems to independent 
Greece and was finally resolved with the autocephaly of the Greek Church. 
The most important intellectual of the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios 
Koraes, had pointed out the problem from as early as 1821:
The part of Greece which has been liberated thus far does not need 
anymore to recognize as ecclesiastical head the Patriarch of 
Constantinople for as long as Constantinople remains stained by the 
throne of the unholy tyrant, but needs to be governed by a Synod of 
priests, elected freely by the lay and the clergy, as it was besides 
happening in the ancient Church, and is still maintained in Russia 
which shares the same religion with Greece. For it is not fitting for 
the clergy of the liberated Greeks to obey in the commands of a
114 Cited in Ibid., p. 264
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Patriarch who is elected by a tyrant and is obliged to live under the
sword of a tyrant.115
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Orthodox tradition and way 
of life had to co-exist in the Greek kingdom with the m odern and secular 
ideals of the West which were advanced by the philhellenic movement, the 
post-revolutionary Bavarian government and the western-bred intellectuals 
of the revolution: This 'Hellenic' "strand of modern Greek identity... posited 
classical EXkac, (Hellas), in a central position in attempts to articulate a 
modernizing vision for the populations and territories in question. Informed 
by the intellectual force of the Western European Enlightenment and 
supported by its localized rearticulation in what has been called Neohellenic 
Enlightenment, this strand looked forward and backward: forward towards 
the establishment of a Hellenic state with clear European orientation, and 
backward towards the rediscovery/invention of a classical Greece that 
Western Europe, or more broadly Europe, claimed as one of its originary 
topoi, and that was, in addition, purged of the contaminating presence of the 
backward 'oriental barbarism' of the Ottoman Empire, and to a lesser extent 
of the memory of what was still viewed as Oriental Byzantium".116 In that 
sense, the juxtaposition of Orthodoxy with m odern politics turned out to be a 
necessary, but problematic political articulation, in the new framework which 
was created as a result of the successful War of Independence.
115 Cited in Ibid., p. 265
116 Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History -  Nationalism in Greece and 
Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.22
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III.IIL Orthodoxy after the War of Independence, 1830-1864 
As we have seen in the previous sections, there has been an ideological 
friction in the Greek-speaking world during the revolution. On the one hand, 
there was a population that defined its identity with reference to its religious 
persuasion, as well as with the rituals and practices which were associated 
with this religious affiliation. On the other hand, nationalism and the spirit of 
the Enlightenment (including science and secularism) had come to Greece by 
Diaspora Greek-speaking intellectuals who were more detached from the 
Orthodox culture of the Ottoman East. And, in the middle of all this, were 
those in charge of drawing the ideological and political principles of the War 
of Independence who tried to reconcile this friction. Finally, one should 
always bear in mind that the War of Independence was legitimized in the 
eyes of romantics and neo-classicist Europeans on the basis of the ancient 
Hellenic heritage of M odem Greeks. Frederick Rosen summarizes the reasons 
for which the War of Independence drew public sympathy in England:
1. The birth of European civilization was indebted to the ancestors of 
Modern Greeks (who used similar alphabet and language), and 
therefore all European countries had to support the Greeks as a sign 
of recognition of this huge obligation.
2. Greeks were a Christian people who were fighting hard against the 
faithless Turks. Lack of support to the Greeks in their holy struggle 
m eant that [Europe] would ignore its Christian duties.
3. Support towards Greece would lead to the creation of trade 
opportunities, not just with this new state, but with the wider
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Mediterranean region, since this would limit the influence of the 
Ottoman Empire.117 
The problems that these ideological frictions created in the nation-building 
process of the newborn Greek state became apparent from as early as 1827. In 
that year, the 3rd National Assembly attempted to delineate who is Greek and 
who is not. In article 6, of the constitution it produced, it concluded to the 
following criteria:
Greeks are:
a. All locals within the Greek territory who believe in Christ.
b. All the Christians who migrated from the Ottoman territories to our 
liberated land, in order to participate in the War of Independence, or 
to live here.
c. Everyone who has been bom  abroad to a Greek father....118
In any case, the destruction of the Ottoman navy in Navarino by the 
allied English, French, and Russian naval forces, that same year, opened the 
way for the creation of a geographically compact, but, de jure at least, 
independent Greece. However, it would not be an overstatement to argue 
that what the first Greek governor, Ioannis Kapodistrias, found when he 
came to Greece in 1828 was complete and utter chaos. Empty coffers, 
continuing battles w ith the Ottoman forces, a country run by local warlords 
and bandits, and a central government the authority of which did not extend
117 Rosen, Frederick, 1998. O EXkrjvtKoc, Edvuciopog m i o BpeiaviKog OiXEXevQepiajioc,, [Greek 
Nationalism and British Liberalism], translated by Maria-Christina Hadjiioanou, (Athens: 
Kevrpo NeoeXXrjviKcbv Epeovcov EOvucoo ISpupcrro  ^Epeuvcov), pp. 27-28
118 Hellenic Parliament, 2003. Op. Cit., vol. 3, p. 652. See the appendices for the original text in 
Greek.
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beyond the gates of the capital, were just a few of the problems that the 
governor had to face when he accepted his post. Naturally, ecclesiastical 
issues did not feature high in his priorities. Nonetheless, the severed links 
between the Greek clergy and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the fact that 
the Patriarch did not recognize the existence of an independent Greece posed 
a problem for him, a problem which he unsuccessfully tried to solve. His 
efforts for a rapprochement w ith the Ecumenical Patriarchate were largely 
fruitless. However, despite the fact that he was a very religious man himself, 
he did adopt a set of secularizing measures in line with western European 
legal systems. For example, the creation of a proper judiciary system, which 
included courts of appeal, limited the authority of church tribunals. On the 
other hand, his policies which aimed at the improvement of the financial and 
educational situation of the Greek Church and clergy were fragmentary and 
short-lived.119
After the assassination of the first Greek Governor, the 'Great Powers' 
of Europe decided to appoint Prince Otto of Bavaria as king of the Greeks. 
Clearly, king Otto and his Bavarian government took the neo-classicist side in 
the debate concerning Modern Greek identity. They transferred the capital 
from Nafplion to the historically symbolic city of Athens (which was then a 
mere village of not more than 4,000 people), they commissioned the 
construction of a series of impressive neo-classical buildings, and worked 
hard so as to create a legal framework for Greece similar to the one already 
established in Western European monarchies.
119 Charles Frazee, Op. Cit., p.74
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Picture 1: The University of Athens. It was built in 1839 based on a study drawn by the 
Danish architect Christian Hansen
Picture 2: The National Library in Athens
Picture 3: The Academy of Athens
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Picture 4: The Cathedral of Athens, completed in 1862. Note that its style is alien to
Orthodox architecture
Within this general climate of modernization and westernization, the 
Bavarian regency tried to solve the aforementioned problem between the 
Greek Church and the Patriarchate along the lines and the philosophy of the 
Western model of church-state relations. In 1832, Otto wrote to his father: "If 
the heads of the Greek Church get involved into politics, by explicitly 
supporting a specific party, this could be dangerous for the monarch, because 
it would turn the whole clergy and the people against him. This problem may 
be circumvented if we create a governing body for the Church and place one 
of the bishops of the country as its head. The head of this Synod will be like 
the Speaker of our parliaments, meaning that he will not hold real executive
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powers. The king will also have the authority to appoint new members on 
this Synod, at regular intervals".120
In other words, it was clear that Otto would strive to weaken the 
Russian influence in Greece, which was mainly communicated by the 
Orthodox Church, and consolidate royal authority within the borders of the 
new state.121 In March 15, 1833, the Bavarians established a committee that 
would analyze the current state of affairs in the Greek Church and suggest 
ways to ameliorate its condition. The committee was led by the secretary of 
state on religious and educational issues and the liberal bishop Theoclitos 
Pharmakidis, both members of the English party. The commission 
unanimously decided in its first meeting that "recognizes no other spiritual 
leader other than its founder, Jesus Christ, and no other political leader than 
the king of Greece, while it remains dogmatically united with all the Eastern 
Orthodox Churches".122
With a royal decree of 1833, the Eastern Orthodox Apostolic Church of 
Greece was declared autocephalous and independent from the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. The attempt of the government to resolve the ecclesiastical issue 
concluded to the following decisions:
1) The Church of the Kingdom of Greece does not recognize any 
other spiritual leader other than the founder of the Church, Jesus
120 Cited in John A. Petropoulos, 1997 [1968]. nohm d] m i EoyKpdTrjor] Kpawoc, oro EXkrjvtKO 
BaoiXeio, 1833-1843 [Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843], (Athens: MIET),
p. 218
121 Lena Louvi, "To EXXijviko Kpcrrcx; 1833-1871: To IIoXitiko IlXaioio xoov npcbxcov 
Bupaxiopajv [The Greek State 1833-1871: the Political Framework of its first Steps]", in lanopia 
tov Niov EXbjxnofioo 1770-2000 [History of Modem Hellenism 1770-2000], Athens: EXXijvucd 
Tpdppaxa, vol. 4., p. 11.
122 Georgios Karayannis, 1997. EKKXijoia Kai Kpaxo^ 1833-1897 [Church and State 1833-1897], 
(Athens: To novxixi), p. 13
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Christ, while its political head is the King of Greece, and it shall 
remain independent of any other Church.123
2) The Greek Orthodox Church is administered by a 5 members 
Synod, while a royal representative participates in every meeting of 
this Synod. Any decision taken in the absence of the royal 
representative is not valid. The Greek Church retained only its 
spiritual and dogmatic bonds with the other Orthodox Churches.124 
It was clear that these views represented a westernized model of ecclesiastical 
organization, and reflected the stance of the Bavarian government. W hat is 
more important though, is that the seeds of the continuous intertwining 
between the church and the state over the past two centuries rest in the 
aforementioned decisions. From the publication of this royal diktat onwards, 
the Greek Church was not allowed to retain any form of relationship w ith 
other Orthodox Churches (in Constantinople an d /o r Moscow), other than 
strictly dogmatic and spiritual.
IILIII.i. the Institutional Consolidation of the Helleno-Christian Thesis
The new canonical law which established the autocephaly of the Greek 
Church was drafted by the Bavarian jurist and regent, Georg Ludwig von 
Maurer, with the valuable help and support of two like-minded Greek 
officials, Spyridon Trikoupis and Theocletos Pharmakidis. Especially the 
latter played a vital role in convincing both the bishops of the Kingdom as 
well as a fair number of refugee bishops from the Ottoman Empire that
123 Cited in Christos Yannaras, Opdo6o§ia m i Avarj [Orthodoxy and the West], p.p. 266-267
124 Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit.
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autocephaly was logical, necessary, and in accordance with the Orthodox 
tradition. John Petropoulos notes the "the arrangement concerning Church- 
state relations in Greece was directed by Maurer, viceroy responsible for 
ecclesiastical issues, education and justice. Maurer was a Protestant and the 
relevant decree was inspired by his own secular values and the example of 
Bavaria, where state authority was imposed on the functioning of both the 
Catholic and the Protestant Churches".125 We should also add that Maurer 
was himself the son of a Protestant pastor.
The precedent of the autocephaly of the Cypriot Church provided his 
arguments with additional support, while similar views had also been 
expressed by the most prominent Greek intellectual of the time, Adamantios 
Koraes. The first two articles of the royal decree concerning the autocephaly 
of the Greek Church read as follows:
Article One: The Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of the Kingdom of 
Greece, in spiritual matters recognizes no head other than the founder 
of the Christian faith, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, while in 
secular affairs it respects the authority of the King of Greece. It is 
autocephalous and independent of all other authority, but preserves 
perfect unity according to the doctrines professed by the Orthodox 
Eastern Churches.
Article Two: The highest ecclesiastical authority is entrusted, under the 
authority of the King, to a permanent Synod, entitled "The Holy Synod 
of the Kingdom of Greece'. The King will determine by an organic
125 John A. Petropoulos, 1997 [1968]. IloXmKrj m i EvYKpoTrjor] Kparovg oro EXXrjviKO BacriXeio, 
1833-1843 [Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843], (Athens: MIET), p. 217
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decree of the Secretary of State who will exercise this authority, and 
under whom, as regards this authority, the Synod will act. The Synod 
will hold its meetings at the seat of the Government and it will have its 
own seal, with a cross engraved on it exactly like that on the national 
arms and with the inscription "Holy Synod of Greece'.126
Moreover, the decree ordered the closing of all monasteries with less than 
six monks, the mandatory expulsion from monasteries of all trainee monks 
and all nuns aged under 40, and the nationalization of the estates of the 
closed monasteries.127 Hence, in September 25, 1833, 412 out of the 545 
monasteries were closed down and their estates and valuables were 
confiscated in order to fund the deprived farmers of the new state. 
Nonetheless, many commentators note that, given the extensive corruption of 
that time, it is doubtful whether the seized property and holdings were 
actually used for the intended purposes.128
Furthermore, the control of the state over church decisions was so firm 
that is expectantly triggered fierce reaction. As we noted above, a royal 
delegate was to attend all meetings of the Holy Synod, while any decisions 
taken in his absence would be considered null and void. In fact, any Synodal 
decision required direct ratification by the king. Church officials, who 
disagreed with this unusual state of affairs, seized the opportunity given by 
the revolt of 1843, which forced the king to limit his powers with the
126 Charles Frazee, Op. Cit., p. 113
127 Christos Yannaras, Opdo8o§ia teat Avert] [Orthodoxy and the West], p. 272
128 Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. Cit.
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establishment of a constitution. They asked the National Assembly to 
withdraw the autocephaly clause.
Their demands were not accepted, but some amendments were made. The 
first post-revolutionary Greek constitution of 1844 reaffirmed the authority of 
the king, but clarified that the church recognizes no one as its head other than 
its founder, and is spiritually united with the 'Great Church of 
Constantinople' and every other Orthodox Church.129 In addition to that, 
article 40 of the 1844 constitution required that the succeeding heirs to the 
Greek throne should be Christian Orthodox. The same provision was also 
established for the royal delegate to the Holy Synod.
In the following years, the Greek government attempted to normalize its 
tense relations w ith ecumenical throne. Finally, in June 29, 1850, the 
Patriarchate declared the autocephaly of the Greek Church (without however 
recognizing its previous status as autocephalous), on the condition that its 
administration will be carried out in accordance with the 'Holy Canons', 
without any state interference. The Patriarchate demanded that the election of 
bishops to the Holy Synod, as well as other, strictly internal, affairs will not 
be subjected to state ratification.130 The Greek government accepted these 
demands and issued a new ecclesiastical charter in 1852 that limited the 
powers of the royal delegate - and the government - in the Holy Synod. That 
said, the royal delegate's presence remained necessary for the ratification of
129 Ivi Mavromoustakou "To EAAqvuco Kparo$ 1833-1871: IIoXiTiKoi ©ecrpoi K a i  Aioua]-nKT| 
OpYcrvoooi] [The Greek State 1833-1871: Political Institutions and Administrative 
Organization]", in Ioropia t o o  Nioo EXXrjvioyov 1770-2000 [History of Modem Hellenism 1770- 
2000\, vol. 4., p. 36.
Ibid.
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Synodal decisions, while the king was still the one who appointed bishops, 
although his decision was limited by the suggestions of the Holy Synod. The 
charter was not revised until 1923, whilst its basic principles remain the same 
even today.
In 1863, King Otto was expelled from Greece, and he was replaced by 
Prince George of the Danish royal house of Glucksburg. The house reigned 
until 1973, when monarchy was abdicated in Greece. A new constitution was 
drawn in 1864, in which, however, the provisions regulating church-state 
relations remained as they were.
The ecclesiastical charter's provisions obviously were related to the status 
Orthodox Church of Greece, which is also the main focus of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that not the entire geographical surface 
of m odern Greece falls under the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Greek 
Church, which is limited to the territories of the first Greek state, with the 
additions of the Eptanese islands, Epirus and Thessaly. The island of Crete 
has its own semi-autonomous Orthodox Church. In the north of the country, 
there is the administratively autonomous monastic community of M ount 
Athos (Aghion Oros), while the ecclesiastical dioceses of the Dodecanese 
islands fall under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Finally, the 
territories that were annexed to the Greek state, during its century-long 
expansion, known as the 'new territories', have a different ecclesiastical status 
in comparison with the 'old territories', and their bishops are supposedly 
elected with the approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch.
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With this ecclesiastical constitution the church continued the tradition of 
operating as a state department. The aforementioned royal decree brought it 
under the direct authority of the state and nationalized Orthodoxy in Greece, 
after the example of the Bavarian model. The essence and the spirit of this 
legal arrangement remain intact even in our epoch as we shall see in the 
following chapters. In addition to that, the laws of the Greek kingdom 
provided for the religious indoctrination of young pupils in the Orthodox 
dogma. The Holy Synod adopted the national arms as its symbol, and the state is 
using the sign of the cross as national arms. However, this legal regime only 
explains one facet of Helleno-Christianism, i.e. the nationalisation of 
Orthodoxy. We now need to turn our attention, to its other facet, which is the 
sacralisation of nationalism.
in.III.ii. The Ideological Consolidation of the Helleno-Christian Thesis 
Unlike what is usually argued, the period of national identity formation in 
Greece was not characterized by the presence of only two opposing blocs: the 
modernizers and the traditionalists. In a sense, contemporary historians who 
analyze the ideological struggles of the period under investigation as a debate 
between "progressive modernizers" and "conservative traditionalists" seem 
to fall into the fallacy of anachronism. For how can the obvious differences 
between the vision of the Greek nation espoused by Rigas Feraios and the one 
espoused by Adamantios Koraes, fit into the "progress/tradition" 
dichotomy? Rather than that, as we shall see in the following pages, multiple- 
and equally nationalist- paradigms of Greek national identity were
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articulated by a plethora of agents: from a republican nationalism (Kairis, 
Koraes, and others), to an extremely theocratic conception of the nation 
(Oikonomos, Fanariots, and luben Orthodox). Between these two extremes, 
there were less radical, but equally nationalist views (Pharmakidis, 
Enlighteners, Bavarians, etc). Other nationalist views also existed, which 
cannot easily fit to a 'religious/ non-religious' ideological spectrum (e.g. the 
Helleno-Ottoman position).
The basic difference between these competing notions of 'Greekness' 
was the weight that classical antiquity, and Orthodoxy should respectively 
have in the formation of national identity. As Ozkirimli and Sofos rightly 
argue, the 'Hellenic' narrative of Greek national identity was characterized by 
a serious inconsistency: "the linear past of the nation was invariably 
disrupted, as Koraes and his disciples could not account for the severing of 
modern Greece's link to classical antiquity that arose from the establishment 
of a Christian (not Hellenic) Byzantine Empire, the 'dark ' centuries of the 
Middle Ages, and the often 'unrational' conduct of the Church, the clergy and 
other elites that dominated the Rum millet of the Ottoman Empire".131 On the 
other hand, "the Orthodox Church, despite its ambivalence regarding the 
Greek national(ist) project still had influence on local societies and Orthodoxy 
had permeated the realm of everyday life".132 This tension between the main 
pillars of Greek national identity was reflected in the political discourses of 
the time.
131 Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History -  Nationalism in Greece and 
Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.82
132 Ibid., p. 83
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For example, Bishop Theocletos Pharmakidis was the advisor of the 
Bavarians in ecclesiastical issues and a champion of Greek nationalism. His 
opponents accused him of surrendering the Orthodox Church to the 
authority of a heterodox ruler (king Otto), while his supporters 
communicated their views through the popular newspaper A0r|vd 
[Athena].133 Undoubtedly, the royal decree of autocephaly, which, in essence, 
adopted every single one of his suggestions, was his greatest moment and a 
personal triumph. Pharmakidis' main opponent was Father Constantine 
Oikonomos, who challenged autocephaly both on theological and political 
grounds. The former called the latter 'Russian', while the latter responded by 
calling Pharmakidis 'crypto-protestant', through the like-minded newspaper 
Aiobv [Aeon].134 The Patriarchal Tome of 1850 which recognized the 
autocephaly of the Greek Church on the condition that it would remain 
dogmatically united with the Patriarchate was perhaps his only consolation 
for what he considered to be a new schism in Orthodoxy.
The main problem that the researcher of this period has to face is the 
absence of any data that would count the public's response to these 
ideological antagonisms. Nonetheless, the fact that the views of the opposing 
ideologies were represented by newspapers, demonstrates that the issue 
ranked high in everyday public discourse. Besides, the ecclesiastical dispute 
became the excuse of a popular revolt during that era against the Bavarian 
government. The revolt was led by a monk known as Papoulakos, whose
133 Ibid., p. 284
134 Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Wvog m i Opdo5o§ia: Oi nepvttmeg Miag Tyeorfg [Nation and 
Orthodoxy: The Adventures of a Relationship], (Heracleon: University of Crete Press)
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political position without a doubt expressed a fundamentalist Orthodox
political outlook. Papoulakos political discourse disputed the rule of law,
which, in his view, was much less important than the Orthodox preaching.
Our law of Christ has been written by four evangelists, seven 
ecumenical and eleven local synods, and eleven thousand martyrs.135 
The fact that Papoulakos' revolt challenged the legitimacy of the Bavarian
king and took the combined forces of the Greek army and navy to put down
is illustrative of the penetration of Orthodox politics in the Greek culture of
that epoch. Similar extremist Orthodox viewpoints continued to co-exist in
parallel with mainstream politics throughout the course of the 19th century.136
All of these nationalisms shared some common nodal points in their
discourse: They all believed more or less to the superiority of the Greek
nation and the Greek language at least in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia
Minor, the need to hegemonize the Balkans with an educated class of Greek
speakers, and the need to expand the Greek state. The first elected Greek
Prime Minister, Ioannis Kolettis, stated in a famous speech he gave in 1844:
"Due to its geographical location, Greece is in the centre of Europe, having
the East in its right, and the West in its left, and its destiny has been to
enlighten the West with its fall and to regenerate the East with its rebirth". It
is quite interesting that, during this period, there were three major political
parties in Greece: the Russian party, the French party, and the English party,
135 Christos Yannaras, OpdoSogia m i Avar] [Orthodoxy and the West], p. 291
136 See Paraskevas Matalas, 2002. Edvog m i Opdo8o§ia: Oi TlepmtceiEg Miag Exiarjg [Nation and 
Orthodoxy: The Adventures of a Relationship], (Heracleon: University of Crete Press),
Ch. Maczewski, 2002. H Kivt]at] rrjg Zcorjg orrjv EXka8a [The Movement ofZoi in Greece], (Athens: 
Appo$) and Leon Brag, 1997. To MDXov tod EXXrjvtayov orov ISeoXoyiKO Koayo tod A jto o to Xo v  
MaicpaKT] [The Future of Hellenism in the Ideological World ofApostolos Makrakis], (Athens: Appo^)
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each with a different view of the 'nation's destiny', and each representing the 
interests of a powerful European nation with different religious convictions 
and arrangements in its church-state relations.
Despite the existence of some common ground between the 
aforementioned nationalist imaginaries, there were undoubtedly important 
differences among them that necessitated either a synthesis or the eventual 
dominance of a particular national narrative. Republican nationalists like the 
renowned Greek enlightener Adamantios Koraes argued for the creation of a 
state in the model of western European standards and a national identity 
with particular reference to the 'classical heritage' of m odem  Greece. On the 
other hand, more traditionalist voices in the Greek society, mainly supporters 
of the Russian party, emphasized the importance of the Byzantine and 
Eastern tradition, and promoted a Slavic model of political organization. It is 
worth mentioning that very rarely have the intellectuals of that epoch 
questioned the place of Orthodoxy in Greek political and social culture.
The Church was also ideologically divided. While the patriarchate in 
Constantinople was usually in the Russian side, the Holy Synod in Greece 
was controlled by and expressed the views of the Bavarian government. 
However, even the patriarchate changed its position several times as a 
response to Russian policy, and appointments of new Patriarchs. The point 
here is that there was not at any time in Greece, during this period, a 
significant cosmopolitan, non-expansionist, and progressive political 
movement of modernizers. Such views would not even be imaginable by the 
majority of people, let alone legitimate, in the newly founded Greek state.
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Moreover, there was not a unified Church policy, or a single source of an 
'underdog' Eastern oriented culture. Concepts, such as "the East", 
"Orthodoxy", "the West", "Byzantium", "nation", etc. acquired different 
meanings and place within different discourses. The most peculiar example 
of such discursive ambiguities can be found in the w ord "genos", which came 
to denote, under different discourses, anything from "race", to the "Hellenic 
Volk", and from Greek speaking populations, to the Orthodox Christians of 
the Ottoman Empire. In short, the ideological horizon of Greek political 
culture during this period was vague. There was not a single source or a 
single type of nationalism, but instead many competing nationalisms. Within 
this context of political, social and discursive struggles, a particular national 
imaginary attained a hegemonic position in Greek society.
This hegemonic form of nationalist discourse was structured around a 
series of nodal propositions: a) there is a unified history of one Greek nation 
starting from the pre-Homeric era, through to Classical Greece, the Hellenistic 
epoch, the Byzantium, and continuing in m odern Greece, b) The nation is 
bound together by geography, history, language, and religion, c) Being 
Orthodox Christian is an almost necessary prerequisite for being Greek, d) 
The Greek nation is superior to almost any other nation in the world since 
Greeks are the heirs of almost all the great civilizations of the West (Ancient 
Greek, Hellenistic/Alexander the Great, Eastern Roman/Byzantium). Hence, 
Helleno-Christian nationalism was (and still is) a comprehensive political discourse 
which claims that Greek national identity is based on two pillars: the ancient 
Hellenic cultural heritage, and Orthodox Christianity. This unreservedly cultural
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form nationalism managed to transcend party and class differences, to legitimize 
government policies, to constitute political orthodoxy and to define publicly accepted 
social behaviours.
But why and how this happened? Our contention here is that the 
redeployment of Orthodoxy in a nationalist context was essential since 
religion was an indispensable part of the everyday life, traditions and 
customs of the Greek society. It was therefore the primary cultural material 
upon which national solidarity could be based. On the other hand, the 
Hellenic heritage of m odem  Greeks was both a necessary reference to a 
glorious past for the people of the newborn state, as well as a reason for the 
philhellenic sympathy towards the Greek cause in Western Europe. Hence, 
the fusion between religion and nationalism, classical Greece and Byzantine 
Empire, provided Greek irredentism with a valuable arsenal of arguments, 
demonized the enemy (i.e. the Ottoman Empire which conquered 
Constantinople and destroyed the Byzantine civilization), and offered a 
coherent national narrative which became the basis of national identity.
The most important intellectual resources in the effort to construct a 
Helleno-Christian national history were to be found in the traditional 
nationalist sciences, that is history and folklore studies. Zambelios, the most 
prominent Greek folklorist, spent his academic life at pains to prove the 
ancient roots of traditional songs and customs and to reveal the 'rich cultural 
heritage' of m odem  Greeks. In his own words, the aim of his research was to 
"uncover the fundamental unity of the Byzantine state, to shed light into its 
culture, to use the methods of historical and philosophical research in order 
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to discover the meaning of Greekness".137 Paparrigopoulos, on the other 
hand, represents a classic example of Romantic historian. Educated in the 
motherland of romanticism, Germany, he became a professor of history at the 
University of Athens. He wrote the definite 'History of the Greek Nation', a 
work which can be characterized as the epitome of Helleno-Christianism. 
According to this version of history, there is an uninterrupted 'Odyssey' of 
the Greek people which starts from the mythical and pre-historic times, and it 
will end with the realization of their destiny, which is none other than a 
return to the greatness of the Ancients: "unlike all other nations, the Greek 
nation developed a civilization immediately after its birth in the ancient 
times. This does not mean that it appeared in the face of the earth in the same 
form that it has today, but that it had a remarkable culture long before we 
learn about it through the epics of Iliad and Odyssey".138 Paparrigopoulos 
argued that the Christian Byzantine Empire was an indispensable part of the 
Greek identity. In 1878, he wrote: "It is an honour for Greece that produced 
such a remarkable civilization like Byzantium...But, w ithout the Byzantine 
Empire, there would be no Greek nation, nor anyone left in the world to 
speak the Greek language".139 Moreover, according to Paparrigopoulos, 
"medieval Hellenism deserves to be called Greek. It is true that the history of 
our people from the 5th century A.D. to the 13th century A.D, is not full of 
great deeds. But that is always the case with nations".140 The establishment of
137 Spyridon Zambelios, 1857. Bvgavrtvig MeMreg [Byzantine Studies\ (Athens)
138 Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, 1972. Ioropia tod EXXtjvikod EBvovg [History of the Greek 
Nation], (Athens: raAa^icn;), vol. 16, p. 9
139 Vangelis Panagopoulos, 2001. Introduction to a special issue of £ -  IoropncA [E-Historica],
on Paparrigopoulos, vol. 85, p. 5
140 Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, Ibid.
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a system of universal education played a crucial role in disseminating these 
ideas, and Professor Paparrigopoulos assumed the role of the 'national 
historian', despite the fact that many other historians in his time challenged 
his views.141 In fact, Greek children are taught in schools today the historical 
schema of Paparrigopoulos, which divides the history of the Greek nation 
into an ancient, a medieval and a modern period.
In terms of state politics, Helleno-Christianism was expressed through 
the 'Megali Idea', foreign policy dogma which became hegemonic in the 
Greek society and pushed Greek governments until 1922 towards an 
expansionist foreign policy. It aimed at the liberation of the 'unredeem ed 
lands' which used to belong to the Byzantine Empire and in which Greek­
speaking Orthodox populations continued to live. Before coming to a 
catastrophic end with the Asia Minor disaster, the Megali Idea underm ined 
any prospect for friendly relations between Greece and its neighbours. It 
served to solidify national identity against 'constitutive others', enemies 
against which the Helleno-Christian Greek self was defined.
III.IV. Conclusions
The heavy politicization of the Orthodox Church is not a new phenomenon. 
On the contrary, as we have argued in this chapter, the Orthodox Church has 
been acting as the main producer of a particular type of nationalism (Helleno- 
Christianism) since the founding of the Greek state, while the origins of its 
political activism can be traced even further back. For the last 1600 years, the
141 Vangelis Panagopoulos, Ibid.
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Eastern Christian Orthodox Church has played an active political role in the 
Balkan region. Since the times of the Byzantine Empire, it enjoyed the status 
of the established state religion. In the years of the Ottoman rule in the Balkan 
region, the Church acted as an institution of the Empire with an extensive set 
of political, judicial, and cultural privileges. The nationalization of the 
Orthodox Church in independent Greece consolidated its role as a state 
department responsible for the cultural, religious and political nurture of 
Greek citizens. Despite the fact that the Patriarchate initially reacted to this 
decentralization, it eventually accepted the progressive nationalization of the 
Greek -and the other Balkan- Churches as an unavoidable consequence of the 
political situation of the time, and the rise of nationalism in the region. The 
legal regime of 1833 remains largely in effect until today, while Orthodoxy 
has been serving as a focal point of Greek national identity since mid-19th 
century.
What we hope that it has become evident in this chapter is, first of all, 
Hutchinson's point that: "In spite of significant differences between pre­
m odern and modern societies, long established cultural repertoires (myths, 
symbols and memories) Eire 'carried' into the m odern era by powerful 
institutions (states, armies, churches) and are revived and redeveloped 
because populations are periodically faced with similar challenges to their 
physical and symbolic survival". In the case of Greece there was no pre­
m odern army and no pre-m odem  state, and therefore cultural repertoires 
were Ccirried out by the only important pre-modern institution that was able, 
and indeed did so, to carry out cultural repertoires into the m odem  era was 
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the church. The Church remained the only pre-modem institution, which 
retained its importance throughout the modern era in Greece. As a result, it 
managed to 'relocate' pre-modern cultural material into the m odern nation­
state environment, thus forging the cultural base of national identity. 
Therefore, this chapter demonstrated how demotic ethnic cultural material 
became an indispensable part of Greek identity, much more important them 
citizenship, rights, and other m odem  categories. Ethnic symbols of 
Orthodoxy were reinterpreted within a nationalist framework, and religion 
was deployed in the Greek nationalist paradigm in am extremely durable 
fusion, Helleno-Christianism.
Another aim of this chapter was to dissolve some myths that exist in 
the Greek historiography about the 'positive role' of the Church during the 
War of Independence. In addition to that, and most importantly, we have 
been arguing that the seeds of separation of the Greek Church from the 
Patriarchate are to be found in the years of the War of Independence and 
even before that. Thus, nationalization of the Church starts before the 
doctrine becomes an official state policy, while autocephaly was not solely an 
arbitrary Bavarian policy, but an idea which was also adopted by a number of 
Greek officials, intellectuals and clerics in the face of the problems which 
were created with the outbreak of the War of Independence. The fact that the 
aforementioned elites never seriously questioned the position of Orthodoxy 
in Greek society and culture, demonstrates the effects of demotic cultural 
material to the modernization process.
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Our analysis of the state policy towards the Church has shown that the 
Bavarian regime promoted a neo-classical conception of Greek identity, while 
trying to enforce a westernized model for the organization of the Greek 
Church. This official ideology (which was also shared by some intellectuals) 
achieved mixed results in communicating with the 'masses', both because of 
the resistance of Orthodox intellectuals and activists, as well as because of the 
penetration of the Orthodox culture in the Greek society. Instead, the 
particular national narrative which prevailed, Helleno-Christianism, was a 
durable fusion between the demotic culture of m odern Greeks and a series of 
references to a glorious past which are necessary for the formation of a 
nation. Within a social milieu of political, social and discursive struggles, a 
particular national m yth attained a hegemonic position in the Greek society 
which brought together Hellenism and Orthodoxy.
In subsequent years, Helleno-Christianism becomes an official state 
dogma, taught in schools and universities. Orthodoxy becomes the 'national 
religion' of m odem  Greece. Furthermore, it is more than likely that the legal 
arrangements of this period affected later Greek Church political culture in a 
controversial manner. Despite the fact that the legal status of 'semi­
separation' has been widely perceived as a progressive measure which 
restricted any theocratic aspirations on the part of Church officials and ultra- 
Orthodox intellectuals, we may argue that the recent confrontations between 
the Church and the State in Greece are partly the result of the Church's legal 
status. The legal regime of 1833 in essence legitimized the intertwining 
between secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Contemporary Church policy 
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may be perceived as an attempt of the Church to 'stick' to its role as it has 
been drafted out during the first years after independence, despite the fact 
that it has originally reacted to this role. This phenomenon is an example of 
the antinomies of modernization, since it was a secularizing policy that 
established a tradition of political interference on the part of the Church, 
while nowadays we notice a situation in which a traditional institution such 
as the Church is the champion of Greek nationalism.
The prevalence of Helleno-Christianism demonstrates the importance 
of drawing political, social, and cultural frontiers between 'us ' and 'them ', in 
constituting individual and collective identities. As an ideology, 'Helleno- 
Christian' nationalism was able to construct rigid boundaries between 
insiders and outsiders, Greeks and non-Greeks, and thus provide the 
newborn nation w ith a solid collective identity. For example, other forms of 
nationalism that were emphasizing the religious element of Greek identity 
were unable to offer adequate grounding for a firm distinction between 
Greeks and the other Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Helleno-Christian thesis managed to do so, by emphasizing the 'Hellenic' 
element of Greek identity. On the other hand, 'Hellenized' conceptions of the 
nation were unable to communicate with the masses that formed the Greek 
nation. These masses were divided into linguistically fragmented groups, 
very few of which could understand the 'language of Plato', despite the fact 
that they were mostly using Hellenic dialects. Therefore, Orthodoxy was a 
cultural resource w ith which they could easily identify (at least more easily 
than they could identify w ith Ancient Greece).
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Pre-existing cultural material and symbolic resources posed obstacles 
and created complexities in the modernization/secularization process in 
Greece. Helleno-Christian nationalism was more appealing to the people, 
since it drew on pre-modern and pre-national existing communal ties. This 
type of nationalism was compatible w ith many of the other identities 
(familial, communal, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and citizen identities) that 
subjects were holding during the period under investigation, since it was 
based on myths, symbols, traditions and memories w ith which large parts of 
the population were familiar with. Helleno-Christianity was therefore 
ideally constructed in order to replace a previous symbolic order w ith 
familiar and at the same time novel symbols. Contingent and otherwise 
unrelated practices acquired meaning within this new symbolic order. 
Speaking an archaic Greek dialect, going to the Church, and disliking the 
Turks for instance were practices which were bound together in a particular 
system of meaning which was called Helleno-Christianity and these practices 
were experienced by individuals as aspects of the "Greek Way of life". The 
legal and political position of the Church of Greece facilitated the birth and 
eventual dominance of 'Helleno-Christianism'. Despite the fact that the 
Church was politically subjected to the secular authority of the state, it 
managed to retain an extensive degree of autonomy at a cultural level (e.g. 
influence to the people through education and Sunday liturgy), and thus was 
able to use the mechanisms that its legal position provided it with, in order to 
disseminate this distinctive cultural nationalism.
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III.V. the Church in the 20th Century
The course of Church-state relations throughout the twentieth century 
up until the fall of the military junta in 1974 is beyond the scope of this study, 
since the legal, social and political arrangements that had already taken place 
in the period under investigation in this chapter did not go through 
significant changes. The nodal points of Helleno-Christian nationalism 
remained unaltered. Even a sketchy account of the facets of Helleno-Christian 
nationalism in the period following 1864 supports this conclusion.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Queen Olga attempted to 
publish a translation of the New Testament in Modem Greek, since the 
original text, written in a Hellenistic language was almost incomprehensible 
to the majority of the population. Her intention provoked a chain reaction in 
Greek society that ended with student rallies, the interference and 
condemnation of the translation by the ecumenical Patriarchate, and the 
resignation of the Athens archbishop. As a result, the constitution of 1911 
included a clause that prevented the translation of the Bible without a 
previous authorization of the Ecumenical
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Patriarch.
Popular painting o f 1901, which depicts the student rallies in protest o f the Queen's 
intention to translate the New testament in modern Greek
During the early decades of the 20th century, Greece carried a series of 
irredentist wars, which led to its significant territorial expansion. The basic 
legitimizing factor for these wars was the Orthodox religion of the 
populations of the "unredeemed lands". For example, the ecclesiastical 
dispute between Bulgaria and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople 
played a significant role in the short "cold war" between Greece, the Ottoman 
Empire and Bulgaria, over the control of the region of Macedonia (1904-1908). 
A report by Pavlos Melas, officer of the Greek Artillery Corps, who was one 
of the protagonists of the "Macedonian struggle" is indicative of the role of 
religion in the aforementioned dispute: "Having summoned the villagers, 
and, in particular, the village elders, I suggested to them to return to 
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Orthodoxy [the Patriarchate]... they assured me that they never embraced the 
Schism [between the Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarches]... I then told 
them to that I demand, first, that they take an oath of faith to Orthodoxy... 
Also [I ordered them] to petition within ten days to be sent a priest and a 
teacher of Greek".142
A few years later, during the First World War, the Church became 
actively involved in the national discord between the supporters of liberal 
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and those loyal to the king. In December 
1916, the Archbishop of Athens, Theocletos, excommunicated Venizelos, 
cursed him, and asked the people of Athens to "throw the stone of 
anathema".143 When Venizelos finally prevailed, he ordered the arrest of the 
Archbishop and those churchmen who supported the "anathema".
In 1923, a new ecclesiastical charter institutionalized the right of the 
Orthodox Church of Greece to "approve" all school textbooks. Undoubtedly, 
the new assignment related to a social and political dispute that divided 
Greek society: a new generation of intellectuals advocated the use of demotic 
Greek language and the replacement of the archaic "official" dialect, known 
as katharevousa. Their demand met strong resistance by conservative 
politicians and academics, who sought to "protect" the linguistic heritage of 
ancient Greece. The dispute was only resolved several decades later, when, in 
1976, demotic Greek was finally adopted as the official state language. 
Throughout these years, the church remained a staunch opponent of linguistic
142 Cited in Umut Ozkirimi & Spyros Sofos, 2008. Tormented by History -  Nationalism in Greece 
and Turkey, (London: Hurst), p.148
143 Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. C it, p. 34
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reform. At the same time, the Holy Synod was recognized as the sovereign 
governing body of the Church, although the presence of a royal envoy was 
required in all of its sessions.
After the German invasion, the archbishop of Athens, Damaskenos, 
kept a moderate stance towards the Nazis, while, at the same time, several 
bishops joined the resistance movement. Some of them, like the bishop of 
Kozani, attempted to mediate between nationalist and communist guerillas, 
in order to solidify the unity of the anti-Nazi partisan groups, which were 
active throughout the occupation period in the mountainous regions of 
Greece. Others, like the bishop of Helia, Antonius, joined the communist 
"National Liberation Front" (EAM). Antonius was even appointed local 
guerilla captain in his parish. Another prominent cleric, Seraphim, joined the 
nationalist guerilla group EDES. Seraphim was to become archbishop of 
Athens after the fall of the military junta, in 1974.
The ideological frictions which divided the resistance movement did 
not die out after the liberation from the Nazis. On the contrary, political 
conditions deteriorated even further, eventually leading to a civil war 
between nationalists and communists. Although some members of the clergy 
who had initially joined the resistance against the Nazis kept a moderate 
stance towards the left, the Orthodox establishment remained loyal to the 
right-wing governments of the time.
The civil war ended with the defeat of communist forces and signaled 
the beginning of 25 years of oppression for the Greek left. The communist
party was outlawed, and several thousand communists were sent to exile in
Keligion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 130
Nikos Chysoloras Department of Government, LSE
small or deserted islands of the Aegean Sea. At the same time, army officers 
formed secret societies aiming at the establishment of a military junta. The 
most active of these societies, known as IDEA, was in direct contact with the 
archbishop of Athens, Spyridon, and in 1951, they even suggested that he 
should be placed at the head of a military government.144 The plans for a 
military dictatorship eventually succeeded in 1967.
It is also worth pointing out that Orthodoxy has never been stripped of 
the privileged status of the "established" religion in Greece, in any of the 
constitutions of the 20th century. In essence, the institutional arrangement 
which was reached after the War of Independence remained unaltered until 
our days. Thus, all of the Greek constitutions (1822, 1823, 1827, 1844, 1864, 
1911, 1927, 1952, and 1974) nominally protected freedom of religion and 
consciousness. Until 1974, this right was included in one of the first two 
articles of the Constitution, which referred to the position of Orthodoxy as the 
established religion. The most characteristic example of this conflation is the 
Constitution of 1927, the first article of which states that Orthodoxy is the 
established religion. Nowadays, freedom of religion is a separate clause in the 
second part of the constitution (the hum an rights part) and it is not associated 
with Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the legal status of the Church of Greece 
throughout the 20th century not only meant that it enjoyed special privileges,
144 Georgios Karayaimis, 1997. Op. Cit., p. 108
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but also confirmed the continuing hegemony of Helleno-Christian 
nationalism in Greek politics.145
Some jurists dispute this conclusion and suggest that the constitutional 
articles on the established religion merely ascertain a fact -  the fact that the 
majority of Greeks are Orthodox Christians. Nonetheless, this view seems to 
ignore that the function of constitutions is regulatory and proscriptive. 
Constitutions do not normally "inform" the public on demographic 
tendencies.146
To conclude, throughout the 20th century, the Church remained 
actively involved in Greek politics, and defended its privileged place in the 
public sphere. The political developments of this period are beyond the scope 
of the thesis at hand. However, as it became obvious, Helleno-Christian 
nationalist was a significant factor in the most important of them (the national 
discord between supporters of Venizelos and royalists, the irredentist wars of 
the early 20th century, the struggle for the control of Macedonia, the Civil 
War, and the rise of the military junta). Finally, the institutional consolidation 
of the Helleno-Christian thesis (reflected in the legal order of Greece), has 
never been seriously challenged so far.
145 For a more detailed list of the legal privileges of the Church in Greece, see Constantinos L. 
Georgopoulos, 1998. Emwjio EwrayjianKd Aimio [Concise Constitutional Law], (Athens: 
ZciKKOuAas), esp. pp.165-202 and 531-544
146 For more details on the legal debate regarding the status of the Orthodox Church in 
Greece, see Costas Chrysogonos, 2002. Arojiim m i Koivamm Aimicbjiara [Human and Social 
Rights], (Athens: ZdxKOuAa), and Costas Mavrias, 2004, ZvvrayjiauKd Aimio [Constitutional 
Law], (Athens: ZdKxouAa)
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Chapter IV: Religion and Nationalism in the 
Greek-Cypriot Political Culture
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This chapter examines in particular the impact of the Orthodox Church 
and religion on the development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Many 
commentators, especially nationalists, have claimed that given the cultural, 
religious, and linguistic differences which divide the two main ethnic groups 
in Cyprus, hostility between them and lack of a common civil culture was to 
be expected. However, there is no historical evidence to suggest that such 
was the case in pre-m odem  Cyprus before the appearance of nationalism,147 
and it is only nationalist 'mythistoriographies' which claim otherwise. Other 
possibilities of historical development were possible were it not for the 
dividing influences of other factors, among which we count the Orthodox 
Church. Assimilation, co-existence of the two groups within a context of a 
common Cypriot identity (as it happens in Switzerland and Belgium), or, if 
all else had failed, a peaceful federate model with an extensive degree of 
devolution (e.g. Canada), were other possible outcomes of the Cyprus 
question. In this chapter, we will be arguing that the Church of Cyprus 
should be counted as among one of the factors who prevented such 
outcomes. Obviously, the Cyprus question is a multifaceted problem, w ith 
both national and international dimensions. To claim that the Church is the 
only divisive agent in the island would be a crude reductionism. 
Nevertheless, it shall become obvious in the following pages that the 
importance of the Orthodox Church in producing ethnic frictions has been 
underestimated and understudied.
147 Paschalis Kitromilides, 1977. "From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic 
Conflict in Cyprus", in Michael Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed, (Jus Cypri: Nicosia), pp. 35- 
60
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I will be arguing that the politicization of religion in the island is the 
main reason for the failure of a Cypriot national identity, and the 
development, in its place, of an ethno-religious Greek-Cypriot identity. The 
main characteristics of Greek-Cypriot nationalism are anti-Turkism, pro- 
Europeanism, and strong religious references. These characteristics show that 
it has a lot in common with the mainland Greek Helleno-Christian 
nationalism, despite the social and political differentiations in the history of 
the two countries. There are a few other examples in which ethnic 
communities with similar cultures- but which spread across diverse 
territories and live under various types of administration- politicize their 
cultured resemblances and demand political unification (e.g. the doctrines of 
Pan-Turkism, the Greek 'Megali Idea', and the ideology of Great Albania). 
This sociological phenomenon is usually described as 'irredentism '. However, 
irredentism in Greece, Cyprus or elsewhere is not a historical necessity- a 
consequence of cultural unity- as nationalists have argued. It usually arises as 
a result of specific institutional and national policies and ideologies. The 
Church of Cyprus and its Helleno-Christian nationalism were among those 
who shaped Greek-Cypriot irredentism.
IV.I. A Political History of the Church of Cyprus
Traditionally, the establishment of the Church of Cyprus is traced back 
to the 1st century, since, according to the Book of Acts, the island was 
evangelized by the Apostles Paul and Barnabas in 45 A.D. Barnabas is
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considered the first archbishop of Cyprus and one of the 'proto-martyrs' of 
the Christian faith. By the 4th century A.D. Christianity was spread 
throughout the island, and, despite the claims of the Antioch Patriarchate, the 
Third Ecumenical Synod, which convened in 434 A.D. in Ephesus, ratified the 
autocephaly of the Cypriot Church.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, Cyprus became part of the 
Byzantine province of Antioch. Because of its geographical location, Cyprus 
was an area of the Empire susceptible to Arab, Ottoman and Western 
European attacks, and the control of Constantinople over the island was 
always fragile. In a radical measure taken by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian 
II, many of the island's Christians including the Archbishop of Cyprus were 
displaced from their homes and moved to Nea Justiniana, a new city closer to 
the mainland of the Empire and better protected from the Arab threat. Since 
then, the Archbishop of Cyprus retains the title of 'Archbishop of Nea 
Justiniana and All Cyprus'. After the defeat of the Arab navy by the 
Byzantine forces of Nicephorus Phocas, Cyprus came again under the control 
of the Byzantium.
Subsequently (1191), Cyprus was conquered by King Richard the 
Lionhearted, and then sold to French feudal lords, and then to Venetians.148 
Until 1571, when the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the 
authority of the Orthodox Church and faith was undermined by the Catholic 
hierarchy which was established in Cyprus. In fact, the Catholic monastic
148 Victoria Clark, 1999. Why Angels Fall- A  Portrait of Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to 
Kosovo, (London: Macmillan)
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orders which settled there seized control over Orthodox monasteries, sent 
local bishops to exile in remote villages, abolished the autocephaly, while 
sustained attempts to convert the local population and the Church to Western 
Christianity took place over that period, but with mixed and ephemeral 
results.149
Unsurprisingly, given the example of other Balkan regions, the 
position of Orthodoxy was ameliorated with the Ottoman invasion and the 
establishment of the millet system, which favoured and restored the -civil and 
spiritual- privileges of the Church. As it happened w ith the rest of the 
religious communities in the Empire, the Archbishop of Cyprus and the local 
bishoprics were given civil authority and duties as well as religious freedom, 
or, in other words, were raised to an 'Ethnarchic status'. The Orthodox 
Church was the only institutional point of reference for the Orthodox 
population of Cyprus in the rather secluded social environment of the island, 
as it performed important state functions such as the collection of taxes from 
the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.
During this period, Orthodox and Muslim peasant populations co­
existed relatively peacefully within the decentralized Ottoman system of 
government in mingled or mixed villages.150 However, w hat is important at 
this historical stage for the later development of nationalism is that the millet
149Stavros Fotiou & Georgios Efthymiou, 1990. H EKKXrjcria T7/g Kvxpou [The Church of Cyprus], 
(Nicosia: fepa Apxi£niOKonf| Kunpoo)
isopeter Worsley, 1979. 'Communalism and Nationalism in Small Countries: The Case of 
Cyprus7, in Peter Worsley & Paschalis Kitromilides (eds.), Small States in the Modem World- 
The Conditions for Survival, (SAGEM: Nicosia)
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system divided ethnic groups on religious grounds, and assigned a series of 
important administrative duties to the local Churches.151
Already from 1660, the Church becomes a tax collecting agency of the 
Ottoman state and remains so until the arrival of the British in late 19th 
century. This privilege, along with the official application of Orthodox family 
law to the Christian subjects of the Empire, provided the Church with civil 
authorities and transformed it into a peripheral organization of the Ottoman 
state,152 as it happened in Greece. The Sultan's decree of 1865 concerning the 
appointment of bishop Sophronios as new archbishop of the Church of 
Cyprus is illustrative of this point. Among other rights and privileges, the 
new archbishop and his companions were allowed to carry weapons for self­
protection, to ride horses, while he was also appointed to act as an arbitrator 
in matters of wedding, divorce, and inheritance between Christians of the 
island, to collect taxes, to freely administer the Church's property, whereas 
proselytism against the Church and violent conversions to Islam were 
forbidden.153
Gradually, the Church expanded its economic activities and developed 
into the largest property holder of the island.154 The economic growth of the 
Orthodox establishment, its political power and its cultural ties with the 
Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, strengthened the relationship between
151 (ibid.)
152Michalis, Michail 2004. H AmSimaia ZvyKpdTrjarjg Evog Qeopov EfyvoiagH EKxXtjaia Trjg 
Kmpov 1754-1910 [The Making of a Powerful Institution: the Church of Cyprus 1754-1910], 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Nicosia: University of Cyprus)
i53FiUipos Georgiou, 1975 [1875]. EiSrjaeig Ioropncai rrj$ EKKXrjcriag rrjg Kmpov [Historical 
Anecdotes Regarding the Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia: KonpioAoyiKri Bi(3Aio0f|Kr])
154 Michalis Michail, Op. Cit.
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Church and people to an extent that turned the Church into a semi- 
autonomous political authority on which Orthodox Cypriots were dependent 
for survival.
In 1821, with the outbreak of the War of Independence in Greece and 
the Balkans, the Ottomans took the pre-emptive step of executing the Cypriot 
archbishop along with 186 other senior clerics and prelates of the island. This 
bold move put an early stop to any thoughts for a War of Independence in 
Cyprus.155 In mainstream nationalist history,156 this event proves the 
Greekness of Cyprus since the island suffered its toll in the 'national 
awakening struggle' and was already seen by the Ottomans as a Greek 
territory that had to suffer for the actions of 'their brothers in Greece'. 
However, a more sensible explanation of the Ottoman reaction would point 
out to the fact that the War of Independence did not break out in 'Greece' 
alone. There were simultaneous revolts in the greater Balkan region as well 
(the Danube provinces of the Empire). The Ottomans tried to avoid another 
war front in Cyprus by executing whoever was susceptible of being able to 
organize it. Thus, the War of Independence only survived it in Greece (in 
what is today southern Greece, to be precise). Besides, even Greek-Cypriot 
nationalist authors admit that the conditions for an armed revolution did not 
exist in Cyprus in 1821, and therefore such thoughts were quickly 
abandoned.157
155 Paschalis Kitromilides & Marios Evriviades, 1990. Cyprus, (Clio Press, Oxford)
156 Athanasius Papageorgiou, 1962. Zvvropog Ioropia rpc, Eiadrjmag rpg Kmpov [A Short History 
of the Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia: Ek6ooei$ Iepcr^  ApxiemoKonfi^)
157 Andreas Mitsidis, 1994. Zvvropp Ioropia rrjc, E K id.pch.ac, rpc, Kvnpov [A Short History of the 
Church of Cyprus], (Nicosia)
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It is w orth mentioning however, that the autocephalous Cypriot 
Church was the first political agent in Cyprus to adopt Greek irredentism. 
Although nobody can be certain about the extent of involvement of Cypriot 
bishops in the 'Friendly Society', the freemason-like revolutionary 
organization which disseminated nationalist ideas for a generalized War of 
Independence in Greece and South-eastern Europe in general, most authors 
agree that this group enjoyed at least a form of financial support from the 
Church of Cyprus.158 After independence, when the irredentist ideology of 
'Megali Idea' became hegemonic in Greece, Cyprus was included in those 
territories which should be 'redeemed' from Ottoman rule.
The opening of the Greek consulate in 1834 at Lamaca, in conjunction 
w ith the establishment of Greek schools was instrumental in the 
dissemination of nationalist and irredentist ideals in the island. Cypriot 
merchants saw Greek citizenship as a way to liberate themselves from 
Ottoman taxation and the constraints of the inflexible millet system of the 
Empire.
In the largely agrarian Cypriot society of the time, where the merchant 
classes were but a small segment of the population, capitalism was not the 
decisive factor for the development of nationalism at that stage of historical 
development. However, one cannot ignore the importance of the fact that a 
wealthy -  albeit politically powerless -  fragment of the population opposed 
the parochial administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire. Frequent 
incidents of malpractice and incompetence by the local delegates of the Sultan
iss Ibid.
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increased public unrest.159 As a result, the Ottomans tried to implement a 
series of reforms that would modernize the administration of their territories. 
In 1830, a 4-member committee of senior citizens was appointed in Cyprus in 
order to replace the Church in tax collection. Moreover, representatives of the 
public and the clergy formed a type of advisory council that would 
participate in the administration of the island.160 The Orthodox archbishop of 
Cyprus was an ex officio member of the Supreme Council of Nicosia, and thus, 
the involvement of the church in Cypriot politics was institutionalized.
The Ottoman rule in the island ended in 1878, when the British Empire 
Teased' Cyprus from the Sultan. The defeat of Ottoman Empire in the 1st 
World War led to the annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain and the island 
was officially declared a colony. The British tried to limit the influence of the 
Church in politics and civil society by introducing secularizing measures, but 
their attempts were largely unsuccessful if we judge by their results. Besides, 
similar attempts have been made earlier during the 19th century, during the 
Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire.
The Church reacted to both these secularization and modernization 
waves by swiftly adapting its organization so as to be able to function 
effectively in the new environment. Thus, for example, clerics were elected in 
the Legislative Council which was established by the British, and managed to 
further institutionalize the position of the Church in Cypriot society. Another
159 Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Kunpo<; 1830-1878: Ano tt|v  OOGopavtKf) cm] BpExavucf] Kupiapxia 
[Cyprus 1830-1878: From Ottoman to British Rule]", in Ioropia row Niov EXXijmojiov 1770-2000 
[History of Modem Hellenism 1770-2000], vol. 4., p. 363
160 Sia Anagnostopoulou, "Kunpo^ 1830-1878: Ano t t j v  OOcDpavucri cro] Bpexavucf] Kupiapxia 
[Cyprus 1830-1878: From Ottoman to British Rule]", in Ioropia rov Niov EXXr/inopov 1770-2000 
[History of Modem Hellenism 1770-2000], (Athens: E M ijv ik c i rpdppaxa), vol. 4., p . 364
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example of Church modernization is the fact that Cypriot people participated 
in the election of bishops in Cyprus. In this way, Church hierarchy was 
presenting itself as a natural representative of the people. The 
aforementioned examples demonstrate the adaptation capabilities of the 
Church to modern conditions. Consequently, the main results of the British 
efforts to weaken the Church were to turn it against them and lead it in the 
unreserved adoption of Helleno-Christian nationalism, an ideology which 
opposed their imperial rule.
One should not fail to note at this point, that the end of the 19th century 
marked the birth of a modernizing Greek-speaking bourgeois class in Cyprus, 
the members of which were much wealthier than their Muslim compatriots, 
and were often educated in Greece. This class was heavily involved in 
Church affairs and participated in the archbishopric crisis at the turn of the 
century, as we shall see later. This unequal development between Christians 
and Muslims- the results of which are visible even in today- undoubtedly led 
to an increasing alienation of the two religious communities.161
British hostility towards the Church was an important enough reason 
in itself for the latter to adopt a nationalist discourse in order to avoid further 
depletion of its privileges in the increasingly secular environment of the 
British Empire. Moreover, the Church, through its Sunday masses and its 
partial control of the educational system had much more effective channels to 
communicate its ideas with the public. Here, we may -with caution- draw  
parallels between the radicalization of the Cypriot Church policy as a reaction
161 Peter Worsley, Op. Cit.
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to British modernization efforts, and the Greek case in which the Church 
similarly reacted to the modernization efforts of the Greek government at the 
end of the 1990s.162
By the dawn of the 20th century, the Church became a champion of 
Greek irredentism and Helleno-Christian nationalism, and promoted 
demands for unification with Greece (what is known in Cypriot politics as the 
'Enosis movement'). In Cyprus, like almost everywhere in the colonized 
world, nationalism became the ideological platform of resistance to 
imperialism and colonization. However, Orthodox nationalism in Cyprus did 
not sought independence for the island but unification with Greece. Again, 
the archives of the time can be demonstrative of the nationalist conversion of 
the Church. Already from the 1st issue of 'AnocrroXo^ Bapvdpc*;' (1918), the 
official periodical of the Cypriot Church, the national question arises as the 
main concern for the high ranking clergy of the island.163 In another issue of 
the same periodical, which was published in November 1918, the 'close ties' 
between Hellenism and Christianity are emphasized, while it is argued that 
Greeks are the most civilized nation of all, the cradle of European civilization, 
which shined already from the ancient epochs, when the rest of Europe was 
still in a semi-barbarous civilizational stage.164 The latter argum ent constitutes 
a common repertoire of Greek nationalism until nowadays. The infusion of 
political nationalism with religious (i.e. cultural) references has resulted, in
162 Nikos Chrysoloras, 2004a. 'The Political Discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church', in the 
Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 30.1.2004, pp. 97-119
163 AitoonoXoc, Bapvafiag [Apostle Barnabas], vol. 1, issue No. 7 Nicosia, October 31,1918
164 Ajtoorrohog Bapvafag [Apostle Barnabas], Issue No. 8, November 18,1918
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most cases including the one of Cyprus, into a further strengthening of its 
appeal to the people.
Nationalism was such a force in the politics of the Church of Cyprus 
that it created a major institutional crisis in the years between 1900 and 1910. 
Because of the rivalry between a conservative bishop and a nationalist 
hardliner rival to the archbishopric throne, the Church hierarchy was unable 
to agree in the election of a new archbishop for ten whole years after the 
death of archbishop Sophronios.165 Around these two camps, the 
predecessors of later political parties were formed. While conservatives were 
more eager to strengthen the position of the Church and the Greek-speaking 
population within the existing system of British administration and saw 
Enosis (unification w ith Greece), as a long-term possibility, nationalist 
hardliners adopted a much more radical anti-British stand. Nationalist 
segments of the Cypriot society attempted, through their effort to control the 
Church, to gain political power, while conservatives were more or less 
satisfied w ith the Ottoman status quo that assured political privileges for 
clerics and landowners. This politico-ecclesiastical crisis divided Greek- 
Cypriot society, and was resolved with a victory for the hardliners. 
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons that led the Church to such a hard-line 
nationalist position was the fact that it faced hostility by the British, and saw 
that the colonial power aimed at stripping the Church of most of its authority.
165 Benedict Egglezakis, 1995. Studies in the History of the Church of Cyprus- 4*-20th Centuries, ed. 
by Silouan & Michael Ioannou, translated by Norman Russell (New York: Variorum)
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In any case, the archbishopric crisis demonstrated the heavy 
politicization of religion in these early stages of the development of Greek- 
Cypriot nationalism. Another proof of that point is the role of the Church in 
the popular uprising of Greek-Cypriots against British rule in 1931. The 
British had to send to exile two bishops after these events, since they 
considered them as responsible for what happened, and suspended many of 
the civil liberties Cypriot enjoyed until then.166 The Orthodox Church became, 
in essence, the political terrain in which ideological rivalries in Cyprus were 
played out.167
In addition to that, Helleno-Christian nationalism was imported to 
Cyprus from Greece. From the late 19th century Greek-speaking Cypriots 
started being educated in Athens, and were thus introduced to the values of 
Greek nationalism, of which the Greek university was a committed 
advocate.168 Even today, educational curricula are very similar between 
Greece and Cyprus and many Cypriot students study in Greece (and vice 
versa). The Greek student support towards the Cypriot demand for Union 
continued with the same zeal until the 1960s. The ex-chancellor of the 
University of Athens, Professor Bambiniotis, remembers from his student 
years in the early 1950s:
E-E-ENOSIS was the slogan of the students of the University of 
Athens in our demonstrations during the decade of the 1950s.
166 Andrea Mitsidis, Op. Cit.
167 Sia Anagnostopoulou, Op. Cit., p. 363
168 Nicos Christodoulou,1999. To ApxiemmcomKO Zrjrrjjia rtjg Kvjtpoo Kara ta 'Ettj 1900-1910 [The 
Archbishopric Question in Cyprus in the years 1900-1910], (Nicosia: Kevrpo M eXetgjv K ukkou)
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Depending on the political situation, our rallies were often irritating 
[the politicians], and police officers were violently trying to scatter 
us, but we didn't falter. Our Cypriot fellow students were always 
marching ahead....Today, fifty years later, following the Turkish 
invasion... our uncompromising demand for unification with Greece 
has given its place to an accommodating request for reunification of 
Cyprus...169
In 1950, the Church organized a referendum, in which the total of the 
Greek-speaking population voted for unification of Cyprus with Greece.170 
The result of the referendum was submitted to the British and the Greek 
governments and the U.N. This was the start of a long effort for the 
internationalization of the Cyprus question, a policy orchestrated by both the 
Orthodox Church and Greek-Cypriot politicians.
The involvement of the Church in nationalist politics was personified in 
the first president of independent Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III (1960- 
1977). In the years preceding independence, Makarios acted as political leader 
of the violent guerrilla resistance of Greek-Cypriots against the British. A 
British travel writer notes that 'by the mid-1950s wives of British servicemen 
were blown up, and the British tabloids had dubbed him "Black Mak'".171 
Apart from Makarios, the struggle for Cypriot independence was co-led by 
general Grivas, who formed a guerrilla group (EOKA) aiming at 
independence and subsequent unification of Cyprus with Greece. The first
169 Bambiniotis in KcmodicnpiaKd [Capodestrian], 15/4/2004
170 Andreas Mitsidis, Op. Cit.
171 Victoria Clark, Op. Cit., p. 351
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aim was realized in I960, while the latter one proved to be a catastrophic 
chimera for Cypriot politics.
Ethnic violence broke out between the two communities almost 
immediately after independence, with frequent abuses of power from the 
Greek-Cypriot side, and frequent 'silencing' (even through murder) of 
reconciliatory voices. An attempted coup d'etat against Makarios, which was 
backed by the Greek junta gave Turkey the excuse that it was asking for 
intervention. The Turkish invasion of 1974 led to the establishment, a few 
years later, of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', a state recognized 
mainly by Turkey. The failure to build a Cypriot national identity resulted in 
catastrophe and misery on both sides. The northern part of the island is 
ridden by poverty, lack of international legitimacy, dependency on Turkey 
and an increasing num ber of Turkish settlers. The, much richer and 
developed, southern part has to live with the reality of buffer zones, refugees, 
and reliance on Greek military forces for 'protection'.
IV.II. the Church in Cypriot Politics, 1950-1974
The previous section brought into our attention two important 
historical features that differentiate Cyprus from the Greek case. First, unlike 
the Greek Church, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus has a long history of 
autocephaly and, thus, relative autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
of Constantinople. This particularity allowed it to develop into a strong 
peripheral organization, already since the early years of the Ottoman Empire.
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Second, Cypriot history is marked by the presence of the British in the island 
for almost a century, which delayed the emergence of an independent state 
and galvanized Cypriot nationalism through the resistance of the people to 
colonial rule.
The first signs of Helleno-Christian nationalism in Cyprus are to be 
found in the years of the Greek War of Independence, when many Orthodox 
Cypriots hoped that the revolt in the Balkans would spread in Cyprus and 
that it would result in independence from the Sultan. However, all moves 
towards this direction were swiftly suppressed by the Ottomans. 
Nonetheless, the few Greek-Cypriots who did participate in the Greek 
Independence War returned to Cyprus as citizens of the Greek state and were 
thus excluded from tax payments.172 As a result, Greek citizenship became a 
attractive choice for Cypriots. When the British arrived in the island in 1878, 
the Church expected its position to improve since it perceived the new rulers 
as 'civilized fellow-Christians'. These hopes were depressed when the British 
adjusted their policy so as to limit the political powers of the Church.
However, the suppression policies of the British only managed to 
strengthen political (in addition to religious) solidarity among the flock of the 
Cypriot Church, which was mainly Greek-speaking. Civil unrest against 
imperial rule broke out, which was followed by even more oppression. 
Gradually, Greek-Cypriots came to the conclusion that they will liberate 
themselves from successive waves of oppression and imperialism only by 
uniting with Greece, with which they shared a common language (albeit a
172 Sia Anagnostopoulou, Op. C it, p. 364
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 148
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
very different dialect), a common religion, as well as common cultural roots 
which can be traced back in the pre-Classical era.173 A 1928 report by the 
British governor of Cyprus is indicative of the penetration of Helleno- 
Christian nationalism in Cypriot education: "All Greek-Cypriot primary 
schools use the curriculum of the Greek schools, which is approved by the 
ministry of education in Athens. The educational system functions in 
accordance with the guidelines of the Greek ministry of education. 
Classrooms are full of portraits of King Constantine, Eleftherios Venizelos, 
and Queen Sophia, and detailed maps of Greece. Maps of Cyprus are rare, 
and even when they exist, they are outdated".174
According to the ethno-symbolic approach to nationalism which is 
adopted here, this was to be expected. When an ethnic community wants to 
define itself nationally and establish a valid claim to self-determination, it 
needs to prove to itself and the outsiders that it is a distinct entity with a 
glorious past. The monuments from the ancient-Greek period in Cyprus, its 
ecclesiastical landmarks from the Byzantine past, its Orthodox customs and 
its religious and linguistic identity played exactly that role in Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism. Given that both Orthodoxy and the ancient-Greek past served as 
points of identity reference only for Christian Greek-speaking subjects, there 
was no common cultural pre-national ground upon which a common
173 It is believed that the Greek alphabet and culture have been established in Cyprus after the 
Persian Wars (5th century B.C.), although Greek-speaking populations had migrated to 
Cyprus much earlier. After the death of Alexander the Great, Cyprus was controlled by the 
Ptolemaic Hellenistic kingdom, before falling into the Romans and subsequently to the 
Byzantine Empire. See also Athanasius Angelopoulos, 1991. EKxXrjaiaonKfi Ioropia, 
(Thessalonica: AScXcpoi KupicnciBq)
174 Cited in Greek, in Niyazi Kizilyiirek, 1999. Kmpog: to  A6ie§o6o tc d v  EOvnciojiav [Cyprus: the 
Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Mabpq Aiara), p. 35
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national identity could emerge. For example, two attempts to introduce a 
purely "Cypriotist" and anti-imperialist nationalism, which were carried out 
in the 1920s by the Rural Party of Cyprus (AKK) and the Communist Party of 
Cyprus (KKK), ended up in complete failure, as they did not draw substantial 
public support.175
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, two parallel efforts began in order to 
advance the demand for unification with Greece; one from the communist 
party of Cyprus (AKEL, successor to KKK, and more open to the prospect of 
Enosis), and one from the Church. Greece was unwilling to discuss the issue, 
since it would seriously damage its relations with Great Britain. The Enosis 
(Unification) effort was intensified when the nationalist bishop Makarios took 
up the archbishopric throne. The demand for Enosis w ith Greece alienated 
Turkish-Cypriots from their fellow islanders and the anti-imperialist struggle. 
In fact, some of them allied with the British in order to prevent Unification, 
and this resulted to a permanent friction between the two communities. In 
1955, Greek-Cypriots started an armed struggle against the British, this time 
with the unofficial support of the Greek government. The agent of this revolt 
was the guerrilla group EOKA (National Union of Cypriot Fighters), whose 
political leader was archbishop Makarios. The official policy of EOKA 
towards Turkish-Cypriots was that their "presence in the island will be 
tolerated and that they will leave in peace with Greek-Cypriots, once the
175 Nicos Peristianis, 2006. "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics", in Yannis 
Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, Divided Cyprus (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press), p. 101
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British are gone, as long they do not pose obstacles to the demand for 
Enosis"176.
In the meantime, the Greek government changed its approach to the 
Cyprus issue, as a result of the wholehearted support of the Greek public 
opinion towards the Cypriot demands, which was also shared by the Greek 
Church. Moreover, the internationalization of the Cyprus problem provided 
Greece and Cyprus with some support in the U.N., while the 1955 pogrom 
against the Greeks in Constantinople ended the fragile Greco-Turkish 
friendship which was established by Kemal Ataturk and Eleftherios 
Venizelos earlier in the 20th century. Makarios, along with two other senior 
clerics and an employee of the Church were sent to exile in Seychelles in a 
British effort to weaken EOKA. However, violence did not wither away, and 
the British had no choice but to compromise.
Finally, in 1959 the Zurich-London agreements were signed which 
granted Cyprus independence. The demographic realities of the island in 
which Greek-speakers formed the vast majority of the population were taken 
into account, and Greek-Cypriots enjoyed a more seminal place in the 
administration of the island in comparison with the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority. However, the two communities were recognized as equal, extensive 
autonomy was given to the Turkish-Cypriots who were represented 
proportionately in parliament and the executive, while Greece, Turkey, and 
Great Britain were assigned as the three powers that would safeguard
176 British intelligence estimates, cited in Greek, in Niyazi Kizilyiirek, 1999. Kmpog: to  A5ie§o8o 
t o w  Edvnaojicbv [Cyprus: the Dead End of Nationalisms], (Athens: Mcropr] Aicrra), p. 41
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independence for Cyprus and the normal functioning of the new Cypriot 
Constitution. The main failure of the London-Zurich negotiations and 
agreements is to be found in the fact that it recognizes the existence of two 
distinct ethnie in the island and divides the population into two communities 
based on religious criteria.
The Cypriot Constitution, adopted on 16 August I960, is enlightening 
at this point. Articles 1 and 2 recognize the existence of two nationalities, a 
'Greek' and a 'Turkish' one.
Article 1: The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign 
Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and 
the Vice-President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish 
Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this 
Constitution provided.
Article 2: For the purposes of this Constitution:
(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who 
are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share 
the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox 
Church;
(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic 
who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or 
who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems',
(3) citizens of the Republic who do not come within the provisions of 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, w ithin three months of the
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date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong 
to either the Greek or the Turkish Community as individuals, but, if 
they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious group and 
upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such 
Com munity...177
In 1963, a new round of ethnic violence broke out, and archbishop and 
president Makarios presented his famous "13 points', which gave the 
impression of an effort to strip Turkish-Cypriots of their privileges. It was 
clear that the policy of the Church and the government aimed at the creation 
of a Greek-Orthodox Cyprus. That said, it gradually became evident that the 
Enosis slogan was but an excuse for Makarios to gain support from Greece, 
since it was clearly a politically unrealistic target. When the Greek PM, 
Georgios Papandreou, stroke a deal with the British and the Americans which 
allowed unification of Cyprus with Greece, on the condition that 5% of the 
island would be leased to the Turks for fifty years as a military base, 
Makarios refused it. It was clear that unification would limit the political 
power of Makarios and the Church, since it would turn  Cyprus into a mere 
province of the Greek state.178
The rise of a military dictatorship in Greece further deteriorated the 
relationships between Athens and Nicosia. Violence against Turkish-Cypriots 
continued, and, as a result, Turkey threatened to retaliate unless Greece
177Intemational Constitutional Law Website,
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/cyOOt .html, 10/10/05
178 This interpretation of events was provided by a senior Greek diplomat, during our field 
research in Greece. He moved on to suggest that 'Makarios would only have accepted the 
plan of we [Greece] had promised him that we will welcome him as our next Prime Minister/
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withdrew its army division from Cyprus. The eventual withdrawal of the 
Greek forces from the island removed any deterrent obstacle against Turkish 
intervention. The assault unfolded between July 20 and August 16 1974. A 
Greek military response was impossible given the realities of the balance of 
power between the two countries and, eventually, the Greek junta fell, and 
Cyprus remains dichotomized until today, despite all peace and reunification 
efforts.
IV.IIL Helleno-Christianity as an Impediment to Reconciliation: the Church, 
the People, and the United Nations' Peace Plan
After the Turkish invasion, Makarios returned to Cyprus and 
grudgingly started negotiations with the Turkish side. His hard-line 
approach, which was followed by his successors as well as by the Turkish- 
Cypriot leader Rauff Denktash brought all discussions for reunification to 
stalemate. As noted by Niyazi Kizilyurek, after the death of Makarios, Greek- 
Cypriot political elites (which were mostly comprised by ex-EOKA members) 
never supported the idea of an independent Cyprus. Instead, they tried to 
create a Greek state in the island, and they treated Turkish-Cypriots not as a 
political, but as a cultural community.179
The Church of Cyprus, often with the support of the Greek Church, 
became the advocate of the most maximalist views regarding a possible 
political solution to the Cyprus problem: "The influence of the Church in
179 Niyazi Kizilyurek, 1999. Kvnpoc,: to  A5ii§o8o tc o v  EdwKiopav [Cyprus: the Dead End of 
Nationalisms], (Athens: Mauprj Aiara), p. 41
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education has been a crucial factor towards in the mobilization of Greek- 
Cypriots towards unification w ith Greece. Indeed, Greek nationalism has 
spread from the cities of Cyprus to the countryside, through education and 
Orthodoxy".180
At the same time, however, the events of 1974, which were triggered 
by the intervention of the Greek military junta, caused a certain 'bitterness' in 
the bilateral relations between Cyprus and Greece. The attempted coup 
against Makarios was characterized as a "betrayal" of Cyprus. Hence, Greek- 
Cypriot political leaders, mainly from the left (AKEL), started pushing for 
reconciliation with Turkish-Cypriots, especially after 1977. The result of this 
movement of "Cypriotist" nationalism and the traumatic Turkish invasion, 
was the relative marginalization of the demand for unification w ith Greece in 
the subsequent years (1980s).181 Thus "a) the Cypriot flag was gradually given 
pre-eminence over the Greek flag in most public administration buildings, ii) 
the Independence Day of Cyprus, legally established in the 1960s, started 
being officially celebrated (with parades etc.) in the 1980s, iii) is sports, 
Cyprus abandoned all Greek 'national teams' and formed its own in the early 
1980s, participating for the first time as 'Cyprus', in international athletic 
games, iv) 'Cypriot history' was first introduced as a separate course from
18°, Niyazi Kizilyurekl999. Kbjipoc,: to  A5ii§o6o tcov Edvmop&v [Cyprus: the Dead End of 
Nationalisms], (Athens: Maupi] Aicrra), p. 47
181 Caesar Mavratsas, 1998. 'Oxpeic, t o o  EXfojvncoi) EQvnaopob orrjv Kbnpo [Facets of Greek 
Nationalism in Cyprus], (Athens: Kaxdpxi)
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Greek history at the secondary school level in 1977, v) the same happened 
w ith the lesson of "Cypriot literature in 1986".182
However, this is not to suggest that Helleno-Christian nationalism 
was also marginalized. On the contrary, the demand of Enosis was merely 
replaced by a demand for complete Hellenization of Cyprus, mainly 
expressed by the late presidents of Cyprus, Glafkos d e rid e s  (1993-2003) and 
Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-2008). Even today, visitors in Cyprus will see 
Greek flags in abundance, almost everywhere in the internationally 
recognized Greek part of the island - in streets, balconies, stores, football 
stadiums, and mostly, in Churches. Some commentators attribute the 
successive failures of "Cypriotism" and the political comeback of 
"Hellenocentrism" to rational self-interest, in other words the recognition of 
the plain fact that an alliance with Greece is necessary in the unequal struggle 
against Turkey.183 However, "rational choice" cannot account for the 
continuing loyalty of a large part of the Cypriot population to the ideal of a 
unified Greek nation, which is espoused by Helleno-Christian nationalism.184
Despite the difficulties created by mutual lack of trust, fanaticism, and 
obstinacy, the two sides reached to a common platform upon which a future 
solution would be based. This common platform is none other them a federate 
or confederate model of governance w ith extensive autonomy for both sides.
182 Nikos A. Stamatakis, 1991. "History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of the 
Modem Greek Cypriot Identity", in Cyprus Review, vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1991, p. 76
183 Nicos Peristianis, 2006. "Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics", in Yannis 
Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gisela Welz, Divided Cyprus (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press), p. 104
184 According to a survey on political and national perceptions, which was conducted in 2000, 
less than half of Greek-Cypriots identify themselves as "Cypriots only", and not "Greeks" at 
all. See Nicos Peristianis, Op. Cit, p. 107
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The prospect of a completely unified Cyprus in the future has been 
abandoned, something which also recognized in the ongoing (2010) peace 
talks.
Makarios died in 1977, and his successor, archbishop Chrysostomos, 
remained in the archbishopric throne until 2006. As we shall see in the 
following pages, Chrysostomos remained faithful to the nationalist Orthodox 
tradition, and since a chronic illness prevented him from public interventions 
during his last years in office, the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus took 
up the role of defending the 'national rights' of Greek-Cypriots.185
Moreover, the Church propaganda against a solution to the Cyprus 
problem reached its peak during the 2003-2004 period, when frequent 
interventions from the Church hierarchy (especially the Metropolitan of 
Pafos) encouraged the people to vote 'N o' to the proposed U.N. settlement, 
and all this in defence of 'faith and country'. The official position of the 
Church is summarized in its official periodical 'AnocrroAo^ Bapvdpa^', in 
which the bishop of Pafos argued that 'history leaves us w ith a heavy weight 
on our shoulders, the weight of the patriotism of our race...and it is not just 
our glorious ancestors whose heritage requires us to say No to the despicable 
peace plan. It is also our Christian faith. Those who choose slavery are a 
disgrace for the nature of m an who is made in the image of God...And it is 
not only spiritual slavery that is hated by God. [God also hates] the denial of
185Since Makarios' death, the elected presidents of the republic who succeeded him (Mr. 
Kyprianou 1977-1988, Mr. Vassiliou 1988-1993, Mr. Clerides 1993-2003, and Mr. 
Papadopoulos, 2003-) were not clerics. Others followed a more pragmatic approach aiming at 
a peace solution (e.g. Clerides), while others (e.g. Papadopoulos) kept a hardliner position.
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our rights, the denial of our fatherland, and our national humiliation'.186 In 
this passage, the Helleno-Christian nationalist view is captivatingly depicted. 
God is presented as guiding the Greek-Cypriot nation to salvation, as 
standing by its side in a holy struggle against possible ground giving to the 
enemy who is personified to non-other than to fellow Cypriots who happen 
not to be Greek-speaking Orthodox. In other words, the Helleno-Christian 
God is a nationalist God.
A similar view on the Anan plan is expressed in the proceedings of the 
Holy Synod congregation which took place in 2002 to discuss the U.N. 
proposals. More specifically the plan is rejected on the following grounds:
a. It forbids the return of internally displaced people.
b. It is not functional, and it will create problems in the running of the 
state.
c. It is very beneficial for the Turkish side and unfavourable for the 
Greek one
d. It is legalizing the presence of Turkish settlers in Cyprus
e. The Turkish side is not a reliable negotiator, and it is doubtful if 
Turkey will keep its part of the deal.187
This position towards the peace plan was later supported by other 
Orthodox Churches, namely by the Greek Church w ith an announcement that
186 Chrysostomos, Metropolitan of Pafos, 2004. Turn npmei va rioope 'Oxi (no Zxe5io A w a v  
[Why Should We Say to the Annan Plan]', in AjtootoXoc, Bapvafiac; [Apostle Barnabas], March 
2004, p. 102
187Proceedings of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus meeting; November 17,2002
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it made on November 20, 2002, and the Greek-controlled patriarchates of 
Jerusalem (November 21, 2002), and Antioch (November 24, 2002). Although 
an analysis of the exact legal nature of the U.N. proposals is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is definitely w orth making a few remarks concerning the 
reasons that the Church provides for rejecting the peace plan.188 There were 
two main features in the legal nature of the plan: the first one is that it 
constituted an attempt to balance contrasting interests, policies and 
ideologies, and the second feature is that an effort was made to be slow but 
sure with any changes that it introduced. Therefore, it provided the means for 
a gradual return of refugees and internally displaced people in their homes. It 
also requires a slow but steady withdrawal of foreign troops (both Greek and 
Turkish) from the island. It worked on the assumption that a confederate 
model of governance will be applied in Cyprus in order to avoid the mistakes 
and the tensions of the past. In any case, a federate Cyprus has been the basis 
of all negotiations since the late 1970s. Finally, I should mention that the plan 
provided for the return of a significant proportion of land to Greek-Cypriots 
which has been lost to the Turkish invasion of 1974. When it comes to the 
issue of settlers, one cannot fail to note the complexity of the situation given 
the frequency of mixed marriages and the fact that many settlers have been in 
Cyprus for decades. W hat is sure is that the Secretary General's plan took all 
the necessary precautions so as to stop the influx of more settlers in the 
future. In short, the position of the Church appears to do no justice 
whatsoever to the U.N. proposal.
188A copy of the plan has been obtained from the Greek Service of the BBC News Website, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ greek
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 159
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
What is most significant for our study is that the Church saw the plan 
through a nationalist prism. Hence, it argued that it is advantageous for 
Turkish-Cypriots, as if Turkish-Cypriots are not Cypriots themselves, but 
Turkish. In the eyes of the Holy Synod there is no such thing as a common 
Cypriot identity. Hence, the two communities are seen as antagonistic players 
in a zero-sum negotiation game. The views of the Church were identical with 
those of the then president of the republic, Tassos Papadopoulos. In a historic 
and emotionally loaded speech, ten days before the referendum, the 
president called the people of Cyprus to say a 'p roud No' to the proposed 
peace plan. Despite the fact that he was the de jure president of all Cypriots, 
both Christians and Muslims, his speech was a direct attack against his 
compatriots on the North of the 'Green line'. Among others he claimed that 
'the aim of the Turkish-Cypriot side for two peoples, two separate states 
which will just co-operate, will be fully realized [with the peace plan]'.189 
Before wishing 'H appy Easter to all', he concluded as follows: I urge you to 
reject the Anan plan. I urge you, on April 24, to say a proud NO. I urge you to 
defend your right, your dignity, and your history.. . ' 190
The plan was finally put to a test in April, 24, 2004, when two 
referenda were held simultaneously in both Southern and Northern Cyprus, 
one week before the official entrance of the island in the E.U. An 
overwhelming majority in the North voted 'Yes' to reunification, while, at the 
same time, an overwhelming majority voted for exactly the opposite in the
189 The transcript of the President7s TV message to the country was found in the periodical 
EQviKTj 'Ejra\§t][Ethmki Epalksi\, vol. 54, April-June 2004 
i9° Ibid.
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South. The plan was rejected, and the internationally recognized Republic of 
Cyprus joined the E.U, while the Northern occupied territory remains 
impoverished and isolated until today. The influence of the Church, through 
its public interventions and Sunday masses, in this decision was paramount. 
The two big parties of Cyprus, Left and Right, did not reject the plan. The 
liberal Right party (DESY) supported the plan, while the socialist Left (AKEL) 
initially accepted it and subsequently changed position, keeping therefore an 
ambivalent position towards the proposed solution. In other words, among 
the political powers of the Cypriot Republic, it was the Church and the 
President who carried out the 'N o' campaign.
IV.V. Conclusions: A People in Search of National Identity
The millet system of Ottoman administration endowed the Church of 
Cyprus with several political privileges and an extensive degree of authority 
over Orthodox Cypriots. The attempted reforms towards the end of the 
Ottoman regime in the island did not affect it significantly, as the Church 
managed to secularize its structures, while the involvement of people in the 
running of the Church bestowed its power with legitimacy. In short, the 
Church of Cyprus was the most important political and cultural institution 
under both Ottoman and British reign.
After the crisis of the first years of the 20th century, the Church of 
Cyprus continued to function as a political institution with unique privileges 
and immense political power. The control of the Church was at the epicentre
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of political rivalries and antagonisms in the Cypriot society for most part of 
the 19th and 20th centuries. When Cyprus became independent, it even 
managed to strengthen its position in comparison with the years of the 
Ottoman and British rule in the island. Even if the nationalization of 
Orthodoxy is a general historical trend which has been observed in the 
Balkan region and especially in Greece since the 19th century, the case of 
Cyprus is undoubtedly the most idiosyncratic of all. Church and state were 
completely united in the face of president Makarios, to the point that it was 
difficult to distinguish between them. Since the start of peace talks in 1977, 
the Church has remained faithful to the tradition of a maximalist nationalism 
which was first advanced by Makarios. Apart from the consequences of the 
Church's nationalism in terms of foreign policy, we should not fail to mention 
the most important outcome of Helleno-Christianism in the domestic politics 
of Cyprus, which is the deterioration of every possible prospect for a peaceful 
co-existence between the two communities on the basis of a single Cypriot 
consciousness. What is missing from Cyprus is not a legal regime that it will 
be arranging the relationships between the two communities. This legal 
regime would be much easier to establish if there was a Cypriot national 
identity that would transcend religious differences, or at least a common will 
to co-exist peacefully.
Of course, to blame exclusively the Church for the failure of peace 
efforts and ethnic co-existence would be a gross oversimplification and an 
analytical shortfall. The Cyprus problem was created by a combination of
factors, both internal and external. Among others, British and Ottoman
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Imperialism, 'm otherlands' paternalism '191, and the Cold W ar's fragile 
balance of power were causes of continuous instability in Cyprus, which were 
intensified by a series of internal drawbacks in both the economic and 
political realm. Nevertheless, one cannot fail to point out the systematic 
attempts of the Church to undermine peace efforts and to construct rigid 
boundaries between the two communities. And, given the immense political 
and cultural power of the Church in the island, a balanced observer has no 
choice but to count this institution among the obstacles to peace.
Before bringing this chapter to a close, it is necessary to put 
together a sketch of the basic comparisons one can make between the Greek 
and the Cypriot Churches. Both Churches were significant determinants of 
the pre-modern ethnic cultures in the two regions. Moreover, under the 
auspices of the ecumenical patriarchate and the provisions of the Ottoman 
law, in both Greece and Cyprus the Church enjoyed a great deal of economic 
power in conjunction with political authority in the fields of family law, tax 
collection, and arbitration among the Christian population. These important 
historical facts seem to verify the argum ent made in the introduction of this 
paper regarding the importance of pre-modern cultural material and 
institutions in the nation building process.
Clearly, there are also significant differences between the Greek 
and the Cypriot case. The autocephaly of the Cypriot Church from a very 
early period (431 A.D) allowed it to emancipate from the ecumenical spirit of
191By this term, I mean the consistent efforts of Greece and Turkey to control Cyprus and use 
it to advance their own national and regional interests
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the patriarchate and strengthen its particular ties with Christian community 
of the island. The process of nationalization was therefore much smoother in 
Cyprus and came as effortlessly as possible with the appearance of 
nationalism, without the presence of frictions and heated debates which 
characterized the Greek case. The antithesis with the Greek case becomes 
even sharper if we bear in mind that there was a certain degree of forceful 
state intervention in order to complete the conversion of the Greek Church to 
nationalist values.192 Conversely, the Cypriot Church adopted nationalism 
under the influence of European ideas and Greek irredentism. Cypriot 
nationalism was among the last pieces in a pan-European domino. What is 
more is that Orthodox nationalism in Cyprus was partly a reaction to 
imperial rule, given the methodical efforts of the British to abolish the 
Church's political and economic privileges. Nationalist and irredentist 
demands went hand in hand with self-protection for the Cypriot Church.
To conclude, our analysis illustrates that, as the conditions of 
modernity changed the Cypriot society, the Church also changed in order to 
adapt to the novel environment. Despite being a pre-modern institution, it 
embraced a plethora of modern features under a seemingly traditional veil. 
Given its functions and importance in medieval Cyprus, it was easy for it to 
politicize pre-modern structures, practices, and institutions in a nationalist 
manner and incorporate them in modernity. Thus, it offered individuals a
192 Nikos Chiysoloras, 2004b. /Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political 
Culture7, in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, vol.4.1.2004, pp. 40-61
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welcomed sense of continuity between the familiar symbolic universe of 
tradition and the brave new world of nationalism.
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Chapter V: Orthodoxy and Nationalism in 
Greece after 1974
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V.L Introduction
In the previous chapters, we investigated the process of consolidation 
of Helleno-Christian nationalism in both Greece and Cyprus, during the 
periods of the respective independence struggles in these two countries. In 
Cyprus, Helleno-Christianity has remained a powerful political force until 
today, and had a profound impact on the recent Greek-Cypriot decision 
regarding the re-unification plan, put forward by the Office of the United 
Nations Secretary General.
Such is also the case in Greece, where, over the last 175 years since 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Orthodox Church has 
developed a nationalist and conservative discourse, it has allied itself with 
extreme right wing governments, it 'anathematized' or excommunicated 
progressive political leaders and intellectuals (e.g., P.M. Eleftherios Venizelos, 
writers Nikos Kazatzakis, Emmanuel Roidis, and others), and it turned a 
blind eye on the military dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). The 
autocephalous Greek Church has acted in the recent Greek history not only as 
a state-funded institution, but also as an ideological and legitimating 
mechanism of the state, which has been 'blessing' governmental decisions, in 
exchange for a privileged status in the Greek society. In effect, the 
institutional and ideological ties between church and state have remained 
unaltered until today, and this is reflected in official and unofficial public 
discourse regarding Greek national identity, as well as in the legal and 
political arrangements of church-state relations in contemporary Greece.
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In 2005, the Department of Media of the University of Athens 
completed a survey regarding the political culture of young Greeks, aged 
between 15 and 29 years. The survey attempted, among other things, to 
measure the trust of the Greek youth in various institutions. As we can see in 
the Figure below, the Orthodox Church appeared to be one of the most 
popular and trusted institutions:
Trust in Institutions
Political P arties 
Public Adm nistration 
U nions 
Parliam ent 
G overnm ent 
Television 
Local A uthorities 
Police 
E uropean  Union 
N ew spapers 
S econdary  Education 
Army 
Ju s tice  
Radio
Higher Education 
Church 
P residen t
0 2 4 6 8 10
Figure 1. Trust in Institutions. Source: Nicos Demertzis et. al, 2005. The Youth in 
Contemporary Greece (Unpublished survey, translated in English by Nikos Chrysoloras)
The president and the Church are perceived as institutions that unite
the nation, in contrast to political parties and labour unions which are seen as
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divisive actors in Modern Greek society. Moreover, according to the same 
survey which included a representative sample (1,600 individuals) from all 
the major cities in Greece (Athens, Thessalonica, Patras, Larissa, Serres), 
religion is one of the most important social values:
□  Family B L ove □  Friendship □  Knowledge ■  C areer □  Knowledge ■  Money □  Religion
Ranking of Social Values (in a 1 to 10 Scale)
Figure 2: Ranking of Social Values. Demertzis et al . , 2005. Op. Cit.
Finally, it worth mentioning that one out of four young Greeks attends 
Church at least once a month, while almost 1 out of ten goes to Church each 
week:
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Figure 9: Frequency of Church Attendance
8%
0 Only on Big Celebrations
■ A Few Times per Week
□ Every Sunday
□ At Least Once a Month
■ Never
Figure 3: Frequency of Church Attendance. Nicos Demertzis et al., 2005. Op. Cit.
Both the cultural and institutional aspects of Helleno-Christian influence have 
undermined the supposed "religious neutrality" of the state, the treatment of 
immigrants and minorities, the protection of human rights, and the conduct 
of abstemious foreign policy. For example, Greece was convicted in the 
European Court of Human Rights for not allowing the elected mufti of the 
Muslim minority in Western Thrace, Mohamed Ali Aga, to practice his 
religious role.193 Moreover, in its 2008 report, Amnesty International criticized 
Greece for discrimination against religious minorities, especially within the 
army and the public service.194 The 2005 report of the American Embassy in 
Athens regarding religious freedom in Greece, notes the following: 
""Representatives of some religious groups report difficulties in their relations
193 Cited in the Greek news portal, www.in.gr, published on September, 9, 2006. See link: 
http://www.in.gr/news/article.asp?lngEntityID=737259&lngDtrID=244
194 See the link in the official website of Amnesty International:
http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/grc-summary-eng#4. Accessed on September 10,2008
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with Greek authorities. Religious and legal privileges which are provided to 
the Orthodox Church are, in principle, denied to other recognized religions. 
Non-Orthodox Churches have to submit separate and time-consuming 
applications to government authorities for issues such as permission to 
transfer their temples to larger buildings. On the other hand, the Orthodox 
Church enjoys a net of institutionalized relations between the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy and the Ministry of Education and Creeds regarding administrative 
issues".195
The Greek Church has come to understand itself as the guardian of 
tradition and national identity, and the expression of the 'true ' Greek spirit. 
This myth has appealed to the Greek public. The Church considers itself more 
as a guardian of the nation (or even race- yivog196), rather than as a messenger 
of the will of God. At the same time, it considers its views as carrying a divine 
legitimization, which places them above positive law, and makes them 
immune to criticism,197 since the 'will of God' is perceived as the ultimate 
foundation for legitimizing one's views.
As we have seen in chapter III, since the declaration of the autocephaly 
of the Greek Church in 1833, the relationships between the Greek state and 
the Church have been relatively harmonious (after a short 'adaptation' 
period), within a legal context of subordination of the ecclesiastical power of 
the Church to the secular power of the state. The latter, with the help of
195 http://athens.usembassy.gov/religiousfreedom_gr2005.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 
2006
196 The meaning of the word 'genos' (y£vo<;) is ambiguous. It may mean 'Greek speaking 
populations', "Orthodox Christians of the Balkans", or 'the Greek race'.
197 See the interview of the Archbishop of Athens Christodoulos in Eleftherotypia, 15/6/2000
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Romanticist intellectuals and politicians (Paparrigopoulos, Zambelios, 
Kolletis), disseminated the basic arguments of the Helleno-Christian thesis to 
every layer of the Greek society through public education, policies, and laws. 
The Church on the other hand played an active role in supporting, through its 
influence to the people, state decisions and augmenting popular feelings of 
national solidarity and nationalism in the face of external 'threats7 and 
internal dissents. This is not to suggest that there were not voices which 
opposed the hegemony of Helleno-Christianism. However, it is only after 
1974 that we can observe a serious threat to the chain of equivalence between 
religious and national identity. A reason for that is the traum a of the military 
junta.
Despite the fact that the majority of the Greek people did not actively 
oppose the ideological and political dominance of the military dictatorship, 
almost immediately after its fall, the slogan 'EAAa^ EAXfjvcDV Xpicruiavcbv' 
[For a Greece of Greek Christians] lost its popular support.198 In a way, it became 
"politically incorrect" for a period of time. Traditional institutions (including 
the army and the church), slogans (including the infamous 'ncrupi^, 
©pqoKda, OiKoyeveia' [Fatherland, Family; Religion]), and political powers 
temporarily lost their legitimacy, after being associated w ith the dictatorship.
At the same time, the multi-party system of the pre-dictatorial period 
was replaced by the complete hegemony of two major parties in the post­
authoritarian period [METcmoXnevorj]: the centre-right 'N ew  Democracy' and 
the centre-leftist PASOK. The parties of the radical left (both reformist and
198 Mass resistance to the military dictatorship was not widespread during the early years of 
its rule, and it was limited in Athens.
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 172
Nikos Chysoloras Department of Government, LSE
orthodox communist) have never regained the popular support that the 
commanded until the late 1950s. They typically supported the complete 
secularization of the Greek state, while, at the other end of the spectrum, New 
Democracy has defended the status quo in Church-state relations. As we shall 
see in the following pages, PASOK has been a great deal more ambivalent in 
its intentions. During the 1990s, three different parties were formed, which 
attempted to challenge the dominance of PASOK and New Democracy in the 
Greek political landscape (the right wing Politiki Anoiksi, the left wing DIKKI, 
and the centrist KEK). None of them succeeded. Instead, in the early years of 
the 21st century, two other parties occupied the far right end of the Greek 
political spectrum: LAOS and Democratiki Anagennisi. The former one 
proved quite resilient and successful, drawing its political rhetoric from the 
main themes of Helleno-Christian nationalism.
However, the most significant sociological development in the post­
authoritarian period was the emergence of a new type of nationalist discourse 
that attempted to replace Helleno-Christianism as the dominant ideology in 
the Greek political culture. It was PASOK's nationalist discourse, which was 
centered on a series of anti-imperialist and anti-American slogans and it 
incorporated elements ranging from populism to socialism. Having the 
benefit of hindsight, we may now conclude that clash between PASOK and 
the Church was unavoidable.
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V.II. PASOK and the Church
The congruent cooperation amongst the Church and the State started 
disintegrating in the beginning of the 1980s when the leftist "Pan-Hellenic 
Socialist Movement' (PASOK) came to power. Since its first years in office, 
PASOK attempted to introduce a series of secularizing measures (e.g. civil 
marriage and divorce), which were perceived by the Church as direct attack 
against its hegemonic position in the Greek national life.199 As James Pettifer 
argued,
The Church has generally seen PASOK governments as an object of 
cultural opposition; a secularist party with only a weak, if any, 
commitment to the position of the Church in national life and enemy 
likely to champion changes in social legislation of which the Church 
disapproves.200
The intentions of the Socialist Party regarding church-state relationships were 
already revealed from the its first days in office.201 The decriminalization of 
adultery, the introduction of civil wedding and the simplification of the 
procedures for a divorce were among the initial pieces of legislation that 
brought the government into conflict with the Orthodox Church. The Holy 
Synod of the Church was caught by surprise, even though radical
199 However, the popularity of the Church did not allow to any of the post-1974 Greek 
Governments to proceed to radical measures such as "disestablishment", or to permanently 
solve the issue of the Church property, despite the fact that there were relevant discussions 
among academics and politicians during the two constitutional reforms of 1986 and 2000.
200 James Pettifer, 1996. "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy", in Kevin Featherstone,& 
Kostas Ifantis, (eds.), Greece in a Changing Europe, (Manchester: Manchester University Press)
p.p. 21-22
201 Io$ xr]$ KupidKf|$ [Sunday Virus], "Oi E k o t o  npcoxe^ Mepe$ t o d  IlaEoK o t i |v  E^ouaia.. .xai 
oi E k o t o  TeXeuxaiEs" [The First 100 Days of PASOK in Office... and the Last 100], in 
EXEvdepowma [Eleftherotypia], 14-3-2004
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secularization measures were included both in PASOK's political manifestos 
as well as in frequent public statements of its members. During the 
parliamentary debate regarding the post-dictatorial constitution of Greece, in 
1975, the leader of the socialist party, Andreas Papandreou, has made his 
intentions quite clear: "We support a full and complete separation of church 
and state. This is in the interest of both the state and the church. It is high 
time for the church to become independent and to disentangle from partisan 
politics".202 Among the fiercest critics of PASOK at that time, was the 
Metropolitan of Demetrias, and later to become archbishop, Christodoulos 
Paraskevaidis 203
To the disappointment of modernizers, PASOK was not able to 
proceed to a complete separation of church and state at the 1986 
constitutional reform. This was partly due to reactions from within the 
government itself, as many of its members during that period represented 
what was later called 'patriotic socialism7, or, in sociological terms, an 
ideological mixture of populism, socialist parlance and nationalist attitude. 
Moreover, PASOK lacked popular support for its disestablishment project, as 
Helleno-Christianity remained, and still is, an ideology shared by vast 
numbers of the Greek population. It is worth mentioning that PASOK's 
attempt to solve the problem of ecclesiastical property, and to reform the 
electoral system for bishops, in 1987, created a prolonged crisis in church- 
state relations, which led to the resignation of the Minister of Education and 
Creeds, late Anthonis Tritsis, and the abandonment of further efforts of
202 Georgios Karayannis, 1997. Op. C it, p. 182
203 EXeoQepotvma [Eleftherotypia], 14-3-2004, Op. Cit.
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secularization. PASOK lost the elections of 1989 amidst a series of scandals 
and accusations of corruption.
Even though the socialists did not succeed in separating church and
state, the legacy of the eight-year rule of PASOK should not be
underestimated. Apart from the liberalization of family laws mentioned 
above, PASOK also managed to alter the attitudes of the Greek society 
towards issues that the Church considers as taboos. Hence, despite its 
traditionalist political culture and the power of the Orthodox Church, Greece 
has established a very liberal - even by European and North American 
standards- legal framework in relation to issues such as duration of 
imprisonment, abortion, and prostitution.
The center-right party that succeeded PASOK in office, Nea
Democratia [New Democracy], did not touch the sensitive issues related to
secularization. Besides, popular disappointment w ith its tight financial policy 
quickly brought PASOK back in power w ith a landslide victory, in 1993. 
However, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's poor health made PASOK 
more concerned about a smooth succession, rather than political reform 
issues. In the meantime, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disillusionment with 
communism, the consequent crisis among the Greek left that eventually led to 
its fragmentation, the political cynicism caused by the various corruption 
scandals of the early 1990s, and, more importantly, the dispute between 
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, over the 'Greekness' 
of Macedonia and the heritage of Alexander the Great, brought nationalism 
back to mainstream politics and public discourse. In 1992, millions of Greeks
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protested in the streets of Athens and Thessalonica, with their main slogan 
being "Macedonia has been Greek for over 3,000 years". This phrase is 
nothing but an exemplar of nationalist thinking, according to which the 
Greek nation has been in existence since before the Trojan War, and 
Macedonia is an integral part of it.
Contrary to this political climate of nationalist populism, PASOK 
elected a Prime Minister, Costas Semites, whose main political catchphrase 
was 'modernization'. The government which was formed after the 1996 
elections included many senior ministers who appeared to share Semites' 
vision of Europeanized and modernized Greece, while 'patriotic socialists' 
within the party were forced to step aside. Unfortunately for the modernizers, 
immediately after their election, nationalism was revived, since Greece won 
the Olympic Games bid and reached to the brink of war w ith Turkey, due to a 
dispute over the control of two small islands called Imia. The stance of 
PASOK during the latter crisis was criticized as being nationally treacherous, 
since the government made every effort to avoid a war and Semites thanked 
the United States for their help in this effort.
V.II.i. Christodoulos vs. PASOK
The relationships between the Church and the State further 
deteriorated when the dynamic and charismatic Archbishop Christodoulos 
succeeded the low-profile Seraphim as head of the Greek Church in 1998. 
Christodoulos seemed unwilling to make any further concessions to the state 
that would compromise the position of the Church in the Greek society. His 
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personal popularity, the strong attachment of the Greeks to the Orthodox 
dogma, as well as his rhetorical and leadership capabilities facilitated his 
cause.
In 1999, w hen the socialist government attempted to make one more 
step towards secularization, and abandon the requirement for the Greek 
citizens to state their religion in their identity cards, the Church fiercely 
reacted and asked for the carrying out of a referendum to decide on the issue. 
The government refused, and Christodoulos started a struggle against the 
government's decision, which included street demonstrations attended by 
hundreds of thousands of people, interventions in the media, and the
collection of signatures in favor of a referendum. Although there are no
official data for the exact number of those who signed for the illegal
'referendum ' of the Church (we can only rely on the data given by the
Church), virtually no one disputes that the Church managed to collect more 
than three million signatures (around 35% of eligible voters).204
From a legal point of view, the Church was clearly wrong. Both the 
independent Personal Data Protection Authority, and the superior 
constitutional court of the Greek state, the State Council, had ruled that even 
the optional inclusion of religious attachment in identity cards is 
unconstitutional 205 However, the Archbishop, through the use of a clearly 
populist discourse, managed to convince the people that he is carrying out a
2°4 According to the Church data, 3,008,901 signatures. Cited in Yannis Stavrakakis, Religion 
and Populism../
205 It appears that there is a significant consensus among legal theorists, academics and jurists 
towards the view that the statement of religion in identity cards is unconstitutional, and 
violates the principle of personal data protection. See Antonis Manitakis, Op. Cit., Panayotis 
Dimitropoulos, Op. Cit., and Evangelos Venizelos, Op. Cit.
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"holy war" against the alienation of Greece from her tradition. In addition to 
that, the Church enjoyed the support of the major opposition party of Greece, 
the center-right Nea Democratia, and the almost unconditional support of the 
whole spectrum of the Greek right. Finally, the legal status of the Orthodox 
Church as the 'established Church' of Greece provided it with special 
privileges and allowed it to intervene in public affairs.
The present constitution of Greece cannot dictate to the Church its 
views. It cannot prohibit the ethnocentric fundamentalist doctrines espoused 
by the Church hierarchy. In fact it gives Orthodoxy the role of the 
'established' Church. Article 3 of the 1975 constitution (even after the last 
revision in 2001) recognizes the Christian Orthodox religion as 'the prevailing 
religion in Greece'. More specifically, Article 3 reads as follows:
1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our 
Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the 
Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church 
of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the 
holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is 
autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving 
Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and 
assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church in 
compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 
1850 and
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the Synodal Act of September 4,1928.
2. The ecclesiastical regime existing in certain districts of the State shall 
not be deemed contrary to the provisions of the preceding-paragraph
3. The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official 
translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior 
sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great 
Church of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.206
That said, we should also emphasize that freedom of worship and belief are 
typically protected by the constitution in accordance with the Western 
standards. Article 13 of the Constitution reads as follows:
1. The freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. The enjoyment of 
civil and individual rights does not depend on the religious conviction 
of each individual.
2. Every known religion is free and the forms of worship thereof shall 
be practiced without any hindrance by the State and under protection 
of the law. The exercise of worship shall not contravene public order or 
offend morals. Proselytizing is prohibited.
3. The ministers of all religions are subject to the same obligations 
towards the State and to the same state supervision as the ministers of 
the established religion.
4. No person shall, by reason of his religious convictions, be exempt 
from discharging his obligations to the State, or refuse to comply with 
the laws.
206 http://  www.mfa.gr/syntagma/ artcl25.html#A3
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5. No oath shall be imposed w ithout a law specifying the form 
thereof.207
Moreover, article 16 of the Greek constitution, which describes the role 
and scope of education in the country, states the following:
Education constitutes a fundamental state objective and aims at the 
moral, intellectual, professional, and physical instruction of the 
Greeks, the development of national and religious consciousness, 
and the formation of free and responsible citizens.
Before finishing this brief summary of the place of religion w ithin the 
Greek legal order, it would be useful for the reader to synopsize the political 
party system of m odern Greece and its relationship w ith the Greek Church. 
Greece has been formally a constitutional democracy since 1864, though 
democratic politics has been interrupted twice in the past by dictatorial coups, 
foreign occupation and civil w ar (1936-1949 and 1967-1974). Since 1915, when 
a 'national schism' was brought about as a result of the disagreement between 
the king and the prime minister regarding the position that Greece was to 
take during the 1st W orld War, Greek party politics is characterized by the 
presence of a right and an anti-right coalitions (or, before that, 
liberal/conservative, and even before that, republican/royalist). The 
allegiance of the parties of the centre in this conflict varied in different 
historical periods. The right/anti-right distinction became even sharper 
during the consolidation period of the so-called Third Greek Republic (1974-), 
when many supporters of the left shifted their support to the center-left
207 http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/grOOOOO_.html, emphases added
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PASOK.208 Since 1996, the use of the 'right/anti-right' discourse has been 
limited and what we usually call Greek post-authoritarian period seems to 
have come to an end. A firmly consolidated democracy based on a 
Westminster-type two-party system has been established.
While the Church has been traditionally a supporter of the right, both 
the centre and the left had never been unequivocally hostile to the Church 
(although the left supports secularization), and this is partly because of the 
wide and cross-class appeal of Orthodoxy in Greek political culture. 
However, even the slightest secularizing measures, which are necessary for 
the protection of basic hum an rights, have been perceived by the Church as 
direct threats to its position in Greek politics, and it is in part because of this 
Church attitude that there is a continuous tension in the relations between the 
official Church and the parties of the left until today.
The conflict between the Church and the State on the issue of the 
identity cards finally ended in August 29th 2001, with the decisive 
intervention of the President of the Republic, Constantinos Staphanopoulos, 
who refused the demands of the Church for the carrying out of the 
referendum, on the basis of the argument that this would be an 
unconstitutional action. This intervention "led to the suspension of most 
politicized activities" of the Church at least for the next couple of years 209
208 PASOK's founder, and three times-elected PM of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, managed 
to gain the support of the left, with the talented use of a populist discourse, in which he 
claimed that he represented all the democratic and 'anti-right7 forces of Greece, and that he 
supported the claims of the "unprivileged".
209 Yannis Stavrakakis, Op. Cit., p. 8
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Nevertheless, the period starting with the enthronement of 
Christodoulos in 1998, until the final resolution of the issue in 2001 was 
admittedly a period of heavy politicization of the Church discourse, and 
produced a considerable amount of academic literature on the subject. The 
main points of the Church discourse during that period were that a) the 
Church is the only agent available to protect Greek national identity, since the 
state is becoming increasingly detached from the idea of the nation, and b) 
membership in the E.U is potentially dangerous for Greek national identity in 
the absence of a strong Church, which will be able to protect the Greek 
tradition from the corrupting influence of the heterodox210, and c) by linking 
Greekness with Orthodoxy, the Church has managed to convince a large part 
of the Greek population that secularization measures in Greece are irrelevant 
and illegitimate. In other words, the ideas of the West and the Enlightenment 
are only acceptable as long as they do not come into conflict with the Greek 
Orthodox 'tradition'. As we can note, the last years of confrontation between 
the Church and the governments of PASOK marked a radical change in the 
role of the Church, which, challenged the legal and political dominance of the 
state over ecclesiastical authority, and assumed the role of an autonomous 
political agent.211
The aforementioned conclusions derive from the study, analysis, and 
interpretation of the Church's political actions and rhetoric, during the period 
under investigation. More specifically, for purposes of analytical clarity, the 
words and acts of the elected head of the Church of Greece, archbishop
2i° Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, Op. Cit., p. 158
2ii Ibid. p.162
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Christodoulos, are considered as representing the institution as such, 
especially because of the lack of any serious opposition views within the 
clergy in general and the Orthodox hierarchy in particular.212 Besides, by 
virtue of his place as the head of the Holy Synod in Greece, Christodoulos 
had been widely considered as the legitimate voice of the Church. The 
archbishop's public rhetoric during the identity cards quarrel is indicative of 
his views regarding Hellenism, Orthodoxy, Greek national identity, and the 
public good.
The first rhetorical strategy that the Archbishop used in order to 
articulate his nationalist discourse was the construction of a logic of 
equivalence. "The logic of equivalence constructs a chain of equivalential 
identities among different elements that are seen as expressing a certain 
sameness".213 In the case of populism, the political spectrum is simplified by 
the populists, to the extent that is perceived as being formed by two opposing 
camps: the people and its "enemies" 214
Populism, characterized by the identification of all social groups as 
"the people" and by the masking of individual and corporate demands 
as "popular demands", affects political practice and shapes the manner 
in which social and political reality is perceived and understood 215 
In our case, the Archbishop refers to the "people" as a unified and undivided 
entity. He then constructs a set of ideological and political frontiers between
212 Apart from the notable exception of the bishop of Zante.
213 Torfing, Jacob, New Theories of Discourse, p. 301
214 Lyritzis, C., 1987. "The Power of Populism: the Greek Case", in the European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 15, p. 671
ns Ibid., p. 683
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the people and its enemies. The imaginary 'will of the people' is the supreme 
will in a society according to the Archbishop:
The history and the will of the people are above the Constitution and the 
laws...W hen the people do not want the laws, then they are not 
implemented, they become useless and, in reality, they cease to exist. 
The consciousness of the nation about what is right and what is not 
rejects them.216
In the above passage, one can see a direct challenge to constitutional 
democracy in the name of the people. And, since heterodox and atheists in 
Greece are officially less than 4% of the population, the Church assumes the 
role of the representative of the people, or at least of the vast majority of the 
people 217 However, it is clear that even if Orthodox Christians comprise the 
vast majority of the population in Greece,218 it does not follow that all the 
Orthodox Greeks have chosen the Church as their representative in political 
affairs; nor does it follow that their Christian identity leads them to challenge 
the political Constitution of Greece. Nevertheless, the Archbishop claimed to 
speak both in the name of the people (and not in the name of Orthodox 
Church), as well as in the name of God, since he was the head of the Holy 
Synod. These claims provided his discourse with an unusual status of
216 Christodoulos, in EXevdepowma [,Eleftherotypia], 15/6/2000
217 Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Religion and Populism.. .', p. 24
218However, according to the last census of 2001, the number of immigrants in Greece has 
increased to more than 800,000 (more than 7% of the total population). Only 52.7% of those 
immigrants are baptised Christian Orthodox. See Christos Vemadakis, 2003. VPRC 'Epeweg- 
Atjfio<JK07rr}aeig 2002 [VPRC Institute Researches and Surveys 2002], (Athens: Atp&vr]$)
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infallibility. Speaking in the name of the people is a typical practice of 
populist movements.219
Another emblematic example of populist practice was Christodoulos' 
tactic of presenting himself as a direct and unmediated representative of the 
people, one who rejected the modern unpopular bureaucratic procedures, 
and his words appealed to the nation as a whole, independently of party 
attachments. He was acting like a media star, his speeches were deeply 
emotional (and therefore irrational), his vocabulary was extravagant, and 
sometimes included the argot of the youth. In a widely known speech at a 
high-school, Christodoulos asked young male students to come to church 
even "with their earrings", while, after they applauded his statement, he 
replied, "you're my men too [kcu 'yea oa<5 nao]". As Nicos Demertzis notes, 
Christodoulos did not hesitate to say jokes -often racist- in his church 
speeches, and to "conversationalize" theological discourse, a practice which 
until recently had been alien to Orthodox hierarchy culture.220 Like most of 
the populist movements, contemporary Greek populism was characterized by 
the presence of a charismatic leader.221 This empirical observation seems 
again to be consistent with Laclau's theoretical framework for the analysis of
219 Ernesto Laclau, 1997. Da t t j v  Ejtavaoraarj rrjg Enoyflc, Mac, [New Reflections on the Revolution of 
our Time], edited and translated by Yannis Stavrakakis (Athens : Nf|Oo$), p.p. 165-174
220 Nicos Demertzis, 2001. "©pqoxEia xai MME orr]v EWd6a [Religion and Media in 
Greece]". Paper cited in professor Demertzis' personal webpage at the University of Athens 
website:
http://media.uoa.gr/people/demertzis/pages_gr/articles/ docs/2001/religion_media.php
221 Spyros Sofos, 2000. "AaiKT| TaoxoxijTa xai IToAtTiKf| KooAxoupa oxr) MexaSiKxcacxopucri 
EAAa8a: IIpo$ Mia noAixioxucfj n p o o E y Y ia i ]  t o o  AauaouKou OaivojiEvoo [Popular Identity 
and Political Culture in Post-Authoritarian Greece: Towards a Cultural Approach to the 
Populist Phenomenon]", in Nicos Demertzis (ed.), H EXXrjvncrj IloXiTiKrj KovXrovpa Zrjjiepa 
[Greek Political Culture Today], (3rd ed. Athens: OSuooEas) p. 141
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populism. As it is noted by Lyritzis, in his Laclau-based study of Greek 
populism,
Even where populism is expressed through a strong grassroots 
organizational base, the latter seems to maintain a direct relationship 
with the leader, weakening the intermediary administrative levels 
between the top and the rank and file. Intermediaries are distrusted 
and are seen to impede the direct and immediate rapport between 
leader and led...Populism is thus often characterized by a 
plebiscitarian-charismatic leadership, which acts as a substitute for a 
strong and effective organization in achieving necessary political 
cohesion and a common identity.222
The issues that Christodoulos addressed during his public appearances 
were not theological, but political (or national, as he calls them) in nature. In 
his demonstration speech against the new identity cards legislation in Athens, 
Christodoulos was waiving the flag of Ayia Lavra, a symbol of the 1821 War of 
Independence. This was not accidental. This move intended to demonstrate 
that when the Church is "under threat', then Greekness is also under threat. A 
large part of the Greek population was convinced by Christodoulos' 
arguments that secularization would be a step towards the alienation of 
Greeks from their tradition.223
222 Christos Lyrintzis, Op. Cit., p. 671
^The abovementioned views of the Church, and especially of its Archbishop, seem to be 
very appealing to the Greek public. According to a recent public opinion poll conducted by 
the Greek public opinion agency "MRB" (published on 03/07/2002. Cited in 
http://w ww .ego.gr/pegasus/articles/article. jsp?artid=71913&pubid=85872) the
Archbishop's popularity remains very high- 68%, while in the past it has been as high as 
74.6%. See Christos Vemadakis, Op. Cit., p. 366
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Another crucial observation is that "the people" in Christodoulos' 
discourse was defined in racial terms. In his And Xcbjia mi Ovpavd [From Earth 
and Sky] (1999), he argued that, during the nation-building process, Greeks 
"unfortunately" lost the identity that the Church had assigned to them: their 
racial identity.
Against the conqueror [the Ottoman Empire], we had a religious as 
well as a racial difference. We were the Race [yevo^]. We kept our 
racial identity until around the 17th century when the ideas of the 
British philosophers about the Nation [eBvog] were spread among the 
Greek intelligentsia...Since then we lost the identity that the Church 
had given us, we ceased to be a race and we became a nation.224 
In another passage of his book, Christodoulos even more boldly states: "The 
other man, the one who has a country, and a family and values, this man is 
today useful to the Race [yevo^]. And this is the type of m an that Orthodoxy 
shapes and supports: the man with self-consciousness and identity".225 Apart 
from the clear indications of the development of racial ideas within the 
contemporary Church discourse, other authors have also emphasized the 
existence of strong Anti-Semitic ideas. The bishop of Corinth Panteleimon (an 
honorary Doctor of Philosophy of the Theological Faculty of the University of 
Athens) has written in his book Jewish and Christians:
[The Jews] are natural enemies of Hellenism, because Hellenism is based 
on the correct placement of mind, on rational thinking, on the correct
224 Christodoulos, And Xcbjia xai Ovpavd [From Earth and Sky], p. 220
225 Ibid., p. 233
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positioning of the hum an in his real dimension, while Judaism leads him
to irrational and utopist dreams of material dimension.226 
In the above passage, we find evidence which verify the view that 
contemporary Greek nationalism contains resilient racist beliefs.
The political identity of "the people" in Christodoulos' discourse was 
constructed through the articulation of the social antagonism between the 
people and its enemies; and the enemies are everywhere according to 
Christodoulos: Among the enemies of the people are "the Islamic menace", 
the Vatican, Turkey,227 the E.U, the intellectuals, or even the conscientious 
objectors.228 The common aim of all these 'enemies' is to alienate Hellenism 
from its tradition and culture.229 Hellenism is an "endangered culture",230 and 
the Church is the only political and spiritual agent available in Greece, which 
is able to carry out the Messianic role of saving Hellenism from assimilation 
into a global culture.231 In a rather cliche manner, Christodoulos criticized the 
decadence of m odern ethics, and argued that Greeks "have been infected 
w ith the malicious tumor of alienation".232 Christodoulos' political positions, 
as they were presented in his From Earth and Sky, may be summarized into 
two demands: firstly, in order to combat the ethical decay of Modern Greek 
society, the social role of the Church should be protected and enhanced.
226 Cited in Stavros Zoumboulakis, Op. C it, p. 82
227 Christodoulos, And Xajia m i Ovpavd [From Earth and Sky], p.100
223 Ibid., p. 242
^  Ibid., p. 173
Ibid., p.219
231 Ibid., p.153
232 Ibid., p. 77
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Secondly, in order to contain the "Muslim Curtain" in the Balkans, Greece 
should pioneer in the establishment of an "Orthodox Axis" in the Balkans.233
The Church considered itself as the only institution, which is eligible to 
speak in the name of the "people" and express such views, since it regards 
itself as representing 97% of the Greeks who are baptized Christian Orthodox. 
In this sense, it articulated an image of national identity that derives from the 
Byzantine theocratic culture. By linking Greekness with Orthodoxy, the 
Church has managed to convince a large part of the Greek population that 
secularization measures in Greece are irrelevant and illegitimate. In other 
words, the ideas of the West and the Enlightenment are only acceptable as 
long as they do not come into conflict with the Greek Orthodox 'tradition'.
When it comes to the question of what this tradition means, a careful 
reader cannot fail to note the typical nationalist narrative which underlines 
the political though of Christodoulos. In a 2001 speech entitled EKKXrjoia mi 
Aadc, [Church and People], Christodoulos admitted that European nations are 
products of 18th century nationalism. However, this is not the case for the 
Greek nation.
Homer teaches us that since the dawn of the centuries, we [Greeks] 
are a uniformed nation. Only members of the Greek race could 
participate in the Olympic Games. Obviously, there were city-states 
who fought between them. However, they were conscious that they
233 Ibid., pp. 20-31
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were fighting Greeks. Plato and Thucydides consider these wars as 
civil wars.234
But where does Christianity fit in this ideological schema? 
Christodoulos' answer, given during a sermon, is that, Jesus may have been 
Jewish, but he trusted the spread of Christianity and the New Testament to 
Greeks. This is why the Gospel was written in Greek. The superiority of the 
Greek thinking was the reason that God got His W ord from the Jewish and 
delivered it to Greeks235 In this way, Greekness and Christianity are 
inseparably connected. This connection necessitates the protection of the 
constitutional position of the Orthodox Church.
You often hear me talking about the relationship between state and 
church, to defend it, and to ask everybody to leave this subject 
untouched. We consider this relationship as a priceless legacy, a 
historical given that will ensure the future survival of our race.236
Furthermore, the Church's discourse, during the 1998-2001 period, 
aimed to undermine the Greek government. The Church argued that it is the 
only agent available to protect Greek national identity, since the state is
234 Christodoulos, 19/6/2001, "ExxXqoia xai Aao^ [Church and People]". A speech at the 
Shipping Club of Piraeus. Original text in Greek: "O Opqp09 PaS 6 i 6 6 o x e i  an6 xa pd0q xoov 
aubvcov 6xi Eipaoxe sva xai Eviaio e0 v o <j . 2x19 OXupma8£9, xou9 OXopmaxou9 aycovE ,^ 
pEXEiyav povov p£Xq xod  yevou9 xoov EXXf|voov. BEpai.009 unf|pxav i i o Xe is  xpaxq, nou auvf|0GO9 
noXEpouoav pExa^o X0U9. Opcoc;, unqpxe nXqpq9 cruvEiSqoq oxi oi noXepoi auxoi yivovxav 
p£xa§u EXXf|voov. Tia epcpuXiou9 noXcpou^, yia aSsXcpoKxovoD  ^ noX£pou9 piXouv o ITXaxoov 
xai o 0 ooxu8i6q9".
^Christodoulos, 30/11/2001, "H EXXqvucoxqxa xou Xpioxiaviopou [The Greekness of 
Christianity]". A Sermon at Patras7 St. Andrew Cathedral
236 Christodoulos, 19/6/2001, "ExxXqoia koi Aao<; [Church and People]". A speech at the 
Shipping Club of Piraeus. (Original text in Greek:’ "Euxva p£ o x o u x e  va avacpepopai axq 
oxeoi] ExxXqaiag xai noXixEia ,^ va xqv unEpaoni^opai xai paXioxa va £qxcb ano 0X009 va i l^ 
SiaxqpqooupE oav x£9aXaio nou 6 e v  npaiEi va 0iy£i EmxaXoup£0a auxfj xq oyEoq 009 
avexxipqxq xXqpovopia, £Kcppa^ovxa9 Eva laxopuco 6 e6 o p e v o  xai npox£ivovxa9 e v o v  xpono 
£mpioooi]9 xou y£vou9 pa9 aupio")
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becoming increasingly detached from the idea of the nation. Therefore, 
membership in the E.U is potentially dangerous for Greek national identity in 
the absence of a strong Church, which will be able to protect the Greek 
tradition from the corrupting influence of the heterodox.237 As we can note, 
the last years of confrontation between the Church and the governments of 
PASOK marked a radical change in the role of the Church, which in our 
epoch, challenges the dominance of the state over ecclesiastical issues as well 
as questions of identity.238 Christodoulos believed that the Church was under 
attack by Semites and his modernizers, because it refused to modernize and 
remained faithful to its values and traditions.239
On the other hand, his support for the center-right party was not 
unconditional: For example, during the local elections of 2002, the Church 
clearly supported the extreme right wing party, LA.O.S [Popular Orthodox 
Rally]. The result of the Church support to LA.O.S was that a party whose 
percentages rarely reach above 4%, managed to get a staggering 14% in the 
crucial elections for the prefecture of Athens and Piraeus.240 Moreover, 
Christodoulos had overtly criticized and rejected the Kofi Annan peace plan 
in Cyprus, accusing it of being against the interests of the Greek nation. In a 
church speech he gave in 2001, he asked the Lord "to save our Cypriot 
brothers, who belong to the same race with us, who believe in the same God,
237 Panayiotis Dimitropoulos, Op. C it, 158
238 Ibid. p.162
^Christodoulos, 1/1/2001, "H ISionpooconia Ma$ [Our Uniqueness]", Interview at the 
Magazine Taftotita, found in the official website of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
http://www.ecclesia.gr
240 The prefecture of Athens and Piraeus comprises 25% of the total Greek electorate. We 
should also note that one of the reasons that the mainstream centre-right candidate did so bad 
in the 2002 elections in Athens and Piraeus was the 'disrespect7 that he had shown to 
Christodoulos.
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who speak the same language, and whose fate in this world is tied w ith our 
fa te /'241
Finally, Christodoulos has asked Nea Democratia to commit itself in 
bringing back the optional inclusion of religious affiliation in national identity 
cards, in exchange for his unofficial support. Nea Democratia, won the 2004 
elections, and Christodoulos congratulated it by saying that "the Lord's Right 
hand knows what's good for the nation". This statement has caused outrage 
to the socialists due to the ambiguous meaning of the signifier right in the 
sentence. Although it is beyond the period under investigation in this 
dissertation, it is worth pointing out that Christodoulos did not bring up the 
demand for optional inclusion of religious affiliation in identity cards after the 
2004 elections. This compromise seems to be the result of appeasement 
policies on the part of the new government, which upgraded ecclesiastical 
academies to higher education institutions, and promised the building of a 
new Holy Synod building and a new Cathedral.
241 Christodoulos, 3/5/2001, "H Aycovia xgdv Kunpicov ASsXcpcov pas [The Agony of our 
Cypriot Brothers". A sermon published in the official website of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
http://www.ecclesia.gr. (Original text in Greek: Kai o i oDxes xis eDxes Kai xis npooEoxes xDs 
k o iv o x i]x6 s  pas aDxDs, npooOexco Kai Dyd) xis npooooiriKEs poo npooeoxes xai xis npoaconiKEs 
poo e D x £?/ vd S g x jei □  © eo s , ^ oxe va S i o Xe o k o v Oe D aDxo xo pooxfjpio Kai va □pEprjooov oD 
vpoxes xai oD xapSics Kai xDv ooyyEvDv Kai cpiXajv Kai DXgov DpDv xDv DXXcov DXXfivcov, 
nob DxoopE 6i8ax0£D va 0EoapoDp£ DScXcpobs pas, DXoos p£v xoD DvOpcbnoos, DXgos 
□Siaubpcos 6 e  D k e w o o s , nob EDvai DpoyEVEDs pas, nob EDvai DpocpoXoi pa$, nob 
maxEOOopE axov D6io © eo ,  nob XaXoDpE xf|v D8ia yXcbooa Kai nob Dxope o ov evcooei Kai xis 
xux^S l1 0 ?  Kai h s  ^ ooes pas o e  aDxo xov Koapo).
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V.III. Explaining the Persistence of Helleno-Christianism
In short, the political project that the Orthodox Church tried to launch 
mainly aimed to counter the effects of the 'westernization' of Greece, while at 
the same time protecting and promoting the political privileges of the Church. 
This project paradoxically seemed to be appealing to the Greeks, as the 
'referendum ' over identity cards has shown. Greeks have experienced the 
fruits of westernization, since the country enjoys a relatively satisfying 
economic growth, and has become a full member of the E.U and the European 
monetary system. At the same time however, people seem to be experiencing 
an identity dislocation, since westernization appears as a menace to their 
distinctive national culture. An increasing part of state legislation is subject to 
approval by the European commission, while the influx of more than a 
million immigrants in the country in the 1990s decade has augmented the 
popularity of the extreme right for the first time since the restoration of 
democracy. The approval of the Church's nationalist ideology may be seen as 
a reaction to this identity dislocation.
Many liberal modernization theorists have expressed their hope that 
Helleno-Christian nationalism would fade away within the context of liberal 
globalization and European unification. It would be useful at this point to 
define -  for analytical purposes - the concept of globalization before getting 
into the discussion of its effects on Helleno-Christian nationalism. For the 
purposes of this dissertation we will use Scholte's definition of globalization: 
For Jan Aart Scholte, globalization "refers to processes whereby social 
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relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that 
hum an lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place".242 In 
other words, globalization refers to the social phenomenon of increasing 
interconnectedness between societies. The virtue of this definition is that it 
emphasizes that globalization is at the same time an event as well as an 
ongoing process. Its vice is that it does not specify the mechanisms that 
produce these "processes". Baylis and Smith argue that globalization is 
transforming international politics to global politics. The new 'global' order is 
generated by and manifested through a series of social phenomena including, the 
emergence of a global economy, the development of a network of global 
media and communications, the expansion of global social movements, the 
acme of global franchises (McDonalds, Coca Cola etc.), and the occurrence of 
global risks (environmental hazards, epidemics, terrorism etc.) 243 Time and 
space are collapsing due to the effect of global communications, and our 
world becomes increasingly homogenous due to the slow but steady 
development of a global culture. The states' educational systems find it 
increasingly difficult to prevent this new culture from intruding in the 
everyday lives of adolescents around the world. Information society and the 
Internet undermine the socializing monopoly of the state and family and 
disseminate a cosmopolitan life-style. In his Postmodern Condition, Lyotard 
writes:
242 J. A. Scholte, 1997. "The Globalization of World Politics", in J. Baylis& S. Smith (eds.), The 
Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 14
243 J. Baylis & S. Smith, 1997. "Introduction", ", in J. Baylis& S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of 
World Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 7
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 195
Nikos Chysoloras Department of Government, LSE
Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general 
culture: one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats 
McDonalds food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, 
wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and "retro" clothes in Hong- 
Kong; knowledge is a matter of TV games.244
If that account of the emergence of a global culture is accurate, then 
national identities should be gradually weakening, national practices and 
customs should withering away to be replaced by a globalized life-style, and 
sub-national and supranational identifications should be winning the 
allegiance of ethnic and national groups. Indeed, in a world of transnational 
organizations, global institutions, and global risks, nations seem irrelevant. As 
Marx and Engels have pu t it in a famous passage, "in  place of old local and 
national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, 
universal interdependence of nations" 245 But have our identities, fears and 
dreams become global? Empirical evidence from the Greek and Greek- 
Cypriot cases shows the contrary. "Perhaps the postm odern consumer can 
purchase a bewildering range of identity-styles. Certainly, the commercial 
structures are in place for the economically comfortable to change styles in the 
Western world ... One can eat Chinese tomorrow and Turkish the day after ... 
But being Chinese or Turkish are not commercially available options". 246
244 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 1984. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 
76
245 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, 1985. The Communist Manifesto, (London : Penguin), pp. 83- 
84
246 M. Billig, 1995. Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage), p. 139
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Moreover, the persistence of national, ethnic, and religious 
fundamentalism around the world (including the countries under 
investigation here) indicates that people are not prepared to abandon their 
loyalty to community in favour of the formation of some kind of 'global 
village'. The periodic resurgence of fundamentalist and nationalist political 
projects- both in the West and the developing world- and the rise of the 
Christian right in the United States, and neo-fascism in Europe, attest to that 
conclusion.
Perhaps, the discussion around the effects of globalization to 
nationalism is unnecessarily blurred by the conflation of nations with states. 
Nations and centralized states were bom  and evolved together, and 
undoubtedly the existence of one depends upon the survival of the other. The 
weakening of the sovereign nature of modern states in the context of 
globalization has led to the conclusion that late-modernity will be the era of 
the twilight of nations. Our critique against this position may be twofold: first 
of all, the extent to which globalization is undermining the power of the state- 
system has been overestimated. Obviously, the state has lost many of its past 
powers. It has lost the power to determine autonomously its economic, 
security, and legal policy. It has lost its dominion over the socialization 
process of its citizens. Global economic and environmental forces beyond its 
control undermine its sovereignty. One could not deny the fact that there is 
indeed a shift of power from the nation-state to a multi-layered and complex 
web of decision-making centres beyond the control of the state. On the other 
hand, it would be premature to write an obituary of the state, at least in the 
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short or medium term. Global markets still need stable and well-governed 
states in order to flourish. In addition to that, state apparatus persists and it is 
stronger than ever. Indeed, according to the criteria of a classic, and largely 
Weberian, definition of the state, this specific form of institutional 
organization of political communities is still very much with us today:
1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and 
personnel
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political 
relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, 
backed up by some organised physical force.247
Of course some states are more sovereign than others; the stronger the 
state, the greater its resistance to exogenous pressures. United States would 
find it much easier to break a WTO agreement without serious consequences 
for its economy or political status, than Greece or Cyprus would. To 
summarize, we would suggest that globalization has not annihilated the 
powers of the nation-state, but undoubtedly it has not let them intact either. 
The political power of the nation-state has undergone through serious 
changes in the era of globalization, but still, though restricted, it has not 
diminished, and it is unlikely that it will completely diminish in the near 
future. A post-sovereign nation-state emerges, one, which is not as powerful as 
the old one, but it still performs important functions in the new global order:
247 Ibid. p. 55
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And everywhere it [the state] is the highest secular authority. It 
may decree that a man die; and with no less effort, it may offer 
him  the protection that enables him to live. When no state wants 
him- when man is naked in his humanity and nothing but a 
man- he thereby loses the very first precondition for his fellows 
even to be able to acknowledge his existence. Whether it is to 
born, to live, or to die, he cannot do without official recognition- 
the recognition of a nation-state.248
Our second critique against the pre-mature obituary of nations and 
nationalism is related to the concepts of identity and identification. 
Identification is an everlasting characteristic of human societies and the nation 
is the main locus of individual and collective identification within the social 
and political milieu of modernity. If national identification withers away, then 
it should be replaced by something else, another social entity or a political/ 
discursive project. For the moment, nationalism does not seem to have a 
credible rival. The legitimacy of the nation-state still holds well. The evidence 
so far suggests that it may also survive the assimilating forces of 
globalization, while the stalemate of European Unification illustrates the 
resistance of nations to supra-national organizations. Nationalism is still a 
mighty force in world politics, and the nation remains a foremost source of 
group identification as the Greek case has shown. Not only has Helleno- 
Christianity survived globalization and European integration, but also 
Orthodoxy remains the distinguishing characteristic of Greece which gives
248 Ibid. p. 23
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the impression of stability in a nation increasingly insecure about its identity. 
The fashionable and celebrated through the media discourse of globalization 
enhanced the feelings of threat among Greeks and therefore boosted the 
appeal of the Helleno-Christian discourse.
Since the restoration of liberal democracy in Greece (1974), the state 
has attempted to change the legal status of the Church and the ideological 
position of Orthodoxy in the Greek society. Despite the fact that predictions 
are a dangerous business in the field of the social sciences, we would dare to 
say that the dislocation of the Church-State-Nation equivalence in Greece 
does not appear to be probable in the foreseeable future. Crucial pieces of 
state legislation that serve as a garrison for the status of the Church in Greek 
society remain unchallenged. For example, the preamble of the constitution, 
as well as article 3 that recognizes Orthodoxy as the established religion in 
Greece have not been subject to revision. Moreover, article 16 of the Greek 
constitution affirms that the purpose of public education is the "development 
of national and religious consciousness" of Greek pupils.249 In other words, 
the raison d'etre which, at the dawn of Greek nationalism, turned Orthodoxy 
into a national religion remains pertinent in our era.
In the face of liberal globalization and European unification, 
Orthodoxy remains a distinguishing characteristic of Greece, which gives the 
impression of stability in a nation increasingly insecure about its identity. The 
growing infringement of Western liberal values in the Greek society and the 
new 'global' order, undermine the role of national culture and the socializing
249 Costas Chrysogonos, 2002. Arojam m i Koivamm Aimiojiara [Human and Social Rights], 
(Athens: Z & k k ou A ck ;)
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monopoly of the state and family. The state's educational system finds it 
increasingly difficult to prevent this new culture from intruding into the 
everyday lives of adolescents in the new world of information society and the 
internet. Under such social circumstances, the nationalist discourse of the 
Greek Church finds fruitful background in order to develop, since the Church 
presents itself as a cultural opponent to the forces of assimilation and 
homogenisation, which are perceived as a product of the Western liberal 
globalisation. The strong identification of the Greeks with the Church may be 
seen as a reaction to the abovementioned 'threats' against their imaginary 
collective identities.
Since its election in office in 1981, and the entrance of Greece in the 
E.U. club, PASOK (until 2004, the ruling party in Greece) has attempted to 
introduce secularisation and modernization measures in Greece (often using 
a populist discourse in order to gain the support of public opinion). 
Constantine Semites who succeeded Andreas Papandreou as head of PASOK 
in 1996 further boosted this policy. Semites promised- and made considerable 
steps towards this direction- to 'modernise' (i.e. westernise) the country in the 
sense of promoting Greek membership in the EMU, liberalising (i.e. 
privatising) the economy, and replacing the old clientist politics w ith an 
effective bureaucracy. A large part of the Greek population felt increasingly 
alienated from the new westernised 'image' of Greece. Besides, the Greek 
attitude towards the West has always been ambivalent, and the functioning of 
western-type institutions in has often been disharmonious, if not always
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problematic. In short, Orthodoxy continues to function as a line of 
demarcation between Greeks and non-Greeks.
Secondly, myths, symbols and practices associated with Orthodoxy 
still remain an important part of the everyday lives of modern Greeks. The 
Church is generally connected in the Greek conscience with 'past glories' like 
the Byzantine Empire, while the Greek language occupies a central role in the 
Orthodox liturgy ritual. The Church claims for itself the role of the protector 
of the Christians during the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, as well as that of the 
saviour of the Greek language during the '400 years of slavery of the Greek 
people'. Even the Greek left has (almost) never been unequivocally hostile 
towards the Greek Church. EAM (the communist-controlled Greek resistance 
front during WWII) advertised an Orthodox bishop as its 'spiritual leader', 
while Greek intellectuals, politicians, and artists who are generally 
considered to belong to the left (e.g. Zouraris, Kaneli, Savvopoulos) 
frequently use a Helleno-Orthodox discourse.250 In other words, the 
identification of Orthodoxy with Greekness did not wither away with time. 
Orthodoxy is still the established religion in Greece, in every sense of the 
word: the construction of a mosque in Athens has been delayed for decades 
due to the interference of the Greek Church. Greek children are catechised in 
the Orthodox dogma since the age of eight in school; their school diplomas
250 See for example the lyrics of the popular song by Dionysius Savopoulos, Ag Kparrjaovv 01 
Xopoi [Let the Dances Go On]: "Either with the ancients, or with Orthodoxy, Greek 
communities construct another distinct galaxy" [Ki eixe pc xi<; apxcudxqxes, Eixe pe op0o6o§ia, 
x g o v  EA\f|va>v 01  xoivoxqxe^, cpxiaxvouv a\Ao YaXa^ia]. A similar meaning is conveyed by 
many other songs of Savopoulos (e.g. KcoXoeXbjveg [Bloody Greeks]). Moreover, Liana Kaneli 
(MP of KKE) publishes a nationalist magazine (Nemesis) and defines herself as Orthodox- 
Communist. The most characteristic example of Zouraris7 nationalism is his book Bej3t]Xa 
KipSrjXa OKvfiaXa (2007, Athens: Appo$)
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 202
Nikos Chrysoloras Department of Government, LSE
state their religion. Until recently, even identity cards stated the religion of 
Greek citizens. The Church is also inseparably linked with numerous Greek 
cultural activities (e.g. open fairs to honour local Saints), customs (e.g. Good 
Week fast), and foods (e.g. the Paschal lamb). These are just some examples 
from an endless list which illustrates the penetration of the aesthetics of the 
Orthodox culture in Greek public life.
Despite the existence of the various structural reasons described above 
which contributed the production and continuing hegemony of Orthodox 
nationalism, the importance of personal charisma should not be 
underestimated. The feelings of frustration and defensiveness felt by 'the 
people of the Church' in the face of secularizing measures adopted by the 
state were expressed by a charismatic personality, archbishop Christodoulos. 
Christodoulos, as we have seen, was a successful demagogue. He has draw n 
the attention of the media, and has become very popular w ith the people. His 
nationalist political discourse, arguing for the uniqueness and superiority of 
the Greek people, has covered a gap in the field of extreme right, which was 
created by the centre-right turn of the Nea Democratia party.
The role of the media in the rise of Christodoulos cannot be 
emphasized enough. "Miracles", religious celebrations, speeches of 
Christodoulos, Sunday masses and preaching, are favorite subjects for the 
Greek television. Sunday masses are broadcasted live from state television, 
the current bishop of Demetrias hosts a weekly talk show, and priests are 
called to comment on political events. On February 17, 2001, the news of the 
Greek TV station 'Star Channel', presented an icon which was weeping. When 
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the local priest was asked why this miracle has happened, he replied that the 
icon protests about the construction of Jehovah Witnesses temple nearby.251 
The reporters did not bother to question the possibility of such 'miracle'. 
Endless other similar cases, like the 'natural mummification' of the corps of a 
m onk in 2006, and 'the bleeding of Virgin Mary icons', appear frequently in 
the news and leave the viewers with the impression that supernatural 
phenomena happen all the time in Greece, and that holy icons have political 
views.
Within this social, cultural, and political climate, it is no wonder why 
the archbishop of Athens was able to call those who advocate secularization 
as "Graecilus" (meaning decadent Greeks) in 1998, to sponsor Christian 
families w ith more than three children in areas where religious minorities 
reside, to react to the prohibition of confession in schools in 2006, and to 
question the authority of the ministry of Education in the instruction of 
religion courses in high-schools. In conclusion, the increasing politicization of 
Orthodoxy since 1998 has led to an equally increasing sacralization of 
politics.252
251 Nicos Demertzis, 2001. "©prjoKeia Kai MME anjv EA\d6a [Religion and Media in 
Greece]". Paper cited in professor Demertzis' personal webpage at the University of Athens 
website:
http:/ /  media.uoa.gr/ people/ demertzis/ pages_gr /  articles /  docs /2001/ religion_media.php
252 ibid.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
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As it was explained in the introduction of this dissertation, the purpose 
of this work was threefold: firstly to cover important gaps in the relevant 
historiography on Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. This 'historical' 
task was carried out through the analysis of the important role of the 
Orthodox Church in the consolidation of Greek and Greek-Cypriot national 
identities, manifested in primary and secondary archival sources. Secondly, 
this case study was used as a test ground for an alternative theoretical 
framework in the study of nationalism which may offer solutions to the 
practical and theoretical problems of the dominant modernist paradigm. This 
theoretical framework incorporated elements from ethno-symbolism and 
discourse theory. Thirdly, my aim was to adopt, for the first time, a 
comparative approach to the study of Greek nationalism in mainland Greece 
and in Cyprus. Before discussing the main empirical and theoretical 
conclusions which we could draw from this study, it is necessary at first to 
summarize the main body of the argument so far.
VI.I. Summary o f the Argument
Nationalism is not an ideology which aims to mobilize certain social 
groups for achieving specific political goals. It is a discourse upon which 
depends the very existence of the groups that we came to call "nations". To 
draw an analogy with another comprehensive doctrine, Marxism does not 
mobilize proletarians. It "creates" proletarians, in the sense that if this 
discourse attains a hegemonic position within a given social milieu, then a 
multitude of subjects will self-identify with the category of the "proletariat", 
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which does not otherwise "exist" as such, outside the symbolic universe of 
Marxism. Similarly, the fact that the Greek nation exists is an outcome of 
Greek nationalism, the discourse which claims that people who exhibit certain 
characteristics are Greeks.
Obviously, most of these characteristics are the rooted in pre-m odem  
ethno-cultural materials. This ethnic 'fabric' is in turn filtered through a 
process of 'streamlining', 'rationalization', and politicization, by nationalists. 
However, one should always keep in m ind that the process of producing 
"nations" out of "ethnie" is always political and subject to historical 
contingencies. In John Hutchinson's words "the point here is that one cannot 
deduce from the prior existence of ethnie that they necessarily have any causal 
status in the formation of m odem  national societies. To do so without 
empirical examination is to make uncritical assumptions about continuities 
between premodern ethnic and m odern national identities and to fall into the 
post hoc propter hoc fallacy".253
Greek nationalism emerged out of the crisis of the previous social 
order. It unified subjects through the demarcation of boundaries, the 
discursive construction of a 'w e'. Under its auspices, it accommodated a set of 
demands, not very different from the demands of other nationalist doctrines 
around Europe. In short, Greek nationalism argued that Greeks are different 
from other social groups in the Ottoman Empire, and therefore have the right 
to secede from the rule of the Sultan and govern themselves as they wish.
253 John Hutchinson, 1994, p. 26, cited in Anthony Smith, 1998. Modem Nationalism (London 
Routledge), p. 176
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The obvious question which emerged was why some people were 
'Greeks', and not members of the collectivities which already existed in the 
institutional order of the Ottoman Empire. W hat made Greeks different from 
'Christians', 'O ttomans', and 'Romans'? This was a contentious issue; the 
process of its resolution was long and lasted long after the end of the Greek 
War of Independence. However, those who initially espoused the ideology of 
Greek nationalism and carried out the struggle for the achievement of its 
political and social goals defined as Greeks all 'natives' who 'believed in 
Christ'. The term 'natives' would later become a source of tension, in both 
Greek and Cypriot politics. Nonetheless, the reference to Christ left little room 
for doubt that religion was a factor of seminal importance for the demarcation 
of the boundary between 'Greeks' and 'Others', in early Greek nationalism.
A nodal argum ent of this thesis is that Orthodoxy was the basic 
cultural resource of the ethno-religious community of the millet-i-Rum in the 
Ottoman Empire. This cultural resource was politicized to legitimize the claim 
of nationalists that the millet-i-Rum was actually the Greek nation and ought 
to be sovereign. Consequently, Greek nationalism may be a m odem  
discourse, but the symbolic 'material' for its articulation into a coherent and 
convincing narrative was to be found in traditional pre-modern myths, 
practices and rituals.
Anthony Smith has brought our attention to this interplay between the 
modern and the pre-modem, in a very productive way. He argued out that 
modernists, i.e. those who share "a  belief in the contingency of nationalism 
and the modernity of the nation", must be right. Nevertheless, the modernists 
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do miss something. They cannot explain the durability and salience, the depth 
and longevity, of national identifications, which cannot emerge ex nihilo: 
"Hence the need for a type of analysis that will bring out the differences and 
similarities between m odern national units and sentiments and the collective 
cultural units and sentiments of previous eras, those that I shall term 
ethnie"254. In Smith's schema what is thus needed is an "intermediate position 
between 'perennialism ' and 'modernism ' [able to capture] the often subtle 
relationships between m odern nations and older ethnie"255. Indeed, the 
author of this thesis agreed w ith Smith that the m odem  nation is constructed 
out of materials that originate from pre-existing ethnic and cultural 
identifications and practices.
However, this thesis was not a mere application of Smith's ethno- 
symbolism theory to the cases of Greek and Cypriot nationalism. On the 
contrary, Smith's valuable insight brings a set of new questions into play. The 
pre-modem ethnic and cultural elements are also the products of social, 
historical construction -  a construction that took place in earlier centuries and 
went through a successful process of sedimentation and re-activation. In that 
sense, we seem to need something more to make sense of the attachment of 
people both to the nation and to its ethnic fabric.
When it comes to the first issue, we underlined that the heavy 
politicization of the Church is not a new phenomenon. As we have seen 
throughout the preceding chapters, it has played an active political role in the 
Balkan region, for the last 1600 years. It was a point of reference for the
254 Anthony Smith, 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 13
255 A. Smith, Ibid. p 17
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Christian subjects of both the Byzantine Emperors and the Ottoman Sultans. 
Obviously, the politicization of religion is not unique in the regions under 
investigation in this dissertation. Nonetheless, Orthodoxy was unique in its 
ability to compare and contrast the believers and the non-believers. Greek 
nationalists argued, rather convincingly, that the believers formed a collective 
entity, which was oppressed by another collectivity, the Ottomans; hence the 
need to unite and revolt.
The argum ent was met w ith considerable criticism. On the one hand, 
the leaders of the Orthodox Church in Constantinople never succumbed to 
the idea that religious differences justified a revolution. Besides, the 
Patriarchate was actually a departm ent of the Ottoman apparatus. At the 
same time, competing nationalist paradigms placed much more emphasis on 
language, which was seen as a proof that the Greek speakers of the Ottoman 
Empire were heirs of ancient Greeks. However, no intellectual or senior 
political figure of the time ever challenged the plain fact that all those who 
were called to arms and demanded independence from the Sultan were 
Orthodox Christians. On the other hand, not all of them were Greek-speakers, 
nor everyone could identify with Classical Athens.
The debate continued after the achievement of independence, via two 
simultaneous and intertwined processes. During the process of 
modernization, the newly founded Greek state attempted to limit the powers 
that the Church enjoyed under the Ottoman administrative system. A by­
product of this policy was the fact that the Church was nationalized, despite 
its protests. This meant that its governing body, the Holy Synod, was placed 
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under the authority of the state. Even canonical and religious issues are still 
being resolved by the ministry of Education and Creeds in Greece, which is 
officially, a Christian state.
Moreover, the subsequent development of Greek nationalism 
consolidated the place of Orthodoxy, through the Helleno-Christian 
argument: there is one unified and unique Greek civilization which began in 
the pre-Homeric years, survived the Roman occupation, and was revived 
during the Orthodox Byzantine era. Orthodoxy preserved and protected this 
civilization during the Ottoman years and led the way for the revolution. 
Despite the fact that the Helleno-Christian argument cannot be supported by 
historical or sociological evidence, it is still a hegemonic ideology in Greece. 
This was proven during the recent identity cards crisis, as well as repeated 
social surveys.
In other words, the "Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of Greece" 
enjoys the status of the established state religion in Greece, while at the time 
that this thesis was being written, there was not any demonstration of 
political will to change in the constitutional place of the Church. Ecclesiastical 
and secular authorities were brought together, and the right of the State to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the 'autocephalous' Greek Church was 
institutionalized. At the same time, the Church obtained an important 
political and ideological role and retained some of its Ottoman legal and 
political privileges. At a social and cultural level, Orthodoxy was recognized 
as an integral part of Greek identity, and this idea was reflected in official and
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unofficial public discourse, historiography, education, folklore studies, 
literature, poetry, architecture, as well as in everyday practices, and customs.
The autocephalous Greek Church has acted in the recent Greek history 
not only as a state-funded institution, but also as an ideological and 
legitimating mechanism of the state, which has been 'blessing' governmental 
decisions, in exchange for special its privileged position in the Greek legal 
order. The Greek Church has come to understand itself as the guardian of 
tradition and national identity, and the expression of the 'true ' Greek spirit. 
This m yth has appealed to the Greek public.
Since the declaration of the autocephaly of the Greek Church in 1833, 
the relationships between the Greek state and the Church have been 
relatively harmonious (after a short 'adaptation' period), within a legal 
context of subordination of the ecclesiastical power of the Church to the 
secular power of the state. The Church played an active role in supporting, 
through its influence to the people, state decisions, and augmenting popular 
feelings of national solidarity and nationalism in the face of external 'threats' 
and internal dissents. This congruent cooperation amongst the Church and 
the State started disintegrating in the beginning of the 1980s when the center- 
left 'Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement' (PASOK) came to power. Since its first 
years in office, PASOK attempted to introduce a series of secularizing 
measures (e.g. civil marriage and civil divorce), which were perceived by the
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Church as direct attack against its hegemonic position in the Greek national 
life.256
The relationships between the Church and the State further 
deteriorated when the dynamic and charismatic Archbishop Christodoulos 
succeeded archbishop Seraphim as head of the Greek Church in 1998. The 
decision of the socialist government to erase religion from the identity cards 
data set the ground for a direct confrontation which lasted for more than a 
year. Despite the church reactions, which included demonstrations, a 
'referendum ', and frequent media interventions, the desired results for its 
archbishop were not achieved. Nonetheless, the populist politicization of his 
discourse and actions had changed the tradition of subordination of the 
ecclesiastical views to the authority of the state. Even though the major 
opposition party - Nea Democratia - supported the Church demands, the 
government and the president of the republic were not willing to 
compromise, and new identity cards in Greece do not include sensitive 
private data like religion, profession, or place of residence. It was a victory for 
the modernizers, which, however, did not prevent the church from making 
further political interventions. In other words, the period starting with the 
enthronement of Christodoulos in 1998, has admittedly marked a radical 
change in church-state relations.
As in the Greek peninsula, so in Cyprus the Church has been politically 
active almost since its founding (A.D. 488) during the Byzantine era.
256 However, the popularity of the Church did not allow to any of the post-1974 Greek 
Governments to proceed to radical measures such as "disestablishment", or to permanently 
solve the issue of the Church property, despite the fact that there were relevant discussions 
among academics and politicians during the two constitutional reforms of 1986 and 2000.
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Although, it subsequently suffered from the Frankish rule in the island, the 
Cypriot Church, like all Orthodox Churches, enjoyed relative autonomy and 
political privileges in the Ottoman Empire. After the attainment of the island 
by the British Empire, the British tried to suspend some of the Church's 
political activities. However, the Church managed to retain some control over 
education and became the champion of Greek irredentism in the island. After 
independence, the Orthodox Archbishop Makarios became the President of 
the Cypriot Republic. This move, together with Makarios' seeming257 
insistence for unification with Greece (’Evcomg), served to alienate the Turkish- 
Cypriot population of the island, and further enhanced ethno-nationalism on 
both sides. The basic difference between the Greek and the Cypriot cases is 
the fact that in the latter one, the Church as an institution led the struggle for 
national independence. Orthodoxy in Cyprus was not just a cultural resource 
for nationalists, but also a pioneer of nationalism.
In other words, Helleno-Christian nationalism is the comprehensive 
political discourse which claims that Greek national identity, in both 
mainland Greece and Cyprus, is based on two pillars: the ancient Hellenic 
cultural heritage, and Orthodox Christianity. A third pillar was occasionally 
added, depending on the specific historical circumstances (e.g. "irredentism", 
during the Asia Minor war, "language" during the great dispute between the 
advocates of the demotic idiom and the proponents of katharevousa, or
257 1 use the word /seeming/ with caution here. Despite the fact that Makarios was claiming to 
be a supporter of the unification with Greece, some of his actions during his presidency 
reveal that he was more interested in preserving his personal position as well as in 
maintaining an independent and Greek-dominated Cyprus. More on this issue in chapter IV.
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"geography" during the struggle for Enosis). Nonetheless, ancient Greece and 
Orthodoxy always remained constant points of reference.
Assuming that the foregoing empirical and theoretical argument has 
been convincing, we may now summarize the main conclusions draw n from 
this study.
VI.II: Empirical Conclusions
This paper tried to emphasize the role of Orthodoxy, both as an 
institution and as a cultural resource, in fostering Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism. This role has been underestimated by modernist approaches to 
nationalism. There are three main structural reasons which assisted the 
transformation of Orthodoxy into a national religion: First of all, Orthodox 
nationalism was consistent with pre-modern ways of life and practices. 
Therefore, at the dawn of Greek nationalism, Orthodoxy became the primary 
cultural material which formed the 'nature7 of Greek nationalism. Orthodoxy 
continues to be a part of ritualized practices in M odern Greek and Greek- 
Cypriot societies; it remains closely linked with what is commonly referred to 
as the 'Greek way of life'; in short, Orthodoxy remains an integral component 
of Greek national identity.
Secondly, the discourse of Helleno-Christian nationalism was ideally 
suited to distinguish Greeks from non-Greeks in the process of evolution 
Greek national identity. In the face of European cultural and economic 
integration, Orthodoxy still serves as a cultural opponent to the 'forces of 
globalization'. Thirdly, the legal and political position of the Church of Greece 
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facilitated the birth and eventual dominance of 'Helleno-Christianism'. 
Despite the fact that the Church was politically subjected to the secular 
authority of the state, it managed to retain an extensive degree of autonomy at 
a cultural level, and thus it has been able to use the mechanisms that its legal 
position provided it with, in order to disseminate its distinctive cultural 
nationalism.
To the abovementioned structural characteristics of Greek nationalism, 
I have added the successfulness of Archbishop Christodoulos' populism as an 
important factor for the continuing dominance of the Helleno-Christian 
dogma. The Greek Church's discourse under Christodoulos claimed to 
represent popular demands against de-Christianized western educated, and 
alien to the 'people', state elites.
Important as they may be, legal and institutional arrangements do not 
suffice to offer a comprehensive theory of Greek nationalism. 
Disestablishment would indeed remove one of the main tools for the 
reproduction of Helleno-Christianity, since state assets and channels of 
communication will not be used to disseminate Orthodox views on issues like 
Greek identity, migration, European integration, Greek-Turkish relations, 
homosexuality, etc. At the same time, the rights of religious and ethnic 
minorities would be better protected, as other creeds would be treated as 
equal by the Greek state. Nonetheless, there should be wider considerations, 
as the relation between the Greek nation and Orthodoxy is not constitutional, 
but constitutive. This means that secularization will not lead necessarily to the 
demise of Helleno-Christianism, at least in the short term.
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In Cyprus, religion is the actual "green line" that separates the two 
communities. The religious self-identification of Greek-Cypriots constitutes 
them  as "Greeks", rather than "Cypriots". Orthodoxy has been a main 
obstacle to reconciliation, and it will continue to be so, unless Cypriot 
nationalism, or international pressure, manage to challenge, or override the 
grip of Helleno-Christian nationalism in the island.
As we have clearly seen in Chapter IV, populism was not absent from 
the political discourse of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus either. The Church 
of Cyprus exercised profound influence in the shaping of the Greek-Cypriot 
political culture. The Church's engagement in the political life of the island 
was even more active than it was in Greece. Helleno-Christian ethno- 
nationalism not only influenced the major political developments in the 
country over the past fifty years, but it has affected, to a large extent, the 
functioning of the Greek-Cypriot polity and determined the identity of the 
local population.
VI.IIL Theoretical Conclusions
The foregoing empirical case-study leads us to a series of theoretical 
conclusions. These conclusions are primarily related to the Greek case, but 
some of them can be extended beyond it and provide us with useful insights 
for the study of nationalism.
Identity constitutes one of the main foci in social and political research. 
The analysis of nations and nationalisms is no exception. However, within the 
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general field of nationalism studies, the issue of the attraction and salience of 
national identities has not been sufficiently examined. This is partly due to 
the hegemonic position of modernist and constructionist approaches in the 
relevant literature. Thus, more emphasis is placed on the production of 
nationalism under specific historical conditions, rather than on its 
"consumption" and "re-production", or, in other words, the continuity 
marking identification w ith nations by people in varying social and historical 
milieus. The aforementioned paradigms either tend to overemphasize the 
economic and structural conditions necessary for the emergence of 
nationalism, or, influenced by the so-called "post-modern turn" in the social 
sciences, mainly focus on the social construction, the historicity and 
contingency of national identities. However, none of these features of 
nationalism seem to be able to explain the sustained hegemonic appeal of 
national identifications. The theoretical framework adopted here may be able 
to offer substantial help on this front.
If today we can analyse nationalism as an identity construction it is 
mainly because modernity introduces a sustained awareness of the contingent 
and socially produced character of all identity. Some have concluded that this 
sustained awareness of the socially and politically constructed nature of 
identity entails a picture of our world predominantly governed by fluidity 
and multiplicity. Within such a framework it is sometimes argued that reality 
"is more or less w hat we make it". There is no doubt that modernity -  late 
modernity in particular -  has signaled a greater autonomy in the way people 
construct and reproduce aspects of their identities. However, anyone 
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subscribing to the idea of identity as invariably a fluid, multiple construction, 
m ust surely be challenged by the persistence of certain identifications.
Clearly, the basis of all identity formation -  including the one 
attem pted through national identification relies on difference. National 
identity, like all types of identities, is relational and socially constructed. It is 
constructed upon the opposition between insiders and outsiders. The Greek 
and Greek-Cypriot cases demonstrate the oppositional and constructed 
character of national identities. As it has been demonstrated in all of the 
preceding chapters, one of the reasons that "Helleno-Christianism" has been 
so successful was that it could establish an antagonistic relationship between 
Greek identity and its 'constitutive outsides', the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, 
the surrounding Slavic and Balkan populations, and Europe.
Nationalism illustrates the importance of draw ing political, social, and 
cultural frontiers between "u s"  and "them ", in constituting individual and 
collective identities. Apart from nation building this is also true of 
international politics and of the construction of supra-national entities such as 
the European Union. The purity and stability of the 'W e' is guaranteed first in 
the naming, then in the demonization and, finally, in  the cleansing of 
otherness". However, we would be wrong in limiting this only to a 
"pathological" version of identity linked to an (exclusionary) negation of 
difference. Every identity is only possible through difference. Exclusion 
therefore is not a by-product of nationalism, but a condition for identity.
That is not to suggest that the demonization of O ther is not typical in 
nationalist narratives. On the contrary, romantic nationalist histories are often
Religion and National Identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Cultures 219
Nikos Chiysoloras Department of Government, LSE
based on the supposition of a golden era (Ancient Greece a n d / or Byzantium 
for M odem  Greek nationalism.). During this imaginary period, which we can 
call "original state", the nation was prosperous and happy. However, this 
original state of innocence was destroyed by an evil "O ther", someone who 
deprived the nation of its blessings. Nationalist propagandas are based on the 
assumption that the desire of each generation is to try and recover this loss. 
The evil "O ther" differs in varying historical circumstances. It may be a 
foreign occupation, the Jews who "always plot to rule the world", some dark 
powers and their local sympathizers "who want to enslave our proud 
nation", the immigrants "w ho steal our jobs", etc. The enemy may be 
different, but the logic is usually the same. The source of all evil for our 
community is someone out there. Someone who is using all his powers to 
prevent our nation from realizing its potential; from fulfilling its destiny.
In the meantime, national solidarity is maintained through the 
ritualization of practices (celebrations, festivals, consumption rituals, etc.), as 
well as through the reproduction of the abovementioned m yth of national 
destiny in official and unofficial public discourse. Needless to say, the lost 
golden era and the possibility of a return to this era is a chimera. However, 
the existence of this fantasy fosters the solidarity of the community, and 
consolidates national identity. Thus, nationalisms are always based on claims 
of cultural and communal solidarity. They are produced through complex 
social and political processes premised on the activation of social and cultural 
relationships and emotional attachments. In short, nationalism cannot be 
reduced to rational self-interested motivations, economic conditions, and 
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institutional dynamics. As important as the aforementioned factors may be, 
the play of identifications should be at the heart of any effort to study group 
actions and hum an agency in nationalist movements.
In this dissertation, I have tried to investigate the relationship between 
nationalism and the politicization of religion in Greece and Cyprus. To use 
Durkheim 's terminology, both Orthodoxy and nationalism are discourses 
directed towards the building of 'ethical communities'. They are sources of 
transcendental meaning which bind together the members of a particular 
community and, as such, they have an enormous effect on individual souls. In 
a world characterized by the immanent presence of risk (in the form of 
natural and social hazards and contingencies) and under the Damoclean 
sword of eventual death, peoples and cultures, historical and contemporary, 
have been struggling to attribute a 'larger than life' meaning in their lives. The 
Christian Paradise, the nations' supposed millenarian 'destiny', or the 
communist society are examples of such utopias. Indeed, nationalism has 
been perceived as a substitute for religion: people still seek compensation for 
their lack of personal future "in the reflected glory of the nation's collective 
future".258 In the cases of Greece and Cyprus, Orthodoxy combined the 
utopian forces of religion and nationalism in a very durable fusion. In a social 
context where the utopias of the Enlightenment (progress, the 'invisible hand' 
of the market, reason) seem to betray expectations, the psychological power of 
a national religion is undoubtedly gaining ground.
258 J. Stoessinger, 1991. "The anatomy of the Nation-State and the nature of Power", in R. 
Little & M. Smith (eds.), Perspectives on World Politics, (London: Routledge), p.25
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In an interview to the author of this thesis, author and literary editor 
Stavros Zoumboulakis argued that the Church's conservative renovation and 
its appeal to the people are identitarian phenomena259, independent of 
religious beliefs, and cannot be explained on (de)secularization grounds. 
However, this explanation assigns an essentialist meaning to Orthodoxy, 
based on the metaphysics of the Christian dogma, and disregards the fact that 
Christian religious movements around the world have usually grown to 
dominate the public sphere irrespectively of the 'essence of the Gospel'. 
Religion has always been a facet of individual and collective identity, while 
the purpose of this thesis was to explain how a particular religion became the 
ground upon which a particular type of national identity was based.
Assuming that the foregoing theoretical analysis is convincing, how 
could it be applied in another case study? Although providing exact 
blueprints is beyond the scope and the philosophy of this dissertation, on the 
basis of the argument advanced here our initial engagement with a particular 
"case study" should start by examining the conditions that facilitated the 
birth of nationalism in a country. Here, Anthony Smith's emphasis on "the 
crisis of legitimation" in pre-modern societies and the existence of "ethnic" 
cultural material in the referent populations which later formed nations is 
instrumental for starting to understand when and why nationalisms took 
specific forms in specific communities. Subsequently, discourse theory can be 
used to analyze and elucidate the semiotic/rhetorical structure of nationalist 
discourses and the practices that perpetuate them, above and beyond
259 The exact expression that he used in Greek was "xauTOTiKd Kivfipcrca".
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moralistic oversimplifications about "bad" and "good" nationalisms. Our 
contention here was that nationalism necessarily entails inclusion and 
exclusion, or, to put it more poetically, love and hate. Denial of the violent 
face of national identifications serves only to repress the discussion around 
the issue w ithout eradicating its effects. Surely nations are not eternal, but no 
change -  in a post-national or other direction -  can take place w ithout a valid 
alternative.
VI.III. Epilogue
According to the logic of which was adopted here, the people who constitute 
a certain nation may incorporate certain common elements (phenotypes, 
geography, language, religion, etc), but a nation is not the aggregate of these 
common characteristics. It involves a certain degree of self-identification w ith 
the 'imagined community' of the nation. This assertion may have led the 
author to a subjective definition of nationhood, but, unlike what many 
theorists of nationalism believe, subjective definitions need not necessarily be 
voluntaristic. It became clear in this dissertation that the nationalization of the 
masses in Greece and Cyprus was the result of the exercise of power and is 
always dependent on the existence of specific power configurations. We 
argued that the forces of Europeanization, liberalization, and globalization do 
not automatically weaken the effects of nationalism. We also concluded that 
nationalist identifications presuppose the existence of a 'constitutive outsider', 
an enemy whom we hate in order to love ourselves. Finally, we contended 
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that Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms are cultural nationalisms. The 
only m ethod by which we could dilute the effects of the exclusionary nature 
of Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms is to face the empirical 
realities that surround these phenomena. Denying the Janus faced nature of 
Greek and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms, and suppressing the discussion 
around their 'dark side' will only perpetuate the violence that has 
accompanied these nations since their birth.
We would suggest that the discussion regarding Greek and Greek- 
Cypriot nationalisms is in need of further development towards three 
directions: firstly, definitive conclusions regarding the influence of Orthodoxy 
in fostering Greek nationalism will be extracted if there is further research on 
the national identity of the Greek Diasporas. Secondly, the conclusions from 
this study will be further scrutinized through comparative studies between 
Greece and other Orthodox and non-Orthodox counties. Thirdly, the 
theoretical framework used here may be further developed through its 
application to other case-studies of nationalist movements. In this way, our 
understanding of the 'God of modernity' will be enhanced. In short, the study 
of nationalism should emphasize the workings of the processes of 
identification in comparative and empirical perspective.
We will not risk raising any more theoretical issues in this dissertation. 
Before finishing, we should admit that the possible routes to transcend from 
an often racist cultural nationalism to a more tolerant conception of Greek 
national identity were not investigated in this thesis. Even the most 
superficial examination of Modern Greek and Greek-Cypriot societies will 
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reveal that there is no room for cultural and social pluralism in a 'Greece (or 
Cyprus) of Greek Orthodox Christians'. However, studying the roots of a 
phenomenon is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition in order to 
understand it and possibly uproot it.
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Table 1: Chronology of Important Events in the History of Cyprus. This table is a 
schematic review of Cypriot history. It aims to illustrate the basic events that contributed 
to the cultural, economic, and political formation of Cyprus. Sources: Paschalis 
Kitromilides & Marios Evriviades, Cyprus, (Clio Press, Oxford: 1990); personal research; 
bibliography of the thesis.
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1959
1963
1964-1967
1967
1974
1977-
2004
London-Zurich Agreements: Cyprus becomes
independent. Archbishop Makarios is elected as president 
of the new republic
President Makarios proposes 13 amendments to the 
constitution, which aim at limiting the privileges of the 
Turkish-Cypriot minority. First intercommunal conflicts. 
UN and other diplomatic attempts for a peace settlement 
reach to a stalemate. Turkey threatens with invasion 
Military coup in Greece. Greek army is w ithdrawn from 
Cyprus after a Turkish ultimatum
Coup against president Makarios. Turkish invasion of the 
Northern part of Cyprus.
Repeated failed attempts for re-unification 
Cyprus becomes a member of the European Union. Greek- 
Cypriots reject yet another UN peace plan for 
reunification
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Table 2: This table only focuses on moments of history related to the study of this thesis; 
namely moments in history relevant for the study of Greek Helleno-Christian nationalism. 
References to ancient Greece are only mentioned since they are a point of reference for 
Modern Greek nationalists. Sources: bibliography of this thesis; personal research.
II. Chronology of Important Events: GreeceO J  r
7th Century BC Appearance of the first texts in the Greek language:
5th Century BC 
333 BC
146 BC 
1st Century 
323
1064
1254
1453
1821
1829
1833
Homer's Iliad and Odyssey 
The peak of Ancient Greek civilization 
All the Ancient Greek city-states apart from Sparta join 
Alexander the Great in his campaign 
Roman rule over Ancient Greek city-states 
The New Testament is written in Greek 
Division of the Roman Empire into a Latin-speaking 
Western Roman Empire and an increasingly Greek­
speaking Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium)
A Permanent Schism arises in the Christian Church
between Catholic West and Orthodox East
The Crusaders invade Constantinople
Fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks
Outbreak of a Revolution against the Ottomans in the
Balkans. It only survives in Greece
Greece becomes an independent state
With a royal decree, the Greek Church becomes
autocephalous of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the
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1838
1848
1852
1912-13
1917
1922
1940
1941-44
1945-49
1950-1967
1967-1974
state assumes control of its Synod 
Foundation of the University of Athens. Its history and 
theology departments play a seminal role in advancing 
Helleno-Christian nationalism.
Publication of Paparrigopoulos' "History of the Greek 
Nation", the epitome of m odern Greek nationalism 
The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognizes the 
autocephaly of the Greek Orthodox Church 
Balkan Wars. Greece makes significant territorial 
annexations
Greece joins the Allies in the 1st W orld War
Greece looses the war with Turkey together with most
of its territorial gains from the 1st World War. A
massive exchange of populations makes the country
religiously homogenous. Irredentism does not survive
as a mainstream political doctrine
Greece joins the Allies as it is being attacked by Italy
Greece under German occupation
Civil War between communists and nationalists. The
latter emerge victorious
Post-War Economic development w ithin a climate of 
political instability and anti-communism 
Military dictatorship. "Homeland, Religion, Family" 
become the ideological doctrine of the dictators. The
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1974
1981-1989
1998
2000
Church remains mute, and even collaborates. 
Restoration of democracy. Abolition of monarchy. The 
Church retains its privileges under the new 
constitution
Socialist government in office. Introduction of civil 
wedding and civil divorce., adultery is decriminalized, 
first attempts for partial separation between Church 
and state and settlement of the Church property issue 
Enthronement of Archbishop Christodoulos 
Identity Cards Crisis. Direct Confrontation between 
Church and state.
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III. Schematic Representation of Dependent and Independent 
Variables
Helleno-Christian Nationalism (dependent 
variable)
'/  T  ^
Orthodoxy was a 
demotic pre-modern 
cultural resource with 
people could identify 
during the formation of 
Greek and Greek 
Cypriot Nationalisms 
(independent variable)
Institutional Position of 
Orthodoxy in the Greek 
and Cypriot States 
together with a tradition 
of active political 
involvement in the 
Ottoman 
State(independent
Conversion of the 
Church to the values of 
Greek and Cypriot 
Nationalisms- 
nationalization of the 
Church (independent 
variable)
"W variaoie)
We define as Helleno-Christian nationalism the ideological schema that links ancient 
Greek cultural heritage with Orthodox Christianity and presents Greek and Greek-Cypriot 
national identities as inseparably linked with Orthodoxy. The independent variables 
which are used to explain this form of nationalism are the following: i) in both Greece and 
Cyprus, Orthodoxy was the primary pre-modern cultural reference of Greek-speaking 
populations; ii) in the Ottoman epoch, the Orthodox Church enjoyed a great number of 
political privileges and had considerable political power. This tradition continued with the 
establishment of the Greek and Cypriot states. The justification upon which the political 
authority of the Church in the two modern states was based, is to be found in the first 
independent variable; iii) once Orthodoxy attained a seminal position in the Greek and 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism, the Church converted into the latter's values. It used its 
political and cultural powers to perpetuate this link. Hence the three independent 
variables which are used to explain the subject matter of the thesis are interdependent.
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V. Legal Documents (The Original Greek Texts)
i) Article 3 of the current Greek Constitution (Following the 2001 Revision)
1. EniKparoboa Oprjoxeia oxrjv EXXaSa eivai rj Oprjoxeia xrj9 AvaroXixrj^ 
Op0oSo§r|<s ExxXr(oia<5 t o d  Xpicrcob. H Op0o5o§r| ExxXrjoia xrj9 EAXaSa ,^ non 
yvopi^ei x£(paXf| xrj9 t o v  Kupio r|jitiv Irjoou Xpicrco, unapxei avanoonaaxa 
e v g d jie v t) Soyjiaxixd pe t t j  MEyaXrj ExxXrjoia xrj9 KoovaiavrtvounoXri^ xai j ie  
xa0e aXXrj op66o§rj ExxXrjoia t o d  Xpiarou? xrjpei anapaoaXEUxa, on©9 
£X£ive^ , TOu<; i£poi>5 anoaroXixou9 xai oovoSixob^ xavov£<s xai T19 i£p&; 
napadooEi^. Eivai auxoxecpaXrj, 6ioix£ixai ano xrjv Iepa ZbvoSo tg o v  £v 
£V£py£ia Apxiepeov xai ano xr| Aiapxrj kpa ZbvoSo nou npoEpxexai ano 
auxfj xai aoyxpoxEixai on©9 opi^Ei o Kaxaoxaxixo^ Xdpxrj^ xij9 ExxXrjoia^, p£ 
xfjpr|or| xcov Siaxa^Eoov x o d  Elaxpiapxixob Topou xrj9 x0' (29) IoovioD 1850 xai 
xrj9 ZDvo5ixrj9 npa§r|9 xrj9 4rj9 Z£nx£pPpioo 1928.
2. To ExxXrjoiaaxixo xa0£oxd)9 non unapxEi o£ opiapevE^ nEpiox&S xou 
Kpaxous 6e v  avxixEixai 0x19 5iaxa§£i9 xrj9 nporjyobp£vr|9 napaypacpou.
3. To x£ip£vo xrj9 Ayia9 rpa(pfj9 xrjpEixai avaXXolcoxo. H Enioriprj pExacppaorj 
xou OE aXXo yXoooixo xuno anayopEDExai x°°pi9 Trlv eyKpiorj xrj9 
Auxox£cpaXr|9 ExxXrjoia9 xrj9 EXXa8a9 xai xr|9 M£yaXr|9 xou Xpiarou 
ExxXr|oia9 axrjv Kcd voxavTivounoXrj.
Source: Hellenic Parliament
[Translation: 1. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ The 
Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in 
doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the 
same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred 
traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the 
Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the 
Church in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29,1850 and the Synodal Act 
of September 4, 1928. 2. The ecclesiastical regime existing in certain districts of the State shall not be 
deemed contrary to the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 3. The text of the Holy Scripture shall be 
maintained unaltered. Official translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior 
sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople, is 
prohibited.]
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ii) The First Article of the "Constitution of Epidaurus" (npoocopivov 
IloXiTEopa xr)£ EWaSo^), which was adopted on January 1,1822
EN O NOMAT I THE AT1AE 
KAI
AAIAIPETOY TPIAAOE
T6 £)./.Kjvixiv cQvoc, tA AjtA qppiy_A&r) ABuuavuc^v 4t»vaflr*t'lxv, jx-J) St*vx[isv&v vat 
•piffi w v Pocpi>MT<>v xai tfotxpxJetYjiaTtoTev (uyiu t?(c Tvpxwiac xai xxwreioav xutAv 
[ it  pt-j'dO.a? Oocnxc, xijpuTTti avjuxpov 8 i i  w /  vo|xl[twv rrapxcraT M v t w , e ? ; ’EOvtxrjv 
c ru w jY f tiv ti iv  X u v & c j o i v ,  t v t 's m o v  0 e « J  x * l  a v B p ( 't~ M v  t ^ v  t t o X i t i x t j v  a u T a u  
C -  a p £ i v x a i  a v £ < ; a p ? 7 ) < T i a v .
’Ev ’ErriSxuptd -rrjv a' ’Jxvovapiw £r« ,x»x£’ xai <t -rij? ‘AvrSjapvr/itx;
IIPOSUPINON HOAITEYMA THS EAAAAOE 
T I T A O S  A'
TMJI.MA A'
H s p l  0 ? 7 , « x t » * ;
a '.  'II cnxpxTOVff* Optrjaxe:* tic  ty.v {XXipixr.v traxpxTtixv tuvxi r, ’Avxtc* 
Xwr,; *OpG«$6v>v tr,Z Xpiarc.'j ’Exx)^irf*<‘ a v t/r ra i €jmz ^ Atoixujcriq -rijc 'EXXxSo? 
xxaav 4>./.rtv Bpr,axtiav xai xl T t/xral xm up^apaYtm ixxcrr,; xOtwv exTtXcCvrav 4xw-
TMHMA B'
fT cpl T W V V t V t X (o V H I X X ■. <-> [i. X t  <*1 V
t m v  x a r o i x M V  i j t t x p a r e l a c  t i; s ’E X X a 4 a s
*1’. ”0<j6t avtri/fltivtc vA-rotxai -7% ixtxpa-tla:; rr,; ‘KX>.aRt,? mtiTewjatv ei; Xpt- 
rrtiv, tialv "EXXijve; xai arro/apt^xvcjijtv, Sveu Ttvit itx^cpae. oXwv ?<uv tsc/.itucwv 4t- 
xattiiuiftov.
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Source: The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832
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iii) The First Articles of the Constitution adopted by the Second National 
Assembly (Law of Epidaurus), in the Spring of 1823
EN ONOMATI THE ATLAS 
KAI
AAIA1PETOY TP LA AO £
T& tX/.ijvixiiv fOv&e, t Jjv fp x u S i; iOtopiavix^v 4uva<»Tciav, ur; t d v i p « v  v i
<P«Pf, tov ^otfujTa-tov xai anapa5eiy(u«T«rrov $/yiv rrji; Tupawlac xai aTroutloav «j-rov pic 
l*ey«>,a? Oy<t(a<, xijpurrsi ar,ptepov 8ta ciov uojiluuv xapaoraTwv too, sip ’EBvtxf^ cw/ij- 
Tjiivwv EovcXsvtuv, cvuTttov 0cov  xai av8p<i^tiiv tv; v x o Xctixtjv  « 6 t o C C s a p ^ tv  
x a i  d v c ^ a p - r q a t a v .
’Ev ’E)tt8zup<j> Tjj *' ’lavGuaptoo ,awy. '^ xai a ' if,; 'Avrvtp-rr.ol*;
IU’OSQPINON nOAITETMA THE EAAAAOS
T M H M A  A'
KEGAAAION A' 
llcpl Op^axtEx;
' H CTTixpaTouua Opr,axt'% cl< rr(v iAAYjvtx^v cntxpaTciav eivai if; -?5fc *Av«tgXi- 
X7j; 'OpOo^i^ou ToC X'picTcu ’ExxAv.aiav avfr/CTat, lyjue. r, Aioixrjoi' t t ,;  *EXJ.d8c>< r.i- 
oav S>./.TjM OpTjfrxtiav x a i at TcXxTai xai Itptittpa^lat exaarj]; aurtjv ixTttaOvTai axw).v-
T MI 1 MA B‘
KE*AAAION B'
n  C f  i T b> V S  O X l T I X & V 8 u i l U ) t a T H V  
Twy 'EXX^vbtv
"OffW aux^x^V't; xaTotxoi t rfi imxpartia; -rq; 'E»a8o^ nifftriooai*/ cl? Xpi- 
<rzff/t ciaiv "F.XTrpss xai aTi<i>.a^pivouciv, 4vcj ?iv4; 8ia<p&p5?, fiXtov twv ttoXitixwv 8ixaiw-
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iii) The First Articles of the "Constitution of Troezen", adopted in June 1827
nOAITIKON SYNTAfMA THS E AAA AOS
EN 0 NOMAT I THE ATIAE 
KAI
AAIAIPETOY TPIAAOE
Kal TptTov -JjSt; iXAijvcxAv el? 'EOvixijv EuuiXrjotv (mvaypivov, xr,puTTCi
5’. i  twv vopipwv rXTjpe^oucrlwv ~w cvurriav ©too x«l «vOp«uKti>v riyv rroXinxi)* otvxou 
‘j7T«j>^ iv x*i A«5*pTr(8lav x*l wsTottvti To? Otp^XitiScu: d p /i?  tov  IIoXtTeyjjio-ri; -roti:
K E A A A I 0  N A'
II e p I O p i j f f x s l a ;
1. KaO st; i k  fljv 'KXXdSx dxayviXXsxai r^ v  Opjjoxslxv x w  e/avOepcu? x* l Sid r5)v 
X«Tpe(*v *urr,? Xar;i Grrtpdinticnv >j Si rr(;  ‘AvaxoXtxtj; ‘OpOo&A^oo ‘Ev.xAr/jlat? 
tow XpicrcG, elvxv Opr/ov.el* rrfi fntxpxTtiai;.
K E O A A A I O N  B'
H  t  p 1 ? 5 j ?  C X >. T( V l x f( ? t T l X p K T C i e ?
2 . ' I I  fXX^vtxi) in ix p i- r c ia  eTvau pit* x x l d S w lp c m c.
3. EoyxEitat ano cx ep ^ x ?
4. ‘Erapxuu t?)? 'EXXaSo? el>m &o*i £Xa{iov xai 04 XafSwai t*  orrXa xa-ri Trt? S6cj- 
jiavixfj? Suvousxcix?.
K E O A A A I O N  r  
A 15 p. 6 c  t o v S I x  a  i o v t u v  ' E l X l j v u v
5. *H xvpiapxt* ivi>x«pxct ck  tS 46vo?- n itra  el-o’jffwc nrtya£ei ccvtoG xai vitapxct 
6ntp aGrou.
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652 APXEIA THS EAAHNIKHS llAAHTENEEIAE
6 . *E>.Xr(ve; elvai:
a '.  *0(101 airdyOovi; eiAijvtv.r,; tn x p sT tla ; itiareuooffiv e l; XpiaToV
"Osoi Toi? 6:f4 tov iOw^tavLxov s’-'Y^ vi wktwogvtc;  cl; Xpiardv, TjAOav 
x a i Oi D-Owoiv c l; r^v i » r (vtx'i}v eTrixs*T£ixv, 8 i i  v i  auvavcor.aOoKJiv ^ v i  xaTouef(c<ocw
c l; a-j-njv
y \  * 0001  e i; !^£va; cmxpaTela; clvai yew7;j*ivot i.nb Trxtipa "EU.ijvar 
S'. "Oooi avToyOov*; xai [ill,, x a i oi toAtwv inkyow, xoX'.-roypayj^ivTe; el; 
£dv*4 craxpaccta; itpo r?,; Jrjftoattdireu*; tou irapdvro; EuvrayixxTo;, fXOtoosv c l; rr(v 
i)J.ijv.KT)v ercrxpKTSuxv x a i, ipxicO iL si. t&v £X>,tjvix4v Spxov 
t .  *0 oot JUvoi UxOoxrt x a i jtoXtToypwpjjO&mv.
7. ”0>.ot oi “Ettajve; clvat teai dvwxtov ?wv vdjztov.
8. "O lo i oi "EXXyjvc; clvat ScxtoC, cxasrroc x a r i  t I  (xirpov ty); rspoewrctxyj; tou 
a£(a;, c l; o>.a -ri Snjuidcjta iraYvtXuurrx, xcX m xi xai oTpaTUorsxi.
To SixaUupa t t , ;  avrmpocrMitgla; xai nX^pc^ouo^njTo; Oi xavovtoOfj el; xov rrcpi 
ix>/»y^; vAuov, 4 irrolo; Oi 4~iSioc9<oOf; xai 5Tr;ptooieoftjj aao t }jv BouXr^v.
9. "Oooi £lvot £XOwoi v i  xaxotv-rjaojau rt v i  -rrapoudjownv e l; "rijv fcXJ.rjvixrjv irrt- 
xpixciav, cTvxt tcoi dviomov twv xoXtTtxwv v6|cttv.
10. A l eurrp i^ei; Stavfpiovrxv ei; {Xou; to o ; xxt&Ixou; rffi imxpxTeta; Sixatot; 
xai ivxXoyo; t t , ;  rnpiowola; exacTov xapqxLa St clorcpa^i; Siv ylvcTat, ytopl; xpocxSopC- 
v&v vdptov xai xxvcl; vdjxo; rcpi rtarrpaljtto; 8iv ex&lScTai, elpitj 8t* Iv xai jiovov fro ;.
11. '0  vdfio; 4e9*>.iC« t?)v jtpoowuxYjv ixaorou cXeuOcptav xavsi; 84v -fjpixopct 
v i  dvayOf, 9j ipixXaxtoOf,, etjtt) x a r i  too ; vopixoi; -runoy;.
12. 'H  1) Tijjir, x a i tk xTvjuaTa ixxtrrou, £vt4; rlj; dxixpareta; eoptoxouevov, 
eTvxt o?r4 t Jjv Ttpoaraalav t£>v vopiuv.
13. K appla  Xijcrayr, xepi c;ct3uje«; xai <rj>XV|ytoi; orrotovSr,—ore -pooojrrwv xai 
TtpaYjii-rtav 8iv TjpL^opti v i  cx8o9fj, y,wpk v i  anjplCerai ei; Lxavi Sclypata xai v* xept- 
YpioTi t4v TiTtov rffi i^eciceco; xai Ta npdcwm  xai xpa-ftiaTa, -ra dxoTa x p irc i v i  <n»>- 
XvjyOwoiv.
14. E l ;  SXac c i ;  iyxXijputTixi; SiaSixaala; cxaoro; £yct t4 8ixalo>((a v i  ^T fj t}^ 
at-rlav xai oitoiv ttj;  c l; »’!tciv TrpoaayOctor,; xarYjyopta;, v i  i ’/Tc^cTiCcrai -opi; tov;  
xarijydpov; xai toj;  p ip  Tops;, v i irapovoia!^ papTopla; urrip iavroo, v i  Xxppiv^ c l; 
SovjOeiav tov cvp?o'iX(i'j; xai v i  Tayewtv axdyaunv and t4 iixacr^ptov.
15. "ExaoTo;, rrpi tt, ;  x*T«?lx7j; tou, 3tv Xoyt^tTat tvo^o;.
16. Kavcl; 8ev xplverat 81; Si’ £v xa i to  avro ajxap'njp.a x a i Slv xaTa8(xi*ETat, 
o i8 i  “ poawpivci; aTcpdTai r i  XT^^iara too , X«?v; :cpor,yovj«v>jv 8:x8ixaai«v. Tlaaa 8 i  
uxoOeai;, arra; ipiaTiv.S; XixaflOctaa, Siv ivotOewpctTa'..
17. *H Kopdpvr.ci; ^pixopet v* dnaiT^oa xrp Ouoiav Ttuv xrijfii-rosv tw o ; 8 ii 8t;(*d- 
oiov {ycJ.o;, anoyp<ivTa>; axoSeSciypivov, c U i  Six xpoijyoujiivrj; i ro ^ rfptwoeu;.
18. Al piaavoi xai a l Sijpicvcfei; ircxyoptuovrat.
19. *0 v4p,o; 8cv Yjjixopct v i £'/*i iKiaOr/cpytv 84v«piw.
20. Ot "EW.vivs; l/yjoi t4  Sixxiwpia v i cvaratvoai xaTaaT^pwrr* tmwt4; cu8oo;; 
maScla;, ptXavepwrtx;, S tour^avla; xr.i rtyvoiv, xai v i  ixXiyuat 8j8aoxaXov; 8 ii  tJjv 
cx~al8cvalv tw ;.
Source: The Archives of the Greek National Awakening, 1821-1832
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IVZ suntjK'j pn}jfO£ pup yaajp) aqj ui iQyuapi jpuoijp^ tpup uoffpr#
Sin ADiAliiiocterili aIh didm Sprigrdo o aooioho a o i  ^Iuqdi ADioogommg 
aIuod aIh Sts A©A3rii3xona 3113 orlApg piciD 01 Si3 3i )3 acdiao>iLiad 
id* ADi3>iDlidg aIuod aIll A©iApa3£|o3dn 'codnn^ A3 AoiAao>noiDX SogliAao 
Aonooodn Dgprio i3AiDrilio «5prlo lDiua3>iolidg» ©djpdAodDn lioaodon III Ag
•ADiODmgoig AliA3rilidi3odn aIll Aodlu IixLiad da pikiQiira aIi Si3 'DilupAio:* 
aIll Sro>nrloiD li§3yui3 da /5ogprto Slu SliAoym3 SLii SliXogoiiD So3otiAdD 
Sin SDiAlirlod3rili SIll 911D SpAliri 5oia3 "iDigoiD^g Dgprio ALmiassiolidg 
AlnpDioi S13 ao>iIiad 5du "aorigadD aoA3rtaoiiDiiD ao i DdsioAryo 
idat3 SLllcld Lryprl d i  119 ©Apy ©1 ins 'InsregoiiD IiaiA A3g 'Sogprio Sli>rua3>iolidg 
pna lxA3iioA3A li 'UAoyms li asocpimdsn li A3 "up ©dumdsn iDipo^j
•aoiciD Sprio li oiD§3y3U3
aIi "SoilupAiON Slu Aodocbpig DilupAiox i3A3ym3 "SosoasyjAa^ SLdqioaio^j 
SLomrdaoi Slu m x SlmAliyy3 5lu  Saodg3od]j Saoi S13 idn "SDUDdxoriliv 
Slu Aoytryypna Aoigprldo a o i Si3 aoiciD Sogprio Slu SliAoyui3 Slu SDiAliriod3rili 
Slu 911D SpAlirl S91A3 SliA3rloyyD^)ona goiciD S©30©ylig ao(bpdAonaA3 /ig 
319110 "SLucid AlxAoyura Sogprio Slu S©30pd>oiiD Ampiox aIu Sodn Lgocbdoririao 
lirl da iDiaoTDMig Dgprio Almiasixolidg aIuodioi Si3 aoxIiad SDUDdxoriliy 
Slu Slmyon Son up  SoApADM aoi aoA3riaodlu 'oiAD^yms aIi 'SoilupAioN Slu 
liy3ri TDiAQodo930 liAoyins Iuodioi lu  m3 idn Somgorio DilupAioM Atonxdaoi 
aIu li lDnAliyy3 aIu roaoApyms Dgprio Ali>rua3>iolidg S13 AioaoxliAD Sorlp Aoop 
/bg 'SoiDriApiAa^ a o i SogXoi Slu S©3$dpA3 Slu SDiAliriodsrili Slu puo AOAliri 
AOidi SDrrio30odu S91A3 diIuoaion Alumidaoi aIu li AlmAliyys aIu SoxirioiD 
AioaoA^yms 'aodgdp SoiApdou ao i aodbpdAodon Sod3ia3g Slu li Sluodn  
Slu Sis^piDig Sdi S13 10 A3 rip ad rloyidsn lirl SDiiDdNoriliy Slu iDiiyojj '£
•ioAD03riD©ri tdai3 li Aosoogodon  
Aoxuouryon Aoxrxdaoi a o i  toaoXnsti li AlmMdaoi aIu AooooyA 
Almdiliri So AioaoXs myi SIiAoAdidx SlixDidaoi idau  Ssauio "SouDd^oriliv 
Slu lDiiyon 10 S3iADiip AiopoysioiiD diIuoaiox AlDtixdaoi Alig •£
•ADjotnpoig Ao^ogogdo AlunAliyyg aIu  Si3 AioaoxliAD li Aosopgodon  
A oxuom yon A©xiAliyy3 aoi roaoXnsri li AlDnAliyy3 aIu  AooooyA 
Almdiliri So AioaoX? idm SIiAoAdid>i SlmAliyys idais Ssauio "SDiiDdMorlliv 
Slu iDiryon ro S3iadhd Aioaoy3ioiiD d iIuoaiom AlDnALryy3 aIij^
:SoiDrLApiAa2 SoiApdon ao i Saono>io Saoi div
Z NO J0 JV
■iDi3^rdo uorlApiAag uAodoii 01 A3 So 'aodna^ Slu SoiIuoaion S lm xdaoi 
Slu id>i SLDiiAliyy3 Slu oua SoXioiduad ioA3rlpA3y>i3 "SoMdaox Sodg3pdnuAy 
o id>i Aliyyg, ida}3 Sodgsodjg o Soiono Slu "SoiDriluoao aoxidg3odn 
"DUDd^oriliv SoXdoadax idm Soiludp§3AD idai3 D uuyou  luiDidna^ jg
I NOd0 dV
snidA^ jo uoijnji;suo3  ag; jo sap ifjy  o m j  ;sug agj, ( a i
3TT l}usuiuuaaof) fo iusiuupcJbq svMfosiCtqp) soyi\r
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evcip§eoD9 irj9 10x^09 tod ZDvdypaTC>9 uneppaivEi 1009 x ^ 0D9' £? gw 
todXcixiotov nevrciKOOioi xaT£arr|oav Dnrjxooi Trj9 ArjpoKparia9 Kara ttiv 
£ipr[]i£vr|v r||i£poprjviav.
4. IIa9 60x19 an oxia  xr|v Dnr|Ko6Tr|Ta ttj9 Ar|poxpaTia9 £19 x P °v o v  
|i£Tay£V£OT£pov tt |9 napo8oD Tpicbv prjvcbv and ir|9 r(p£po]ir|via9 irj9 
£vdp?£G)9 tt |9 10x1309 tod ZDVTdypaT09 aoxd  to  £v tt| TpiTrj napaypd9(D tod  
napovro9 ap0poD opi^opEvo Sixaiopa EniXoyf]9 evto9 npo0£opia9 Tpicbv 
prjvcbv ano tt|9 rj]i£pojir|via9/ xa0' r|v an£xrr|0£ tt|v DnrjKOOTTjTa.
5. TXXqv f) TODpK09 no\iTT|9 tt|9 Ar|poxpaTia9 Dnox£iji£vo9 £19 Ta9 8iard^£i9 
ttj9 npcbTT|9 r| tt|9 6£DT£pa9 napaypa90D tod napovro9 ap0poD, SixaiodTai va  
naDorj avf)Kcov E19 ttjv xoivdTrjTa, r|9 Eivai PEX09 Kai va  £niX£§r| tt|v £T£pav 
KOivoTrjTa:
(a) £ni tt| DnopoXrj EVDnoypa90D 5r)Xcbo£G)9 n£pi tt|9 £ni0Dpia9 odtod, 6n©9 
ji£TapaXr| xoivoTr)Ta, £19 tov appoSiov DndXXqXov ttj9 Ar|poxpaTia9 xa i TOD9 
npo£8poD9 ttj9 £XXr|viKf)9 xa i n]9 TODpxixf|9 KoivoTixf|9 Zdv£X£DO£©9 xai
(P) £ni tt) anoSoxii ttj9 SrjXcboEG^  odtod Dnd tt|9 KoivoTixf|9 ZdveXedo£G)9 tt|9 
xoiv6tt|to9, E19 rjv 5r|Xoi dn  £m0oji£i va avf]xr|.
6. OiovSrjnoTE npoooonov r] oia6f|noT£ 0pr|OX£Dnxr) 0)109 0£<Dpod)i£vr| 09  
avfjxoDoa eIte E19 tt|v £XXrjvixf|v eIte £19 ttjv TODpxixrjv xoivdTTjTa, QDjicpcbvo9 
npo9 Ta9 6iard§£i91119 TplTT|9 napaypacpoD tod napovro9 ap0poD, Sdvarai va  
nador) avf|xoDoa £19 trjv p iav tgov xoivott|tov xai va  0£CDpr)Tai 09 avf)xoDoa 
£19 tt)v ETEpav xoivdTTjTa:
(a) £ni tt| DnopoXf) EVDnoypacpoD £yypd900 Sr)X<ba£<x>9 n£pi tt|9 £m0o)iia9 11)9 
toiodtt|9 ji£TapoXr]9 Dno tod npoocbnoD r| Dnd tt)9 0pr|ox£OTixr]9 0)10809 £19 
tov appoSiov DnaXXr|Xov tt|9 Ar||ioxpaTia9 xai £19 TOD9 npo£SpoD9 tt|9 
£XXi)vixf|9 xa i t t |9 TODpxixf|9 Koivotixt|9 Zdv£X£do£g>9 xai
(p) £ni ttj anoSoxr] tt|9 8r|Xcbo£G)9 Dnd ttj9 Koivotixt|9 ZdveXedoegc^ tt|9 
xoivoTrjT09/ £19 r|v 8r|Xoi o ti £m0D)i£i va avr]xr|.
7. (a) H dnav8p09 yDvi) avrjxEi £19 tt|v xoivoTrpa tod ao^dyoD odtt|9.
(P) To app£v f| 0r|Xo dyapov texvov to pr) aupnXrjpcboav to  eixocttov npcbTov 
ET09 irj9 r]Xixia9 tod avr|X£i £19 ir)v xoivdir|Ta tod narpd9 aDTod, £ni 8e 
ayvcboroD narpo9 xai £9' ooov 6ev exei Dio0£TT|0rj, £19 tt|v  xoivoTrpa, £19 rjv 
avrjxEi rj pr)TT|p odtod.
[Translation: Article 1. The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a 
presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk elected by 
the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this 
Constitution provided. Article 2. For the purposes of this Constitution: 
(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and 
whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are 
members of the Greek-Orthodox Church; (2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of 
the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the
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Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; (3) citizens of the Republic who do not come 
within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article shall, within three months of the 
date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the 
Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a 
religious group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such 
Community: Provided that any citizen of the Republic who belongs to such a religious group 
may choose not to abide by the option of such group and by a written and signed declaration 
submitted within one month of the date of such option to the appropriate officer of the 
Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers opt to 
belong to the Community other than that to which such group shall be deemed to belong: 
Provided further that if an option of such religious group is not accepted on the ground that 
its members are below the requisite number any member of such group may within one 
month of the date of the refusal of acceptance of such option opt in the aforesaid manner as 
an individual to which Community he would like to belong. 
For the purposes of this paragraph a " religious group " means a group of persons ordinarily 
resident in Cyprus professing the same religion and either belonging to the same rite or being 
subject to the same jurisdiction thereof the number of whom, on the date of the coming into 
operation of this Constitution, exceeds one thousand out of which at least five hundred 
become on such date citizens of the Republic; (4) a person who becomes a citizen of the 
Republic at any time after three months of the date of the coming into operation of this 
Constitution shall exercise the option provided in paragraph(3) of this Article within three 
months of the date of his so becoming a citizen; (5) a Greek or a Turkish citizen of the 
Republic who comes within the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may cease to 
belong to the Community of which he is a member and belong to the other Community upon 
(a) a written and signed declaration by such citizen to the effect that he desires such change, 
submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents of the Greek and 
the Turkish Communal Chambers; (b) the approval of the Communal Chamber of such other 
Community; (6) any individual or any religious group deemed to belong to either the Greek 
or the Turkish Community under the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article may cease to 
belong to such Community and be deemed to belong to the other Community upon (a) a 
written and signed declaration by such individual or religious group to the effect that such 
change is desired, submitted to the appropriate officer of the Republic and to the Presidents 
of the Greek and the Turkish Communal Chambers; (b) the approval of the Communal 
Chamber of such other Community; (7) (a) a married woman shall belong to the Community 
to which her husband belongs, (b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is 
not married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father belongs, or, if the father 
is unknown and he or she has not been adopted, to the Community to which his or her 
mother belongs.]
Source: Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs -  Republic of Cyprus
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